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POHL v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES/BARTON COUNTY COMMUNITY

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Jan 8, 2003
CIVIL ACTION No: 02-2437-CM (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 2003)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION No: 02-2437-CM

January 8, 2003


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (doc. 8). Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to allege that each individual Defendant is being sued in his/her individual capacity. Plaintiff's initial Complaint did not specify the capacity in which Plaintiff is suing the individual Defendants. Defendants oppose the Motion to Amend on the basis that amendment would be futile.

I. Background Information

Plaintiff brings this action against the Board of Trustees of Barton County Community College (the "Board"), the individual Trustees who sit on the Board (the "Trustees"), and the Director of Student Development at Barton County Community College (the "Director of Student Development"). Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged from her employment with Barton County Community College. She asserts claims against all Defendants for breach of implied contract (Count I) and for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process (Count II). She asserts additional claims against the Director of Student Development for deprivation of her liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment and for defamation (Counts III and IV).

II. Standard for Ruling on a Motion to Amend

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. Subsequent amendments are allowed only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave to amend, however, is to be "freely given when justice so requires," and the Supreme Court has emphasized that "this mandate is to be heeded." The decision to grant leave to amend, after the permissive period, is within the district court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Id.

Id.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991).

Leave to amend should be denied when the court finds "undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." A court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss or if it otherwise fails to state a claim. Thus, the court must analyze a proposed amendment as if it were before the court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993).

Lyle v. Commodity Credit Corp., 898 F. Supp. 808, 810 (D.Kan. 1995) (citing Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992)).

Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only when it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief.

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis

Defendants ask the Court to deny the Motion to Amend in its entirety. Defendants, however, oppose Plaintiff's Motion to Amend only as to Count II (deprivation of Plaintiff's due process rights) and only as it relates to the Trustees. Defendants argue that allowing Plaintiff leave to amend to assert that the Trustees acted in their individual capacities when they allegedly violated her due process rights would be futile, as Plaintiff has failed to plead an affirmative link between any conduct of the Trustees and the alleged constitutional violation.

Defendants correctly point out that in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff's complaint must allege an "affirmative link" between the individual defendant's conduct and the alleged constitutional violation. Although the parameters of this standard are not well-defined, the Court, under the liberal pleading standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 15(a), finds that the standard has been met here. Plaintiff alleges that she had a property interest in her employment with Barton County Community College through an implied employment contract. She specifically alleges in paragraph 30 of the proposed Amended Complaint that Defendants failed to provide her with a due process hearing prior to her discharge. Defendants' conduct in failing to provide Plaintiff with such a hearing is thus affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation, i.e., the denial of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. It is not necessary that Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint allocate among the various Defendants each Defendant's specific responsibility for the claimed due process violation.

See Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144,1156-57 (10th Cir. 2001).

Although the Tenth Circuit has adopted this "affirmative link" standard, it has recognized that its decisions have provided "little explanation on the point." Id. at 1156 (citations omitted).

See id. at 1157 (finding that plaintiff had "loosely" demonstrated an affirmative link between the various defendants' actions and the alleged constitutional violation even though plaintiff did not single out each defendant and describe his/her particular involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

As the Court has found the affirmative link requirement satisfied here, the Court cannot say that Count II as it pertains to the Trustees would be subject to dismissal or that it "appears beyond a doubt" that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her due process theory of recovery that would entitle her to relief against the Trustees. The Court will therefore grant Plaintiff leave to amend to allege that the Trustees are being sued in their individual capacities.

Defendants do not oppose the Motion to Amend with respect to the remaining individual Defendant or with respect to any other counts of the proposed Amended Complaint. The Court will therefore grant the Motion to Amend in its entirety.

Pursuant to D. Kan Rule 15.1, the Clerk shall detach and file the original First Amended Complaint, and it shall be deemed filed as of the date this Order is filed. Plaintiff shall serve the First Amended Complaint on Defendants within ten (10) days after the First Amended Complaint is deemed filed. In addition, Plaintiff shall file a separate certificate of service. Defendants shall plead in response to the First Amended Complaint as set forth in D. Kan. Rule 15.1.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (doc. 8) is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated in Kansas City, Kansas on this 8th day of January, 2003.


Summaries of

POHL v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES/BARTON COUNTY COMMUNITY

United States District Court, D. Kansas
Jan 8, 2003
CIVIL ACTION No: 02-2437-CM (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 2003)
Case details for

POHL v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES/BARTON COUNTY COMMUNITY

Case Details

Full title:INGRID POHL, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BARTON COUNTY COMMUNITY…

Court:United States District Court, D. Kansas

Date published: Jan 8, 2003

Citations

CIVIL ACTION No: 02-2437-CM (D. Kan. Jan. 8, 2003)