Opinion
21-35989
11-02-2022
JENNIFER PLUTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 19, 2022 Seattle, Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Hon. S. Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00036-SKV
Before: TALLMAN, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Jennifer Plute appeals the district court's order affirming an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)'s denial of Social Security disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the district court's order. See Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). We may set aside the denial of benefits only if it is not supported by "substantial evidence or [if] it is based on legal error." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (cleaned up). "Substantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted). Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, we affirm.
1. Plute argues that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the medical opinions of Plute's treating psychologist, Dr. Shope, and an examining psychologist, Dr. Senske. Plute also argues that the ALJ improperly characterized her mental impairments as largely resulting from situational stressors, rather than medically determinable causes, and that evidence the ALJ cited as inconsistent with a disability finding is consistent with her claimed disability. Under the regulations applicable to disability claims filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs will no longer give specific or controlling weight to a medical opinion, but instead will weigh the opinion based on its persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a); 416.920c(a); Woods v Kijakzi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022).
Plute waived any challenge to the new regulations by failing to raise it in her opening brief. See, e.g., Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plute does not dispute that external stressors are cataloged in her treatment records. The question of whether Plute was disabled on account of a medically determinable impairment or faced difficult life circumstances is one for the factfinder. The detailed record of situational stressors Plute faced was a satisfactory basis for the ALJ's finding that the medical opinions of Drs. Shope and Senske were unpersuasive. The ALJ also concluded that Plute's medical records did not generally document significant abnormalities in mental presentation and pointed to Plute's ability to perform activities such as painting, caring for animals and a newborn, and maintaining relationships with her family and girlfriend. This evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ's determination that the medical opinion evidence was not persuasive.
2. Plute next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony and the lay witness testimony of her mother regarding her ankle issues and mental impairments. Where, as here, "the record includes objective medical evidence establishing that the claimant suffers from an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which [s]he complains," we require an ALJ to give "clear and convincing reasons" to reject a claimant's testimony. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
First, the ALJ properly considered the unexplained lack of treatment for Plute's ankle problems. A claimant's "unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment" is a "type[] of evidence . . . on which an ALJ can rely to find a pain allegation incredible." Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).
Second, regarding Plute's mental impairments, the ALJ's identification of situational stressors as a cause of Plute's impairments was also a clear and convincing reason to reject her claims about the extent of her limitations. The ALJ also cited evidence indicating Plute would be capable of interacting positively with others in controlled settings and attending appointments, which undermines her claim that she is unable to interact with others in a work environment. The ALJ therefore properly discredited Plute's testimony because her activities "contradict[ed] claims of a totally debilitating impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by regulation, Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed.Reg. 5844, 5863-64 (Jan. 18, 2017) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)).
Plute raises a similar challenge to the ALJ's rejection of lay evidence from Plute's mother. However, when a claimant's testimony is rejected for sufficient reasons, an ALJ may reject similar lay testimony on the same grounds. See, e.g., Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ explicitly rejected Plute's and her mother's testimony for the same reasons, and so did not err.
Because the ALJ's rejection of the medical and lay witness opinions was supported by substantial evidence and Plute raised no other challenges to the ALJ's five-step finding, we affirm the district court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
[*]This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.