Opinion
Nos. 05-08-01659-CR, 05-08-01660-CR
Opinion issued September 29, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-47525-LI, F06-47628-TI.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Christopher Earl Poe appeals from two convictions for assault-family violence, each indictment alleging a prior conviction for assault-family violence, and an enhancement paragraph alleging a prior robbery conviction. After adjudicating appellant's guilt, the trial court assessed punishment at eight years imprisonment in each case. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The background of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code and his due process rights by sentencing him to prison, rather than placing him on probation; he argues the sentences were not necessary to prevent the recurrence of any criminal behavior. Appellant asserts the evidence shows that although he had money and work issues, he had made progress meeting the conditions of his community supervision. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not support his claims. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses in light of appellant's prior felony convictions. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.42(b), 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2008); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the eight year sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.