Opinion
2013-502 S C
02-23-2015
Point of You, Inc., Appellant, v. John Santangelo and MARY ANN SANTANGELO, Respondents.
PRESENT: : , MARANO and GARGUILO, JJ.
Appeal from an amended final judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Second District (David A. Morris, J.), entered March 1, 2013. The amended final judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the petition in a "holdover" summary proceeding.
ORDERED that the amended final judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner commenced this "holdover" proceeding alleging that occupants were "tenants at sufferage" and that a 30-day notice of termination had been served upon them. The parties appear to agree, however, that the proceeding is in fact one based on a claim that title had been "voluntarily conveyed" by occupants to petitioner within the meaning of RPAPL 713 (8), which provides for the maintenance of a summary proceeding where the owner of the real property, who, having voluntarily conveyed the property to a purchaser for value, remains in possession without the permission of the purchaser. Following a nonjury trial, the District Court found that the property had not been "voluntarily conveyed" by occupants to petitioner and dismissed the petition.
On appeal, petitioner contends that the District Court erred in failing to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior Supreme Court determination of a related litigation, and that application of that doctrine would have foreclosed determination in this proceeding of the issue of whether the deed had been "voluntarily conveyed."
A party seeking the application of collateral estoppel bears the burden of showing that the decisive, identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001]). This is generally accomplished by introducing the judgment and pleadings (Bronxville Palmer v State of New York, 18 NY2d 560, 563 [1966]). Where the judgment and pleadings do not conclusively show what was adjudicated in the prior action, "it may be necessary to look beyond the judgment roll, at the testimony, the charge to the jury and the record of contentions made and determined" (id.).
In the instant case, petitioner did not introduce the Supreme Court pleadings or the bill of particulars, notwithstanding its claim to the contrary. Moreover, while petitioner's principal testified at the trial in the instant proceeding that petitioner's agreement with occupants did not involve a second mortgage, the Supreme Court's decision states that occupants had "alleged significant irregularity in the placement of a mortgage upon their home" and finds that petitioner had "transferred funds to take a pre-existing first mortgage out of foreclosure status and upon default, allowing a filing as a second subordinate mortgage." The Supreme Court's decision thus references only a second mortgage and makes no finding as to the validity of the deed, and petitioner did not establish that the issue of the deed's validity was necessarily determined in the Supreme Court action. Thus, petitioner did not establish that occupants are collaterally estopped from challenging the voluntariness of the deed in this proceeding.
Petitioner further contends that the recorded and acknowledged deed raises a presumption of due execution and delivery, which can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence ( Beshara v Beshara, 51 AD3d 837 [2008]).
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). Upon the record presented, the District Court could properly find that any presumption of due execution arising from the deed was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence including not only the testimony of occupant Mary Ann Santangelo and the negative inference arising from petitioner's failure to put on any witnesses with personal knowledge of the execution of the deed to rebut Mary Ann Santangelo's testimony, but also the documentary evidence, including the mortgage assumption agreement, and the Supreme Court's decision, both of which were substantially at odds with the testimony of petitioner's witness.
We have examined petitioner's remaining contention and find it to be equally without merit.
Accordingly, the amended final judgment is affirmed.
Iannacci, J.P., and Marano, J., concur.
Garguilo, J., taking no part.
Decision Date: February 23, 2015