Police Benevolent Association v. Brown

15 Citing cases

  1. Prime Home Properties v. Rockdale Bd.

    290 Ga. App. 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 13 times

    The proper method of proving such an ordinance is "by production of the original or of a properly certified copy." Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 SE2d 28) (1997). Parol evidence is generally insufficient to prove an ordinance.

  2. Whitfield v. City of Atlanta

    296 Ga. 641 (Ga. 2015)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming dismissal of claims against city as "right for any reason"

    Thus, pretermitting whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint against the City for failure to state a claim, we affirm the City's dismissal from the suit under the right for any reason rule. See Police Benevolent Assn. v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26(2), 486 S.E.2d 28 (1997) (judgment that is right for any reason will be affirmed). Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

  3. Thorsen v. Saber

    288 Ga. 18 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 13 times
    Declining to consider enumeration of error based on ordinance not appearing in the record

    [Cit.]Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 SE2d 28) (1997). "Because the record contains no proper proof of the [local noise] [o]rdinance, we cannot consider its language. . . . [Cit.

  4. Gerisch v. Meadows

    604 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. 2004)   Cited 9 times

    "The proper method of proving a city ordinance is by production of the original or of a properly certified copy. [Cit.]" Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 SE2d 28) (1997). The majority concedes that Gerisch's testimony cited in Division 1 constitutes evidence only as to the "conduct" which led to the initiation of the disorderly conduct charge against him. Majority opinion, p. 643.

  5. Union County v. CGP, Inc.

    277 Ga. 349 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that `Vested rights do not arise from the issuance of illegal building permits" because "[w]here a permit is issued by a governing body in violation of an ordinance, even under a mistake of fact, it is void"

    "[M]andamus is used to compel an official to perform a duty." Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 S.E.2d 28) (1997). Ordering Union County to issue the building permits CGP sought thus amounts to the grant of mandamus.

  6. Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston

    274 Ga. 520 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 15 times
    In Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston, 274 Ga. 520 (2002), the Georgia Supreme Court defined "zoning ordinances" as those which "`regulate by classifying property into separate districts.'"

    [Cits.]" Police Benevolent Assn. v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 S.E.2d 28) (1997). See also Childers v. Richmond County, 266 Ga. 276, 277 ( 467 S.E.2d 176) (1996); Hernandez v. Bd. of Commissioners, 242 Ga. 76, 77 ( 247 S.E.2d 870) (1978).

  7. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Croft

    746 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that when considering whether to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint, "the trial court is not required to adopt a party's legal conclusions based on those facts" (punctuation omitted)

    In fact, the letter from Glynn County does not state that the house has to be razed; it only states that the Crofts must submit plans that bring the house into compliance with new building requirements.Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27(2), 486 S.E.2d 28 (1997) (prior to January 1, 2013, proper method of proving an ordinance is “by production of the original or of a properly certified copy”) (citation omitted). Prime Home Properties v. Rockdale County Bd. of Health, 290 Ga.App. 698, 700(1), 660 S.E.2d 44 (2008).

  8. Smart v. State

    732 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Latimore v. City of Atlanta, 289 Ga.App. 85, 86(2), 656 S.E.2d 222 (2008). See also Police Benev. Ass'n. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27(2), 486 S.E.2d 28 (1997). The prosecutor introduced a certified copy of the IPMC and a certified copy of the ordinance by which the county adopted the IPMC as a part of the same exhibit—Exhibit 5—without objection from Smart.

  9. Stoker v. Severin

    292 Ga. App. 870 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 5 times

    Although we have determined that the trial court was required to grant Severin's traverse as to the amount claimed for health care and extracurricular activities expenses regardless of whether her affidavit was true, we affirm the judgment because the disposition of the case was correct. See Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 SE2d 28) (1997) ("Although [the principle relied upon by the appellate court] was not relied upon by the trial court, where the trial court is right for any reason, its judgment will be affirmed.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Because, the trial court was required to grant Severin's traverse to the extent of the amount claimed for periodic child support and for the amount claimed for health care and extracurricular activities expenses, nothing of the principal debt remains to be satisfied by Severin's garnished property, and the trial court did not err in releasing the funds and dismissing the case.

  10. City of St. Marys v. Fulford

    649 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., Ayers v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 543, 544-545 ( 224 SE2d 392) (1976) (trial court could decide case on the merits because municipal court judge recited applicable ordinance provision on record); Lemon v. Martin, 232 Ga. App. 579, 582 (1) ( 502 SE2d 273) (1998) (trial court may consider testimony and other materials to prove local regulations), rev'd on other grounds, Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120 ( 516 SE2d 66) (1999), disapproved in part, State v. Ponce, 279 Ga. 651, n. 1 ( 619 SE2d 682) (2005). Nevertheless, in order for the trial court to determine, as it did, that "Fulford has complied with the requirements of the zoning district and is entitled to have the request approved," the ordinances setting forth those requirements needed to be properly before it. See Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 27 (2) ( 486 SE2d 28) (1997) (trial court cannot order city manager to comply with the terms of an ordinance not properly before the court); Childers, 266 Ga. at 277 (trial court erred in ordering appellants to comply with the terms of ordinance not properly before the court); Monterey Community Council, 281 Ga. App. at 876 (trial court erred in relying on ordinance not properly in the record). We are therefore constrained to reverse.