Ordinarily, the Florida divorce, based only on constructive service, but obtained by her, would have been effective to terminate plaintiff wife's rights under the New York judgment of separation. ( MacKay v. MacKay, 279 App. Div. 350, but see dissenting opinion by Callahan, J.; Dube v. Dube, 230 App. Div. 494; Harris v. Harris, 197 App. Div. 646.) It appears that a different rule as to the time plaintiff's rights would be cut off obtains in the Second Department, but that difference is not material in this case. (See, e.g., Scheinwald v. Scheinwald, 231 App. Div. 757; Polk v. Polk, 277 App. Div. 885. ) However, the conduct of defendant husband in asserting on this motion the invalidity of the Florida judgment estops him from utilizing it to avoid his obligation under the New York judgment. A litigant may not seek affirmative relief on the basis of a judgment which he is simultaneously asserting is fraudulent and ineffective to affect his rights.