Opinion
22A-CR-2059
03-29-2023
Matthew Poeppel, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anne M. Lowe Fugate Gangstad, LLC ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court The Honorable Allen N. Wheat, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 76C01-2105-F5-656
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anne M. Lowe Fugate Gangstad, LLC
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Matthew Poeppel (Poeppel), appeals his conviction for criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a); intimidation, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(1); domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3; interference with reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-45-2-5(1); domestic battery with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(1)(A); and his adjudication as an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8(c).
[¶2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
ISSUES
[¶3] Poeppel presents this court with four issues, which we restate as:
(1) Whether Poeppel's conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery violates the principles of double jeopardy;
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for intimidation and interference with reporting of a crime;
(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Poeppel's long history of mental health disorders as a mitigating circumstance; and
(4) Whether Poeppel's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] Poeppel lived with his seventy-five-year-old mother, Cheryl Poeppel (Cheryl), from September 2015, while he was serving a community corrections sentence, until April 2021. During this time, he was employed with a components manufacturer and paid Cheryl a monthly $800 in rent. In April 2021, Poeppel informed his mother that he had quit his job and was going to move to Florida because he was "sick of [her] rules." (Transcript Vol. II, p. 174). He gathered his belongings and left Cheryl's home that same day.
[¶5] On May 14, 2021, Poeppel returned to Cheryl's home unexpectedly and entered the residence using a garage door remote. Cheryl questioned him as to why he had returned, and Poeppel responded, "I live here," to which Cheryl replied, "no, you don't." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 178). Poeppel told Cheryl that he would shower and then leave again. After he had showered, Poeppel became aggressive towards his mother. While Cheryl was seated in her bedroom, Poeppel "got really in [her] face" and bumped her forehead. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 178). Poeppel entered and exited Cheryl's bedroom several times, each time becoming more upset and agitated. After asking Cheryl, who was still seated, how she could refuse to let him live with her, he hit her on the right side of her face multiple times. Cheryl was scared because Poeppel became "extremely upset." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 181).
[¶6] Poeppel took Cheryl's cellphone and then asked for her car keys as he wanted to move her car out of the garage so he could move his car inside. He grabbed Cheryl's arm while holding an object in his hand which punctured the skin on her right arm, causing her pain and making her bleed. Following this altercation, Cheryl attempted to leave he house and ran through the patio door. As she reached the house's yard, Poeppel caught up with her and pushed her to the ground. He grabbed her left arm and pulled her back towards the patio. He dragged Cheryl on her left hip over the concrete, causing bruising and swelling to her hand and hip. He then picked her up under her arms and carried her into the house while she screamed. Inside the residence, Poeppel covered Cheryl with a nearby rug and told her to stay there. He informed her that if she told anyone, he would kill her and her granddaughter. Poeppel then left the room, and Cheryl was able to leave the house and run across the yard to her neighbors' house. Cheryl told the neighbors that Poeppel was "out of control[,]" and the neighbors called 911. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 201).
[¶7] On May 24, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Poeppel with criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, intimidation, a Level 6 felony, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, interference with reporting a crime, a Class A misdemeanor, and domestic battery with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony. On January 1, 2022, the State amended the Information, alleging that Poeppel was an habitual offender. In March 2022, given Poeppel's long history of serious mental health problems, Poeppel's counsel petitioned for the appointment of mental health professionals to assess Poeppel's competency to stand trial. Despite the two providers noting Poeppel's significant addictions and mental health problems and one provider finding him to be intellectually borderline, both providers ultimately declared Poeppel to be competent to stand trial. On July 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a bifurcated jury trial. After the jury found Poeppel guilty of criminal confinement, intimidation, domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor, and interference with reporting of a crime, Poeppel admitted to having a prior domestic battery conviction and to the habitual offender enhancement. The trial court sentenced Poeppel to three years executed for criminal confinement, two years executed for intimidation, and one year executed for interference with reporting of a crime. The trial court merged the Class A misdemeanor domestic battery conviction into the Level 6 felony domestic battery with a prior conviction and ordered Poeppel to serve one year executed for the merged convictions, with all sentences to run consecutively. The trial court also imposed a three-year sentence for the habitual offender enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of ten years.
[¶8] Poeppel now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Double Jeopardy
[¶9] Poeppel contends, and the State agrees, that his double jeopardy rights were violated because the trial court entered judgment of conviction for both the Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and the Level 6 felony domestic battery with a prior conviction. A defendant's constitutional rights are violated when a court enters judgment twice for the same offense, but not when a defendant is simply found guilty of a particular Count. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind. 2001) ("It is highly ordinary that a jury . . . may hear evidence about multiple Counts during a single trial and determine guilt on each of them. These findings of guilt do not mean that a defendant has faced multiple sentences or multiple judgments of conviction."); Kennedy v. State, 674 N.E.2d 966, 967 (Ind. 1996) ("For purposes of double jeopardy, this court has long held that a trial court may not convict and sentence a defendant for both murder and felony murder where only one murder occurs."). On the other hand, a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a sentence, is "unproblematic" as far as double jeopardy is concerned. Carter, 750 N.E.2d at 781. However, if the trial court does enter judgment of conviction on a guilty finding, then simply merging the offenses is insufficient and vacation of the offense is required. Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013); see also Gregory v. State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (where trial court entered judgments of conviction on the jury's verdicts of guilty for dealing and conspiracy, then later merged the convictions for double jeopardy reasons, such merging without also vacating the conspiracy conviction was insufficient to cure the double jeopardy violation).
[¶10] Here, Poeppel was found guilty of domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and admitted to domestic battery with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction for both domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and domestic battery with a prior conviction, as a Level 6 felony. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Counts. Poeppel was sentenced to one year for domestic battery with a prior conviction as a Level 6 felony. Because the trial court entered judgment of conviction on both domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor and the Level 6 felony, and then later merged the convictions, the trial court should have vacated the conviction for domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court to vacate Poeppel's conviction for the Class A misdemeanor.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶11] Poeppel also alleges that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for intimidation and interference with reporting of a crime. Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
A. Intimidation
[¶12] To convict Poeppel of intimidation, the State was required to establish that Poeppel "communicate[d] a threat with the intent: (1) that another person engage in conduct against the other person's will; [or] (2) that another person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act." I.C. § 35-45-2-1. The offense is a Level 6 felony if the threat is to commit a forcible felony. I.C. § 3542-2-1. The charging Information filed by the State contended as follows:
On or about May 14, 2021, in Steuben County, State of Indiana, Poeppel, did communicate a threat to another person, to wit: Cheryl Poeppel, with the intent that Chery Poeppel engage in conduct against her will, to wit: not report battery to anyone, and that the threat was to commit a forcible felony, to wit: kill [granddaughter].(Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 25).
[¶13] Although Poeppel now asserts that "the State did not present evidence, or even allege, that Poeppel acted with the intent that Cheryl be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act," Poeppel was not charged under the second prong of the intimidation statute; rather, as is clear from the Information, Poeppel was charged under the first prong, which required the State to establish that Poeppel communicated a threat to commit a forcible felony to Cheryl with the intent that she did not report the battery. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1; (Appellant's Br. p. 17).
[¶14] We find that the State carried its burden. During the hearing, evidence was presented that Poeppel entered Cheryl's home and bedroom uninvited, yelled at his mother, hit her in the face, and punctured her skin, causing her to bleed. When Cheryl ran from the house, Poeppel pursued her and pushed her to the ground. After he pulled her over the concrete back inside the house, Poeppel threatened Cheryl that if she told anyone what he had done, he would kill her and her granddaughter. Cheryl testified that she did not call 911 because she was "afraid" and "didn't want him to catch [her] calling." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 199). Accordingly, the State established that Poeppel's threat to kill her granddaughter prevented Cheryl from notifying the authorities of Poeppel's actions. See I.C. § 35-45-2-1.
B. Interference with Reporting a Crime
[¶15] In a related argument, Poeppel claims that the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he interfered with Cheryl's reporting of a crime. To establish the crime, the State had to prove that Poeppel "with the intent to commit, conceal, or aid in the commission of a crime, knowingly or intentionally interfere[d] with or prevent[ed] [Cheryl] from using a 911 emergency telephone system." See I.C. § 35-45-2-5(1); (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 27).
[¶16] The record reflects that Poeppel took Cheryl's cellphone-her sole means of communication-after he bumped her forehead and hit her on the right side of her face several times. When she attempted to flee the house, Poeppel pulled her back inside and threatened her. Although Cheryl testified that she was too afraid to call 911 in Poeppel's presence, Poeppel was unaware of this, and a reasonable inference can be made that he took her cellphone to prevent her from calling 911. See Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (it could reasonably be inferred that Mathis intended to prevent the victim from dialing 911 from evidence that he tried to take her phone, pushed her over a couch, laid on top of her holding her arm, and admitted that he tried to stop her from calling the police). Accordingly, Poeppel's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.
III. Mitigating Circumstance
[¶17] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. A trial court is not obligated to find a circumstance to be mitigating merely because it is advanced as such by the defendant. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000).
[¶18] Poeppel now claims that his sentence should be reduced because the trial court failed to "acknowledge the significant mitigating factor[]" of his mental health. (Appellant's Br. p. 22). During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
[Poeppel] occupied a position of trust with the victim. The victim was [Poeppel's] mother. She was over 65 years of age. [Poeppel] has shown little, if any, remorse for his actions. He continues to proclaim his innocence, which he has every right in the world to do. Historically [Poeppel] has been treated for mental health issues. And in reviewing the PSI, specifically it's, identified that [Poeppel] has been diagnosed with bi-polar.(Tr. Vol. III, p. 140). The court then stated: "[a]nd I do wish for the record to clearly reflect that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances just set forth by the court are applicable for not only the initial executed sentences imposed upon [Poeppel] but also for the order of this court which is going to require that they run consecutively." (Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 140). In its Sentence and Commitment Order, the trial court elaborated that:
The reasons for the [c]ourt's sentence are as follows:
(X) Prior juvenile/adult criminal history per PSI;
(X) Defendant occupied a position of trust with victim;
(X) Victim [was] more than 65 or less than 12 years of age;
(X) Other reasons: Victim was Defendant's Mother. Defendant wrote letter to [c]ourt indicated no remorse. Defendant has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and treated for mental health issues.(Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 96). Accordingly, it is clear from the record that the trial court recognized Poeppel's mental health problems as a mitigating circumstance. As the trial court is not required to give the same weight to mitigating factors as does the defendant, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (trial court is not required to give the same weight to mitigating factors as does the defendant).
IV. Appropriateness of Sentence
[¶19] Lastly, Poeppel contends that his ten-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character and requests this court for a downward revision of his imposed aggregate sentence. Sentencing is primarily "a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Nevertheless, although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in fashioning a sentence, our court may revise the sentence "if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). "The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 'correct' result in each case." Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Ultimately, "whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Id. at 1224. We focus on "the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served." Id. Our court does "not look to see whether the defendant's sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is 'inappropriate.'" Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied.
[¶20] The advisory sentence is the starting point selected by the General Assembly as a reasonable sentence for the crime committed. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). Here, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence for criminal confinement, a Level 5 felony, which carried a possible sentence of between one and six years with an advisory sentence of three years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6. Poeppel was sentenced to one year each for intimidation and domestic battery, Level 6 felonies, which each carried possible sentences between six months and two-and-a-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7. He was also convicted of and sentenced to one year for interference with reporting of a crime, a Class A misdemeanor, which carried a possible maximum sentence of one year. See I.C. § 35-50-3-2. The trial court also enhanced Poeppel's criminal confinement sentence by three years due to his habitual offender status, which has a range of between two and six years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-8. Poeppel's aggregate sentence amounted to ten years. Poeppel now bears the burden of persuading our court that this sentence is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is "overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense . . . and the defendant's character." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 111-12 (Ind. 2015).
[¶21] We agree with the State that the nature of Poeppel's offenses was egregious. Not only did Poeppel enter his elderly mother's home and bedroom uninvited, but he also became very aggressive toward her, seemingly without any reason. He used physical violence by slapping her and took away her sole means of communication. He pursued her when she attempted to flee and violently dragged her over the concrete patio back inside the house where he threatened her with murdering her only granddaughter. His offenses were not accompanied by any restraint or lack of brutality.
[¶22] In support of his argument that his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of the offenses, Poeppel refers this court to Smith v. State, 154 N.E.3d 838, 840 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), where we reduced Smith's imposed sentence based on his declining mental health. Smith was a law-abiding citizen until the age of sixty-four when he began committing misdemeanor offenses. Id. These offenses, together with Smith's actions in the community and testimony in court, strongly suggested a declining mental health. Id. We noted that Smith repeatedly demonstrated odd behavior, including his erratic driving to avoid being chased by his neighbor, and his repeated trespass onto a property he believed to be an archeological site. Id. Smith's in-court testimony was similarly concerning as his lengthy sentencing testimony included ramblings on aliens, the Bible, Revelations, and other irrelevant and sometimes incoherent thoughts. Id. Based on this evidence, we concluded Smith's criminal acts to be "just as much the result of deteriorating mental health as they are of genuine criminal intent." Id. We find Smith to be unavailing to the case at hand. Unlike Smith, Poeppel has a lengthy and significant criminal history, a formal diagnosis, and received unsuccessful treatment for his mental health problems on numerous occasions.
[¶23] Turning to Poeppel's character, we observe that "[a] defendant's criminal history is relevant in assessing his character." Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). Poeppel's adult criminal history commenced in 1992 with a conviction for criminal trespass and criminal conversion. Four years later, he was convicted of auto theft. In 2003, he committed and was convicted of receiving stolen property and invasion of privacy. In 2008, he was convicted of possession with intent to deliver marijuana and, in the following months, he was sentenced for possession of an illegal weapon and burglary. In 2012 and 2013, Poeppel was convicted of battery resulting in bodily harm, burglary, and intimidation. A mere one day after committing the instant offenses, Poeppel committed larceny in the state of Michigan. At the time of sentencing, Poeppel had an active warrant pending for assault.
[¶24] Again finding an excuse in his mental health problems, Poeppel claims "that the record indicates that [his] offenses were caused more by mental health issues than by poor character." (Appellant's Br. p. 24). Even if this were true, we note that Poeppel received treatment from at least four different institutions for mental health and substance abuse issues. Evidently, based on the evidence before us, these programs did not have the desired effect and have not been successful at addressing Poeppel's issues as he continues to engage in criminal acts. Furthermore, his failure to effectively address his mental health problems despite multiple opportunities offered, not only reflects poorly on his character but also does not demonstrate that placement in the Department of Correction, a structured environment where he can receive the treatment he requires, is inappropriate. Accordingly, Poeppel's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses or his character.
CONCLUSION
[¶25] Based on the foregoing, we remand to the trial court to vacate Poeppel's conviction for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, but conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Poeppel's convictions. We also hold that the trial court did not abuse itst discretion in sentencing him and his sentence is not inappropriate.
[¶26] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[¶27] Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur