Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co.

26 Citing cases

  1. Connolly v. Steakley

    197 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1967)   Cited 20 times
    In Connolly v. Steakley, 197 So.2d 524, 537 (Fla. 1967), Mr. Justice O'Connell referred to contributory negligence as a "primitive device for achieving justice as between parties who are both at fault.

    " This is a more or less typical statement of the proximate cause rationale, and it has been repeated, either literally or in substance, in a considerable number of subsequent opinions of this court and of the district courts of appeal. Dunn Bus Service v. McKinley, 1937, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865; Miami Beach R. Co. v. Dohme, 1938, 131 Fla. 171, 179 So. 166; Davis v. Cuesta, 1941, 146 Fla. 471, 1 So.2d 475; Williams v. Sauls, 1942, 151 Fla. 270, 9 So.2d 369; Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla. 1951, 56 So.2d 905; Shattuck v. Mullen, Fla.App. 1959, 115 So.2d 597; James v. Keene, Fla.App. 1960, 121 So.2d 186; Holdsworth v. Crews, Fla.App. 1961, 129 So.2d 153. Nor is this a particularly unique statement. It is well known that courts of most American jurisdictions have been much afflicted with this propensity to seek a single proximate cause for every accidental injury and to explain the application of last clear chance in terms of last wrongdoer and proximate cause principles. Green, 6 N.C.L.Rev. 3, 24 (1927).

  2. Atlanta St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co. v. Church

    212 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1954)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that circumstances affecting the plaintiff's opportunity to observe the crossing created a jury question as to whether the railroad's stopping and standing of the train constituted negligence

    A case from this court which, though arising in Texas, may be profitably consulted on the point is Texas-New Mexico Railway Co. v. Bailey, 5 Cir., 203 F.2d 647. Florida cases which may be consulted are Goff v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 53 So.2d 777; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509; Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 56 So.2d 905; Horton v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 61 So.2d 406; Bodie v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 61 So.2d 411. We think the rule invoked, that recovery should be denied as matter of law, is plainly inapplicable here, where, as is shown by the testimony of defendant's witnesses, though the defendant thought it necessary to put down the lighted fusee as the train came onto the crossing to stand there, it did not put the fusee on the side of the train which was struck by the car; and neither is the evidence conclusive that the fusee on the other side of the train was burning at the time of the collision, nor that if it was burning it would have given sufficient warning to those coming to the crossing from the opposite side.

  3. Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Company

    234 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1970)   Cited 31 times
    In Hodge v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 234 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970), we held that setting aside a jury verdict requires more than a finding that the verdict is contrary to the evidence.

    "In an attempt to dispell this confusion about procedure of such importance, we will undertake to restate the law on the subject. "When a motion for new trial is made it is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge, Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905; Mead v. Bentley, Fla., 61 So.2d 428, who because of his contact with the trial and his observation of the behavior of those upon whose testimony the finding of fact must be based is better positioned than any other one person fully to comprehend the processes by which the ultimate decision of the triers of fact, the jurors, is reached, Pyms v. Meranda, Fla., 98 So.2d 341. "When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone, supra [Fla., 51 So.2d 33]; Turner v. Frey, supra [Fla., 81 So.2d 721, 722]; Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792; Florida Publishing Co. v. Copel

  4. Russo v. Clark

    147 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1962)   Cited 46 times

    The defendant presented his motion for new trial and the judge after hearing oral argument and considering briefs in support of the motion and in opposition to it granted the motion because the verdict was "so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and indicate that the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice, sympathy or other matters outside the evidence * * *." The case then went to the District Court of Appeal where the appellant was confronted with the burden of clearly showing that the trial judge had abused the broad discretion accorded him in such instances, Cloud v. Fallis, supra, and with the allied rule that it requires a stronger showing to upset an order granting a motion for new trial than an order denying one. Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905; Archibald v. Wittmer, Fla.App. 1960, 120 So.2d 236. At the outset the District Court of Appeal observed that there were many opinions holding that a duty was put upon trial courts setting aside verdicts so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience.

  5. Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority

    131 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1961)   Cited 38 times

    "In an attempt to dispell this confusion about procedure of such importance, we will undertake to restate the law on the subject. "When a motion for new trial is made it is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge, Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905, Mead v. Bentley, Fla., 61 So.2d 428, who because of his contact with the trial and his observation of the behavior of those upon whose testimony the finding of fact must be based is better positioned than any other one person fully to comprehend the processes by which the ultimate decision of the triers of fact, the jurors, is reached, Pyms v. Meranda, Fla., 98 So.2d 341. "When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone, supra [Fla., 51 So.2d 33], Turner v. Frey, supra [Fla., 81 So.2d 721, 722], Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792; Florida Publishing Co. v. Copel

  6. Cloud v. Fallis

    110 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1959)   Cited 476 times
    Holding that the granting of a motion for new trial should not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion

    In an attempt to dispell this confusion about procedure of such importance, we will undertake to restate the law on the subject. When a motion for new trial is made it is directed to the sound, broad discretion of the trial judge, Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905, Mead v. Bentley, Fla., 61 So.2d 428, who because of his contact with the trial and his observation of the behavior of those upon whose testimony the finding of fact must be based is better positioned than any other one person fully to comprehend the processes by which the ultimate decision of the triers of fact, the jurors, is reached, Pyms v. Meranda, Fla., 98 So.2d 341. When the judge, who must be presumed to have drawn on his talents, his knowledge and his experience to keep the search for the truth in a proper channel, concludes that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it is his duty to grant a new trial, and he should always do that if the jury has been deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence or has been influenced by considerations outside the record, Martin v. Stone, supra, Turner v. Frey, supra, Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 86 So.2d 792; Florida Publishing Co. v. Copeland, Fla., 89 So.2d 18.

  7. Loftin v. Nolin

    86 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1956)   Cited 12 times

    We are of the opinion, however, that the cause must be reversed for a new trial because of the error of the trial judge in charging the jury on the doctrine of the last clear chance. We have carefully reviewed our prior opinions with reference to the last clear chance doctrine, and particularly the opinions in the cases of Merchants' Transportation Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401; Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Martin, Fla., 56 So.2d 509. We cannot consider the last clear chance doctrine without also considering F.S. ยงยง 768.05 and 768.06 F.S.A., which sections read as follows:

  8. Horton v. Louisville N.R. Co.

    61 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1952)   Cited 8 times

    * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., Fla., 56 So.2d 905, 907, the locomotive had been standing still for 15 minutes and this Court said that it was standing still "in its switching operations". Probably the best reasoned case to the effect that the "standing train doctrine" does not apply to every case where a vehicle runs into the side of a train is that of Goff v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., Fla., 53 So.2d 777, 778.

  9. Scott v. Sims

    874 So. 2d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 4 times
    Acknowledging confusion in the case law concerning verdicts that are both inconsistent and inadequate

    They also recognize that a stronger showing of an abuse of discretion is required to reverse an order granting a motion for new trial than for one denying new trial. See Poindexter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 56 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951), overruled in part on other grounds, Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956). Appellant argues that new trial should have been accorded only as to the items of damage the jury refused to award, and that the court's order directing retrial on all issues was an abuse of discretion.

  10. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gage

    611 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 7 times

    In reviewing an order granting a new trial the appellate court considers the sufficiency of only those grounds specified in the order. Poindexter v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 56 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951). Where the only ground for granting a new trial is the trial court's belief that it had erred in admitting certain evidence, the reason for granting the new trial fails if the evidence was properly admissible. Boutwell v. Bishop, 194 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); Ewing v. Miller, 172 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).