Plummer v. Plummer

4 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. Smith

    350 Mo. 104 (Mo. 1942)   Cited 30 times

    (2) As the decree which subsequently became final did not award alimony the court lost jurisdiction to thereafter award alimony. Dickey v. Dickey, 132 S.W.2d 1026; Hagemann v. Pinska, 225 Mo. App. 521, 37 S.W.2d 463; Kinsella v. Kinsella, 60 S.W.2d 747; Stanley v. McKenzie, 29 Ariz. 288; Long v. Long, 5 P.2d l.c. 1048; Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N.W. 529; Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45, 37 P. 770; Bassett v. Bassett, 74 N.W. 780, 99 Wis. 344; Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 107, 147 N.E. 659; Moross v. Moross, 129 Mich. 27, 87 N.W. 193; Plummer v. Plummer, 14 A.2d 705; Jones v. Jones, 284 Ky. 511, 145 S.W.2d 90; Cameron v. Cameron, 31 S.D. 335, 140 N.W. 700; McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 49 P.2d 584; 19 C.J., p. 248, sec. 576; 17 Am. Jur., sec. 631; Mefford v. Mefford, 26 S.W.2d 804; State ex rel. Maple v. Mulloy, 322 Mo. 281, 15 S.W.2d 809; Edwards v. Edwards, 228 Mo. App. 449, 66 S.W.2d 969. (3) The trial court was without jurisdiction to award alimony after the decree, silent on that subject, had become final.

  2. Ingraham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    119 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1941)   Cited 4 times

    The same conclusion was reached under an almost identical statute in Bassett v. Bassett, 99 Wis. 344, 74 N.W. 780, 67 Am.St. Rep. 863. See also McFarlane v. McFarlane, 43 Or. 477, 73 P. 203, 75 P. 139; Saurman v. Saurman, 131 Or. 117, 282 P. 111; Plummer v. Plummer, Me. Aug. 12, 1940, 14 A.2d 705; Cameron v. Cameron, 31 S.D. 335, 140 N.W. 700, Ann.Cas. 1915D, 1062; Harner v. Harner, 255 Mich. 515, 238 N.W. 264; Duvall v. Duvall, 215 Iowa 24, 244 N.W. 718, 719, 83 A.L.R. 1242. The Board holds that because there is no decision of a Connecticut court construing the Connecticut statute creating alimony in a situation like that before the Board, the taxpayer has failed to prove the Connecticut law.

  3. Lindsley v. Lindsley

    374 A.2d 311 (Me. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    Were the inconsistency here to present a wholly domestic question, we would find the court's judgment controlling and determinative of the issue concerning the 1965 agreement. See: Lausier v. Lausier, 123 Me. 530, 124 A. 582 (1924); Plummer v. Plummer, 137 Me. 39, 14 A.2d 705 (1940); Coe v. Coe, 145 Me. 71, 71 A.2d 514 (1950). Cf. Doherty v. Russell, 116 Me. 269, 101 A. 305 (1917).

  4. Young v. Young

    329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974)   Cited 16 times
    In Young, the acceptance by a husband of a joint tenancy deed on a home before the adoption of the marital property statute did not transmute the property into marital property.

    Were this judgment to remain unaffected by the present review, plaintiff would be conclusively foreclosed, in the absence of a subsequent change in the Maine statute relating to alimony, from raising the issue of alimony in the future. Plummer v. Plummer, 137 Me. 39, 14 A.2d 705 (1940). Further, since the presiding Justice may have been induced to refrain from awarding alimony to plaintiff by his conclusions as to "marital property" and his disposition of it, our decision reversing the holding of the presiding Justice in these respects, and affective to require the presiding Justice to reconsider the distribution of property, changes the context in which the presiding Justice made his original decision to award no alimony to plaintiff.