Poarch v. Finkelstein

2 Citing cases

  1. Garrison v. Bonham

    251 P.2d 790 (Okla. 1953)   Cited 10 times

    We think the contention of defendant must be sustained. We have, in numerous cases, announced the rule, which is now settled law in this state, that where a fact or facts have been judicially determined in an action and final judgment rendered in accordance therewith, such fact or facts cannot be again litigated between the same parties without impeaching the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done. American Bank Trust Co. v. Frensley, 167 Okla. 533, 30 P.2d 883; McKee v. Producers Refiners Corp., 170 Okla. 559, 41 P.2d 466; Poarch v. Finkelstein, 186 Okla. 523, 99 P.2d 871; Price v. Clement, 187 Okla. 304, 102 P.2d 595; Reinhart Donovan Co. v. Guaranty Abstract Co., 201 Okla. 334, 205 P.2d 881. In all these cases, and many more, which may be found listed in the Oklahoma Digest, Judgment Key No. 634, et seq., we announced and adhered to the application of the rule above stated, although the action in which the judgment was rendered involved a different cause of action from that in which the estoppel was pleaded.

  2. Employers Casualty Co. v. Stephens

    118 P.2d 232 (Okla. 1941)   Cited 1 times

    The facts with respect to it are not in dispute. Company cited Poarch v. Finklestein, 186 Okla. 523, 99 P.2d 871, and many other Oklahoma cases as authority for the rule that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as between the parties and their privies not only as to all issues actually litigated in the action, but as to all issues germane to the issues litigated that could have been litigated. Stephens and Semans do not question the rule announced, but they do insist that the judgment cannot be used in this action for any purpose because (1) the action pending in the federal court was not set up as a bar to this action until so late in this action as to amount to a waiver; (2) that the failure to set up the bar of the federal court action early in this action amounted to an implied withdrawal of the issues relating to this policy from the jurisdiction of the state court; and (3) the judgment of the federal court was dormant when first pleaded herein and ineffectual for any purpose.