Opinion
No. 20 C.D. 2013
07-17-2013
Israel Polanco, Jr., Petitioner v. Department of Corrections, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Israel Polanco, Jr. (Polanco), an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Smithfield, petitions, pro se, for review of an order of the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) assessing his inmate account in the amount of $4,063.62 as reimbursement to the Commonwealth for medical expenses arising from his assault on another inmate. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
DOC has statutory and regulatory authority to assess an inmate's account for medical costs caused by an assault that he has committed in prison. Brome v. Department of Corrections, 756 A.2d 87, 88-89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Greene v. Department of Corrections, 729 A.2d 652, 653-54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(a)(1)(ii), (a)(2)(iii). DOC's inmate discipline policy provides that inmates found guilty of assault on another inmate shall be assessed two-thirds of the medical costs from the assault as a sanction for that misconduct. DC-ADM 801 Inmate Discipline Procedures Manual § 8(B)(4).
On August 3, 2011, Polanco, then incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale, was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of stabbing another inmate, Tyrell Young. (Record Item (R. Item) 2, Misconduct No. B376532 Disciplinary Hearing Report.) On September 22, 2011, Polanco received a Notice of Assessment for Misconduct listing $6,157 in medical costs for the victim's medical treatment and assessing Polanco's inmate account in the amount of $4,063.62, two-thirds of that total. (R. Item 7, Assessment Hearing Exhibit HE-4.) Polanco requested a hearing on the assessment. (Id.) On November 9, 2011, a Notice of Hearing was delivered to Polanco scheduling the hearing on the assessment for December 14, 2011. (R. Item 6, Notice of Hearing.)
At the assessment hearing, the Misconduct No. B376532 Disciplinary Hearing Report, finding Polanco guilty of stabbing inmate Young, was introduced into evidence. (R. Item 7, Assessment Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 6-7 & Exhibit HE-3.) An SCI-Houtzdale accountant testified and identified 22 invoices for inmate Young's medical treatment for those injuries, which totaled $6,157. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 8-10 & Commonwealth Exhibits 1-22.) Polanco was provided copies of the invoices and was given the opportunity to cross-examine the SCI-Houtzdale accountant. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 8, 11-16, 18.) Polanco stated at the hearing that he had no questions for that witness and no questions about the amount of the costs. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 11, 13-14, 18.) Polanco instead contended that the assessment should be denied because he was innocent of the stabbing and complained that he should be allowed to call witnesses on that issue. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 11, 14, 20.) The Hearing Officer ruled that evidence concerning whether he committed the misconduct was beyond the scope of the hearing, which was limited to the amount of the costs caused by the misconduct. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 11-12, 15-16.)
Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued proposed findings, served on Polanco on February 3, 2012, concluding that the medical costs incurred as a result of the stabbing of inmate Young totaled $6,157 and recommending that Polanco be ordered to reimburse the Commonwealth $4,063.62. On May 23, 2012, the Secretary of the DOC issued an order and opinion denying Polanco's exceptions to the Hearing Officer's proposed findings, and assessing his inmate account in the amount of $4,063.62. Polanco timely petitioned for review of that order.
Polanco filed this Petition for Review in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County, the county where the underlying events and hearings occurred, and that court transferred this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, the county where SCI-Smithfield is located. On December 6, 2012, the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County ordered this matter transferred to this Court pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 751(a) on the grounds that it is an appeal from a Commonwealth agency, over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 763(a)(1).
Our review here is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error of law has been committed and whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Moss v. Department of Corrections, 838 A.2d 32, 33-34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Polanco argues that the assessment must be reversed because he was innocent of the assault and that his constitutional rights to due process were violated in the determination that he was guilty because he was not given access to a videotape relied on in finding him guilty of the assault and was not permitted to call as witnesses the stabbing victim and the victim's cellmate. (Petitioner's Brief at 9-12; Petition for Review ¶¶4-6.)
These contentions are not valid grounds for challenging the assessment of his inmate account. The DOC's determination that Polanco committed the assault is a matter of internal prison management not subject to this Court's review. Jerry v. Department of Corrections, 990 A.2d 112, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Moss, 838 A.2d at 33; Brome, 756 A.2d at 89. The only issue in a hearing such as this is whether the amount of the assessment is correct and supported. Jerry, 990 A.2d at 115-16; Moss, 838 A.2d at 33; Holloway v. Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (en banc). The Hearing Officer's refusal to revisit the issue of whether Polanco was guilty of the misconduct and permit witnesses concerning the underlying misconduct was therefore correct and did not deny him due process. Jerry, 990 A.2d 115-16; Brome, 756 A.2d at 88-90.
Moreover, there was no violation of Polanco's due process rights in the determination of his guilt at the misconduct hearing that could preclude reliance on that finding to support the assessment. Procedural due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings are limited. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-72 (1974), abrogated in part on other issue by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Melton v. Beard, 981 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Mays v. Fulcomer, 552 A.2d 750, 752 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
Prison disciplinary proceedings ... take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their ends. They may have little
regard for the safety of others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison life. ... The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonism on the important aims of the correctional process.Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-62. An inmate does have a right in a prison disciplinary proceeding to 24-hour advance written notice of the violations and a written statement of the reason for the decision and evidence relied on. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-65; Jerry, 990 A.2d at 115 n.4; Moss, 838 A.2d at 34. Polanco received those protections in his misconduct hearing. He was given a written notice of the charges against him at least two days before the hearing, a hearing was held at which he was given the opportunity to respond to the charges and denied that he committed the assault, and he received a written decision explaining the reasons and evidence on which the decision was based. (R. Item 1, Misconduct Report No. B376532; R. Item 2, Misconduct No. B376532 Disciplinary Hearing Report.)
While Polanco makes an assertion in his brief that the misconduct hearing officer was biased (Petitioner's Brief at 11), there is nothing in the record supporting this statement or showing that the misconduct hearing officer had any involvement in the pre-hearing investigation of the misconduct or any personal knowledge or prejudgment of the facts. There is therefore no basis to conclude that Polanco was denied an impartial hearing. Jerry, 990 A.2d at 117-18; Moss, 838 A.2d at 34. --------
The fact that Polanco was not permitted to call the inmate witnesses or view the videotape and that evidence against him was heard ex parte to protect witness identity did not deny him due process. An inmate does not have an unqualified due process right to call witnesses or present documentary evidence in a prison disciplinary hearing, and permission to call witnesses and access to evidence may be denied where, in the judgment of prison officials, there is a risk to prison safety or correctional goals. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67; Jerry, 990 A.2d at 115 n.4; Melton, 981 A.2d at 364-65 & n.4; Mays, 552 A.2d at 752. Due process also does not require that the inmate have the opportunity to confront or cross-examine the witnesses supporting the claim of misconduct. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-69; Jerry, 990 A.2d at 115 n.4; Melton, 981 A.2d at 364; Moss, 838 A.2d at 34. Here, given the violence of the misconduct, obvious and serious safety concerns justified both restricting Polanco from calling the victim and his cellmate as witnesses and limiting his access to evidence concerning the stabbing. There is, moreover, no showing that testimony of the inmate witnesses would exonerate Polanco. Contrary to Polanco's assertions, the written statements of those witnesses on which he relies state only that Polanco had a legitimate reason to be in inmate Young's cell at the time of the stabbing (to return a laundry item) and say nothing about the stabbing or who committed it. (Exhibit F to Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to DOC's Preliminary Objections in Court of Common Pleas.)
Polanco also argues that he was denied due process at the assessment hearing because he was not provided staff or inmate assistance to gather evidence, because the notice did not advise him in advance that he could present witnesses at the assessment hearing, and because the misconduct hearing examiner was allegedly present at the assessment hearing. (Petitioner's Brief at 9; Petition for Review ¶¶1-3.) None of these contentions has merit.
The only evidence and witnesses that Polanco sought to present at the assessment hearing concerned whether he committed the assault, not the medical costs, and he admitted at the hearing that he did not dispute the medical costs. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 11, 13-14, 18, 20.) Because the evidence and witnesses Polanco sought were irrelevant to the issue in the assessment hearing, the amount of the medical costs, he had no right to assistance in gathering that evidence and any alleged deficiency in notice to obtain witnesses had no effect on the hearing and did not deny him due process. Jerry, 990 A.2d 115-16; Moss, 838 A.2d at 33-34; Brome, 756 A.2d at 89-90.
Polanco's argument that the misconduct hearing officer was present at the assessment hearing fails for two reasons. First, it is unsupported by the record. The record shows that only three persons were present at the assessment hearing: the assessment hearing Hearing Officer, who had no involvement in the misconduct investigation or misconduct hearing, the SCI-Houtzdale accountant, who testified to the medical costs, and Polanco himself. (R. Item 7, H.T. at 1-2, 5.) Second, even if the misconduct hearing officer had been present at the assessment hearing, his presence would not constitute a violation of Polanco's rights. The cases cited by Polanco as supporting this argument, Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005), Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1992), Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1983), and Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974), involved situations where a person who brought or investigated the charges served as a decision-maker on those charges or served on or actively participated in the reviewing tribunal or committee. None of those cases holds that due process is violated by a prior hearing officer's mere presence as an observer or witness at a subsequent hearing before an entirely different decision-maker.
Polanco's final argument is that the 50% deduction under DOC Policy DC-ADM 005(IV)(I)(1) from his inmate account to collect the assessment must be reduced because that level of deduction is allegedly unconstitutional. (Petitioner's Brief at 12.) This argument is legally invalid. The cases on which Polanco relies, Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2001), Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 1999), and Lafauci v. Cunningham, 139 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D. Mass. 2001), all involve collection of fees and costs from non-frivolous litigation, where high deductions could affect an inmate's right of access to the courts. None of those cases holds or suggests that an inmate has a constitutional right to a particular minimum amount or percentage of his inmate account or that high deductions for reasons that do not impact exercise of a constitutional right are impermissible. Here, the assessment is a sanction for an assault Polanco committed and does not burden exercise of any constitutional right.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Department of Corrections.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2013, the order of the Department of Corrections in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge