Pochat v. Pochat

7 Citing cases

  1. Frimer v. Frimer

    143 A.D.3d 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)   Cited 32 times

    Here, according due deference to the credibility determinations of the Supreme Court, a fair preponderance of the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing supported a finding that the appellant committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Family Ct. Act § 812[1] ; Penal Law § 240.26[3] ). The evidence demonstrated that the appellant, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm the petitioner, engaged in a course of conduct, consisting of threatening to call the police and make false accusations against the petitioner, cursing at the petitioner, shoving the petitioner, and throwing his personal belongings, which alarmed or seriously annoyed the petitioner and served no legitimate purpose (see Matter of Jacobs v. Jacobs, 138 A.D.3d 742, 743, 27 N.Y.S.3d 884 ; Matter of Xin Li v. Ramos, 125 A.D.3d 681, 682, 3 N.Y.S.3d 86 ; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 661, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ). The Supreme Court's findings of additional family offenses, however, were not supported.

  2. Bunin v. Bunin

    187 A.D.3d 1180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    A preponderance of the evidence nevertheless established that the appellant committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree ( Penal Law § 240.26[1] ) and menacing in the third degree ( Penal Law § 120.15 ). Since the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the issuance of the order of protection (see Matter of Mistretta v. Mistretta, 85 A.D.3d 1034, 1035, 926 N.Y.S.2d 582 ), there is no basis to disturb the order of protection on this appeal (see Matter of Filipowski v. Sullivan–Tirelli, 139 A.D.3d 1063, 1064, 30 N.Y.S.3d 825 ; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 661–662, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ; cf. Matter of Crenshaw v. Thorpe–Crenshaw, 146 A.D.3d 951, 951–952, 45 N.Y.S.3d 555 ).The remaining contentions are without merit.

  3. Esipova v. Goloubev

    173 A.D.3d 1024 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 1 times

    The determination should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Miloslau v. Miloslau, 112 A.D.3d at 632, 975 N.Y.S.2d 894 ). The mother established, by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, that the father committed acts which constituted the family offense of harassment in the second degree, warranting the issuance of an order of protection, when, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he engaged in a course of conduct that alarmed and seriously annoyed the mother, and which served no legitimate purpose (see Family Ct. Act § 812[1] ; Penal Law § 240.26[3] ; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 661–662, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ). While the Family Court was presented with sharply conflicting accounts by the parties regarding the subject incidents, we discern no basis to disturb its determination to credit the testimony of the mother (see Matter of Musheyev v. Musheyev, 126 A.D.3d 800, 2 N.Y.S.3d 807 ; see generally Matter of Hon v. Tin Yat Chin, 117 A.D.3d 946, 985 N.Y.S.2d 904 ; Matter of Kaur v. Singh, 73 A.D.3d 1178, 900 N.Y.S.2d 895 ).

  4. Sult v. Sult

    165 A.D.3d 1152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Contrary to the Family Court's determination, the father was not required to specify the value of the destroyed property (see Matter of Omobolanle O. v. Kevin J., 154 A.D.3d 442, 443, 60 N.Y.S.3d 822 ). Furthermore, the petition adequately alleged that with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, the mother engaged in a course of conduct which alarmed and seriously annoyed another person, and which served no legitimate purpose (see Penal Law § 240.26 ; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 661, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ). RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, BARROS and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.

  5. Saquipay v. Puzhi

    160 A.D.3d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 15 times

    In addition, the evidence failed to establish that the appellant's conduct was committed with the intent to cause, or recklessly posed a risk of causing, public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm (see Penal Law § 240.20 ; Paruchuri v. Akil, 156 A.D.3d at 714, 66 N.Y.S.3d 326 ; Matter of Shiffman v. Handler, 115 A.D.3d 753, 753, 981 N.Y.S.2d 790 ; Cassie v. Cassie, 109 A.D.3d 337, 344, 969 N.Y.S.2d 537 ; Matter of Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 59 A.D.3d 621, 621–622, 875 N.Y.S.2d 86 ).Under the circumstances of this case, and in light of the reasonable necessity of providing protection to the petitioner, we find no basis to disturb the order of protection (see Family Ct Act § 842 ; Matter of Shank v. Shank, 155 A.D.3d at 877, 63 N.Y.S.3d 719; Matter of Frimer v. Frimer, 143 A.D.3d at 897, 39 N.Y.S.3d 226; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 662, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ). LEVENTHAL, J.P., COHEN, HINDS–RADIX and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.

  6. Rosenstock v. Rosenstock

    149 A.D.3d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming trial court's course of conduct harassment in the second degree finding

    The evidence demonstrated that the mother, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm the father, engaged in a course of conduct which alarmed and seriously annoyed the father, and which served no legitimate purpose (see Family Ct. Act § 812[1] ; Penal Law § 240.26[3] ; see also Matter of Frimer v. Frimer, 143 A.D.3d 895, 896, 39 N.Y.S.3d 226 ; Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 661–662, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 ). Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the order of protection.

  7. D.D. v. A.D.

    63 N.Y.S.3d 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Here, the Court finds that the incidents detailed above are sufficient to establish the necessary course of conduct, and finds that Husband's conduct served no legitimate purpose other than to alarm and seriously annoy Wife. See Matter of Jordan v. Verni, 139 AD3d 1067 (2d Dept.2016) ; See also Matter of Pochat v. Pochat, 125 A.D.3d 660, 3 N.Y.S.3d 112 (2d Dept.2015). A Temporary Order of Protection with "usual terms" was issued by this Court on or about June 11, 2013.