"[T]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." Police Commr. of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000), quoting from Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 344 (1964). General Laws c. 31, § 34, states in pertinent part: "Following his original appointment to a civil service position as a permanent full-time employee, a person shall actually perform the duties of such position on a full-time basis for a probationary period of [twelve months, as provided by G.L.c. 31, § 61,] before he shall be considered a full-time tenured employee" (emphasis supplied).
The policy of the statute is to ensure sufficient time for a careful determination whether they are present in sufficient degree.Police Commissioner of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 414, 727 N.E.2d 846, 848 (2000) (citing Leominster v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers Local 338, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 127, 596 N.E.2d 1032 (1992). In keeping with the policy of providing effective law enforcement to the public, the State Police Rules and statutes give the Colonel/ Superintendent the necessary discretion to make termination decisions during the critical first year of a trooper's enlistment. It is not for this court to judge the propriety of these decisions under a due process claim, as the termination process was procedurally sound as a matter of law.
We have recognized that "a statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute." Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521, 744 N.E.2d 39 (2001), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413, 727 N.E.2d 846 (2000). The listed disciplinary actions are of a common type, involving significant personnel decisions that will be upheld only if there is "just cause" for the disciplinary action.
Significantly, “cultivation” is not included among the categories not subject to repeal or modification by the enactment of § 32L. See Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521, 744 N.E.2d 39 (2001), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413, 727 N.E.2d 846 (2000) (“a statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute”). Although we held in Commonwealth v. Keefner, supra at 514, 961 N.E.2d 1083, that this list “cannot be construed as exhaustive,” we recognized also that the passage of § 32L may have limited the reach of § 32C( a ).
“[A] statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute.” Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521, 744 N.E.2d 39 (2001), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413, 727 N.E.2d 846 (2000). By creating specific exemptions in the simple possession statute, but not in the possession with intent to distribute statute, we conclude that the voters intended only to amend the simple possession statute and intended to exclude from the act's reach the separate and distinct crime of possession (of any amount of a controlled substance) with intent to distribute.
Any right Pino may have to a "name-clearing" hearing is "independent of his termination" and not at issue here. Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 416 (2000). Moreover, it appears MOSES raises this argument for the first time on appeal, as the judge did not address it in his original decision or his decision on the motion for reconsideration.
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Department of Telecomm. Energy, 435 Mass. 144, 151 (2001), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000). b. Timeliness of appeal.
Although "[t]he interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to substantial deference," Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 (1993), ultimately the "duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." Slater's Case, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 330 (2002), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000). See Walker's Case, 443 Mass. 157, 160-170 (2004).
However, we have often noted that "this principle is one of deference, not abdication," Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Health Care Fin. Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 91 (2002), quoting Protective Life Ins.Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 618 (1997), and that "[t]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts." Slater's Case, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 330 (2002), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000). See Walker's Case, 443 Mass. 157, 160-170 (2004) (reversing board's interpretation of 1981 amendment to G.L. c. 152 based on court's examination of legislative history and intent); Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, supra at 413-416 (vacating motion judge's acceptance of administrative agency's statutory interpretation as "not unreasonable," and adopting alternate interpretation).
Further, "a statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute." Commonwealth v. Russ R., 433 Mass. 515, 521 (2001), quoting Police Comm'r of Boston v. Cecil, 431 Mass. 410, 413 (2000). While the statute provides victims with various types of assistance in understanding and dealing with the criminal justice system, it does not confer on a victim status as a party or the right to file motions such as that at issue here.