Opinion
No. 5902
12-05-2012
CLINTON W. POLAND, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Mendel & Associates, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Shawn D. Traini, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and, Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.
Court of Appeals No. A-10925
Trial Court No. 3PA-10-1429 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND JUDGMENT
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer,
John Wolfe, Judge.
Appearances: Laurence Blakely, Mendel & Associates,
Anchorage, for the Appellant. Shawn D. Traini, Assistant
District Attorney, Palmer, and, Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger,
Judges.
COATS, Chief Judge.
A jury convicted Clinton W. Poland of misconduct involving weapons in the fourth degree. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the jury's verdict convicting him on this charge was inconsistent with its verdicts acquitting him of reckless endangerment and assault. Because sufficient evidence supports Poland's conviction and the verdicts are not inconsistent, we affirm his convictions.
The State charged Poland with assault in the fourth degree, misconduct involving weapons in the fourth degree, and four counts of reckless endangerment, alleging Poland was drunk and possessed a pistol, assaulted his wife, Chiquita Poland, and recklessly created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to their children who were in the home. The jury convicted Poland of misconduct involving a weapon in the fourth degree and acquitted him of assault in the fourth degree and four counts of reckless endangerment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, this court construes the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determines whether fair-minded jurors could conclude that the State met its burden of proving Poland's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Des Jardins v. State, 551 P.2d 181, 184 (Alaska 1976); Silvera v. State, 244 P.3d 1138, 1142 (Alaska App. 2010).
A person commits the crime of misconduct involving weapons in the fourth degree if he possesses a firearm while his "physical or mental condition is impaired [by] ... an intoxicating liquor." Poland claims the evidence is insufficient to show that he was impaired and that he possessed a firearm. Poland points out the State did not present any "tangible" evidence of his level of impairment, such as field sobriety tests, a blood test, or a breath test. But Poland interprets the evidence in the light most favorable to himself.
AS 11.61.210(a)(1).
Chiquita testified that Poland became "very, very drunk" while eating out that evening. She testified that when he possessed one of the pistols, he was "pretty drunk," and she described Poland as having significant mood swings and yelling and screaming right before she called 911. Trinity, their daughter, testified that Poland was acting "loopy" and "wobbly" when he got home. And Trooper Sawyer testified that when he arrived on the scene, Poland had a "good, strong odor of alcohol about him," had "pretty thick slurred speech," and was a "bit disoriented." Both Chiquita and Trinity testified that they saw Poland with a pistol.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict, fair-minded jurors could conclude that the State met its burden of proving that Poland possessed a firearm while impaired beyond a reasonable doubt.
Des Jardins, 551 P.2d at 184; Silvera, 244 P.3d at 1142.
Consistency of the Verdicts
This court will review a claim of inconsistent verdicts only where there is an "obvious and unmistakable inconsistency." That is, "the verdicts must be 'necessarily inconsistent,' 'irreconcilably in conflict,' and 'irrational.'" If the verdicts can be logically reconciled with the evidence, then they are not inconsistent.
Roberts v. State, 680 P.2d 503, 506 (Alaska App. 1984).
Davenport v. State, 543 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Alaska 1975) (quoting DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 373, 378 (Alaska 1970)); Brown v. Anchorage, 915 P.2d 654, 660 (Alaska App. 1996); Born v. State, 633 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Alaska App. 1981).
Davenport, 543 P.2d at 1207-08.
To prove misconduct involving a weapon, the State had to show that Poland possessed a firearm while impaired. The assault charge was based on the allegations that Poland pointed a firearm at his wife and chased her with the firearm, then pushed her and hit her in the face. To prove the assault charge, the State had to show that Poland physically injured Chiquita or that he placed Chiquita in fear of imminent physical injury. The reckless endangerment charges were based on the allegation that Poland had two pistols and pointed one of them at Chiquita and, when she grabbed his arm, it discharged into a bed and penetrated the floor (two children were in the room downstairs), and that he ran around the house waving a pistol and chasing Chiquita, creating a risk to the four children in the home. These charges required the State to prove Poland "recklessly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a substantial risk of serious physical injury" to the four children. The reckless endangerment charges and both theories of assault can be distinguished from the weapons misconduct charge.
AS 11.61.210(a)(1).
AS 11.41.230(a)(1), (3).
AS 11.41.250(a).
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Poland's defense was that Chiquita was not credible and that she was not afraid of Poland but rather that she manipulated the situation to her own purpose. Poland argued at trial that he did not fire the shots into the mattress, implying that Chiquita did. Poland also argued that there was no evidence outside of Chiquita's testimony that Poland possessed the pistol that was fired, and he argued to the jury that Chiquita's testimony was implausible.
If the jury believed that Poland's defense was plausible, the jury could have concluded the State did not prove the allegations of domestic violence beyond a reasonable doubt. But it could have still concluded that at some point in the evening Poland possessed a firearm while he was impaired. Trinity testified that she saw her father with a pistol that night and she described it — silver with a black handle (the pistol she described had not been fired).
It is possible under the facts of this case that the jury believed Poland possessed a firearm while impaired but had a reasonable doubt as to whether he hurt Chiquita or caused her to be afraid of him, and had a reasonable doubt as to whether he recklessly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of injury to the children. Poland's conviction for misconduct involving weapons is not obviously inconsistent with the verdicts acquitting him of assault and reckless endangerment.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM Poland's conviction.