Opinion
No. FST CV 095010296 S
August 11, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #113
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2009, the plaintiff, Florentino Polanco, commenced this action by service of process against the defendant, Javier Carlos H. Ramirez. In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On April 17, 2007, the plaintiff, who is a resident of the state of New York, was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by the defendant. The automobile operated by the defendant was proceeding in a southerly direction on Newfield Avenue in Stamford, when the defendant attempted to pass a vehicle that was stopped in the southbound lane. At this same time, a motor vehicle driven by Sheliah M. Ramber was traveling in a northerly direction on Newfield Avenue. While attempting to pass the stopped automobile, the defendant's motor vehicle struck Ramber's vehicle head on. As a result of this accident, the plaintiff suffered numerous physical injuries, as well as emotion distress. Accordingly, the plaintiff's two-count amended complaint alleges claims against the defendant for negligence and recklessness.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support of his motion on April 21, 2010. In his motion, the defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that this action is barred by the exclusivity provision of New York workers' compensation law. Attached to the defendant's motion are: (1) certified excerpts from the plaintiff's deposition; (2) the sworn affidavit of Michael A. Stelluti, III, who is the managing member of Smith Party Rentals, LLC (Smith Party Rentals) and (3) documentation demonstrating that the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from the state of New York as a result of the subject traffic accident. On July 6, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion. The plaintiff's memorandum of law in opposition attached no supporting documentation. On July 26, 2010, the parties argued this matter before the court at short calendar.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc. 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate an absence of any triable issue of material fact and "[t]o satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). "When a party files a motion for summary judgment and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lefebvre v. Zarka, 106 Conn.App. 30, 38-39, 940 A.2d 911 (2008).
In his memorandum of law, the defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the exclusivity provision of New York workers' compensation law bars the action brought by the plaintiff. Furthermore, even though the subject traffic accident occurred in Connecticut and the workers' compensation law of this state would allow the plaintiff to bring this case, the defendant argues that the choice of law principles mandate that this court should apply New York law. For these reasons, the defendant contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In response, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion should be denied because Connecticut law allows the plaintiff to bring this case and the most significant relationship test indicates that Connecticut law should apply.
An examination of the documentation attached to the defendant's motion for summary judgment reveals the following undisputed facts. At all times since coming to the United States, the plaintiff has resided in the state of New York. On the date of the accident, the plaintiff was employed at Smith Party Rentals, which is a Connecticut limited liability company that rents party supplies to customers. Although Smith Party Rentals has a business address in Greenwich, it also operates a warehouse in Port Chester, New York. In his affidavit, Stelluti attests that both the plaintiff and the defendant "were hired and supervised by the Port Chester Facility, were employees of the Port Chester Facility on the date of the accident in question and at all times worked from and out of the Port Chester Facility." The plaintiff also admits in his deposition that he only worked out of the Smith Party Rental's Port Chester location. On April 17, 2007, the defendant, who was the plaintiff's co-worker at the Port Chester warehouse, asked the plaintiff to assist him with deliveries in Connecticut. The parties then rode in a van owned by Smith Party Rentals and driven by the defendant from Port Chester to Stamford, where the subject traffic accident occurred. According to the plaintiff's deposition testimony, the van left Port Chester at 2:30 p.m. and the accident happened at 3:00 p.m. The accident occurred prior to the completion of the delivery and the parties did not stop in between Port Chester and Stamford. Following this incident, the plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits in New York.
In his deposition, the plaintiff indicates that he lived in Elmsford, New York on the date of the accident. The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff currently lives in Sleepy Hollow, New York.
Given this undisputed factual background, there is no question that this case would be barred under New York law. N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 29(6) (McKinney 2005) provides in relevant part: "The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee, or in case of death his or her dependents, when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ, the employer's insurer or any collective bargaining agent of the employer's employees or any employee of such insurer or such collective bargaining agent (while acting within the scope of his or her employment)." In contrast, Connecticut's workers' compensation statute provides as follows: "If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was willful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in Section 14-1." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-293a. Consequently, the determinative issue in this motion is whether the court should apply New York or Connecticut law.
Our Supreme Court recently examined choice of law principles in the context of a dispute over whether New York or Connecticut workers' compensation law applied to a traffic accident that occurred in Connecticut. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that courts should analyze this issue under the most significant relationship test as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6 and 145. "Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 352, 948 A.2d 955 (2008).
When applying these factors to the present case, it can be seen that (a) and (b) indicate that Connecticut law should apply because the accident and conduct causing the accident occurred in this state. In contrast, (c) and (d) militate towards applying New York law because the plaintiff is a New York resident and the relationship of the parties originated from the fact that they were both employed at a facility located in Port Chester. ". . . It is the significance, and not the number, of § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome of the choice of law inquiry under the Restatement [Second] approach. As the concluding sentence of § 145(2) provides, [t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue." (Citation omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 353. In Jaiguay, the Supreme Court determined that the (c) and (d) factors were more important in cases of this type because: "The most significant factors are that (1) Primo's Landscaping employed the decedent in New York, (2) the entirety of the employment relationship was in New York, (3) the decedent, Vasquez and Percy Montes all resided in New York, (4) the pickup truck was registered in New York, and (5) Primo's Landscaping was a New York corporation." Id. Like the parties in Jaiguay, the plaintiff in the present matter resides in New York, he was employed by Smith Party Rentals in New York and the entirety of the relationship between the parties stemmed from the fact that they were co-workers at a New York facility.
The amended complaint alleges that the defendant currently resides in Kirkland, Washington. It is unclear precisely where he resided at the time of the accident.
Furthermore, "[t]he factors enumerated in § 6(2) also militate in favor of applying New York law. In determining which state's law should apply under § 6(2), we must review, inter alia, the respective policies and interests of New York and Connecticut in the controversy . . . The plaintiff asserts that Connecticut law should apply because Connecticut's interests are stronger than those of New York. In particular, the plaintiff contends that Connecticut has a strong interest in deterring drivers from speeding and driving recklessly on its roads and highways. Although Connecticut does have such an interest, we agree with the defendants that its interest in that regard is diminished when the offending conduct occurs during a brief entry into the state and when any accident that occurs as a result of the undue speed or recklessness does not involve a Connecticut resident." (Citation omitted.) Id., 353-54. "Moreover, Connecticut has little or no interest in vindicating its policy of permitting actions in accordance with the motor vehicle exception of § 31-293a when, as in the present case, Connecticut has no ties to any person or party involved in the accident. In contrast, because the parties' employment relationship is centered in New York, New York has a clear interest in ensuring that its contrary public policy is honored." Id., 354. "Finally, subdivision (d) of § 6(2) requires us to examine the expectations of the parties as to what law governs their actions . . . [B]ecause New York was the situs of the employment relationship and because the parties' only nexus to Connecticut was the fact that the accident fortuitously occurred in Connecticut, the parties reasonably would have expected to be able to invoke the rights and protections available to them under the laws of New York." (Citation omitted.) Id., 354-55.
In the present case, the accident occurred when the parties were making a brief trip to Connecticut to deliver supplies, upon which they were to return to the Port Chester facility where they were employed. The plaintiff is a New York resident and although the defendant's residency at the time of the accident is unclear, there is no indication that he lived in Connecticut. Moreover, as both of the parties were employed in New York and the plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits in New York, the parties would have reasonably expected that they would invoke the rights and protection available to them under the laws of the state.
The facts of this case are also strikingly similar to Snyder v. Seldin, 81 Conn.App. 718, 841 A.2d 701 (2004), where the Appellate Court upheld a trial court's determination that New York law applied in a case where a traffic accident occurred in Connecticut. Although the Snyder court applied a different conflict of laws test than that later employed by the Supreme Court in Jaiguay, the factual analysis of the Appellate Court is still instructive. In Snyder, the plaintiff and the defendant, who were both New York residents, were employed by the New York branch of a corporation that was headquartered in Connecticut. The plaintiff was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by the defendant when the parties were involved in an accident while traveling to the company's corporate headquarters in Connecticut. After the accident, the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits in New York. As noted by the Appellate Court, "the applicable law in a workers' compensation case is the law of the place of the employment relation, because the existence of the employer-employee relation within the state gives the state an interest in controlling the incidents of that relation, one of which incidents is the right to receive and the obligation to pay compensation . . . Here, although Casual Corner had its corporate headquarters in Connecticut, the employment relation clearly existed in New York, which was where the parties lived and where the plaintiff principally was employed." (Citations omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 725. Accordingly, like in Snyder, although Smith Party Rentals is a Connecticut limited liability company and has a business address in Greenwich, the parties' business relationship is centered in New York because the plaintiff and defendant both worked at the Port Chester facility.
At short calendar, the plaintiff's counsel made an oral representation that the plaintiff's pay stubs listed a Greenwich address. There is no evidence in the record to support this statement. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court already addressed this argument in Snyder, as the plaintiff in that case received paychecks from her employer's corporate headquarters in Connecticut. As stated by the Appellate Court, "[s]uch insignificant contacts, however, when viewed in light of the fact that the parties were residents of New York and the plaintiff was principally employed there, are not enough to conclude that Connecticut has the greater interest." Snyder v. Seldin, supra, 81 Conn.App. 723 n. 9.
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the court concludes that New York law should apply in the present case. Having determined that New York law applies, this action is barred by the exclusivity provision of New York workers' compensation law. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendant.