Plum v. Becket

7 Citing cases

  1. Kachig v. Boothe

    22 Cal.App.3d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 132 times
    Holding that facts insufficient to constitute a basis for setting aside a prior judgment cannot serve as the basis for an action for damages on a tort theory

    ( Miller v. City of Bakersfield, 256 Cal.App.2d 820, 823 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 469]; Rest., Judgments, § 11, com. b.) (11) An action for damages for malicious prosecution or fraud constitutes a collateral attack on the judgments in the prior actions. (E.g., Roos v. Harris, 203 Cal. 201, 202 [ 263 P. 225] [malicious prosecution]; Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507, 511 [ 7 P.2d 1111] [malicious prosecution]; Gerini v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., supra, 27 Cal.App.2d at p. 55 [fraud]; Rest., Judgments, § 11, com. a; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) p. 3587.

  2. Alexander v. Scattergood

    51 Cal.App.2d 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 5 times

    There is no direct attack made upon the order of discharge herein grounded upon extrinsic fraud in its procurement, and therefore the presumption arises that the charges allegedly made by respondents against the plaintiff were true, and that the order discharging her was determined by the duly constituted authorities to be just and proper. ( Caraker v. Webster, 24 Cal.App. (2d) 300 [ 74 P.2d 1048]; Roos v. Harris, 203 Cal. 201 [ 263 P. 225]; Fetterley v. Gibson, 210 Cal. 282 [ 291 P. 411]; Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507 [ 7 P.2d 1111].) Of necessity it follows that if the charges contained in the order of her discharge were true and that the procedure provided by the charter for bringing about her discharge were adhered to, resulting in an ultimate finding that plaintiff was discharged for cause, then defendants cannot be held liable in damages therefor. [2] In view of the fact that plaintiff's cause of action arises upon a right derived solely from the charter of the city of Los Angeles, her complaint must allege compliance with the requirements of the charter in order to state such a cause of action.

  3. Prentice v. Bertken

    50 Cal.App.2d 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942)   Cited 8 times

    [3] In actions for malicious prosecution it must be alleged that the prosecution is at an end either by alleging that defendant was acquitted of the charge or by alleging facts showing the legal termination of the prosecution complained of in favor of defendant prior to the commencement of the action. ( Holliday v. Holliday, 123 Cal. 26 [55 P. 703]; Carpenter v. Nutter, 127 Cal. 61 [ 59 P. 301]; Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507 [ 7 P.2d 1111]; Wilson v. Troy, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 156 [ 64 P.2d 1141].) [4] We believe that the amended complaint fails to allege facts showing that the prosecution in question terminated in favor of appellant.

  4. Caraker v. Webster

    24 Cal.App.2d 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    In the absence of direct attack upon the order grounded on extrinsic fraud in its procurement it must be presumed that the charges allegedly made by defendants were true and that the order of discharge was proper. ( Roos v. Harris, 203 Cal. 201 [ 263 P. 225]; Fetterley v. Gibson, 210 Cal. 282 [ 291 P. 411]; Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507 [ 7 P.2d 1111].) It follows therefrom that the order sustaining the demurrer to the fourth amended complaint was correct.

  5. Andrews v. Young

    21 Cal.App.2d 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937)   Cited 6 times

    This uniform rule is predicated on the principle that proceedings in a court having jurisdiction of the party and the cause shall be free from collateral attack. ( Fetterley v. Gibson, 210 Cal. 282 [ 291 P. 411]; Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507 [ 7 P.2d 1111]; 16 Cal. Jur. 734, sec. 7.) Since the recital of a final judgment of conviction against the plaintiff conclusively presumes probable cause for the prosecution of the criminal case by the public officers, and the consequent guilt of the plaintiff, the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action based upon the criminal proceeding.

  6. Williams v. California M.P. Assn

    136 Cal.App. 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)   Cited 4 times

    This is based upon the contention that the police judge was without power to set aside the plea of guilty which had been entered and that all subsequent proceedings in the police court were, therefore, void. The appellant relies on the case of Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507 [ 7 P.2d 1111]. While it was held in that case that the setting aside of the judgment and sentence did not have the effect of setting aside the conviction which had been had on the merits, the remedies of a motion for a new trial and a motion for arrest of judgment not having been used, we see in that case nothing to support the proposition that where the basic proceedings are void they may not be set aside by a proper procedure.

  7. Norton v. John M.C. Marble Co.

    30 Cal.App.2d 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that a conviction establishes probable cause

    In Holliday v. Holliday, supra, the court said: ". . . when a person is charged before a competent court having jurisdiction of the matter, and is tried and found guilty, the judgment rendered, unless it is shown to have been obtained by means of fraud, is conclusive evidence of probable cause for making the charge, even though it is afterward held to be unauthorized and reversed on appeal." The rule as above stated has been followed by our appellate courts ( Black v. Knight, 44 Cal.App. 756, 770 [ 187 P. 89]) and referred to in Plum v. Becket, 120 Cal.App. 507, 511 [ 263 P. 225], Roos v. Harris, 203 Cal. 201, 202 [ 263 P. 225], and Bullock v. Morrison, 118 Cal.App. 112, 114 [ 4 P.2d 812]. The fraud relied upon to overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from the conviction of the complaining party need not be extrinsic fraud such as would support an action for the setting aside of the judgment itself, but the fraud may be intrinsic.