However, in view of the earnest insistence here and in Summrell v. Racing Asso., 240 N.C. 614, 83 S.E.2d 501, that cases cited in the Felton case as in accord with the conclusion reached departed from and were in conflict with a line of earlier cases, we deem it appropriate to discuss that subject further. We refer again to the Felton case, where we discussed at some length S. v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709, and Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688, and cited later cases approving these decisions. We referred to earlier cases, cited by the defendant as in conflict with S. v. Fowler, supra, and decisions based thereon.

" In Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688, an act relating only to Buncombe County and providing that certain provisions should be deemed written into private construction contract bonds executed in that county by corporate sureties different from those required by the general laws relating to the subject, was held unconstitutional on the ground that it conferred special privileges on residents of Buncombe County and imposed on corporate sureties in respect of such bonds executed there obligations not imposed in other counties or on individuals. In Plott v. Ferguson, supra, the Court expressly followed the reasoning in S. v. Fowlers supra, particularly in relation to Art. I, Sec. 7.

Our decision here is in accord with a long line of previous decisions of this Court reflecting a consistent interpretation of this constitutional limitation in striking down legislative grants of separate emoluments and special privileges. Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498; Motley v. Warehouse Co., 122 N.C. 347, 30 S.E. 3 (petition for rehearing denied, 124 N.C. 232, 32 S.E. 555); S. v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709; Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; Edgerton v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 205 N.C. 816, 172 S.E. 481; S. v. Sasseen, 206 N.C. 644, 175 S.E. 142; Brown v. Comrs. of Richmond County, 223 N.C. 744, 28 S.E.2d 104. See also: Cowan v. Trust Co., 211 N.C. 18, 188 S.E. 812; S. v. Warren, 211 N.C. 75, 189 S.E. 108; S. v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854.

The term "law of the land" is synonymous with "due process of law," a phrase appearing in the Federal Constitution and the organic law of many states. Yancey v. Highway Commission, 222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256; Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563; Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 120 S.E. 41; Parish v. Cedar Co., 133 N.C. 478, 45 S.E. 768, 98 Am. S. R. 718. These fundamental guaranties are very broad in scope, and are intended to secure to each person subject to the jurisdiction of the State extensive individual rights, including that of personal liberty.

The constitutional limitation contained in Art. I, sec. 7, has been frequently invoked by this Court to strike down legislation conferring special privileges not in consideration of public service. Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498; Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767; Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, 188 N.C. 278, 124 S.E. 611; S. v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709; Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; Little v. Miles, 204 N.C. 646, 169 S.E. 220; Edgerton v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 205 N.C. 816, 172 S.E. 481; Cowan v. Trust Co., 211 N.C. 18, 188 S.E. 812; S. v. Warren, 211 N.C. 75, 189 S.E. 108; Realty Co. v. Boren, 211 N.C. 446, 190 S.E. 733; S. v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 520; S. v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 28 S.E.2d 104. But where the motivation is for a public purpose and in the public interest, and does not confer exclusive privilege legislation has been upheld.

But whether we regard the imposition of the license fee as a State tax or otherwise, any law which, purporting to operate on a particular class, places upon those engaged in the business in a portion of the State a burden for the privilege which is exercised freely and without additional charge by those engaged in the business in other parts of the State is arbitrary in classification because it discriminates within the class orginally [originally] selected and extends to the latter a privilege and immunity not accorded to those who must, under the law, pay the additional exaction or quit the business. Constitution, Article I, section 7; Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498, 503; Plott Co. v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; S. v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290; Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N.C. 816, 172 S.E. 481; Frazier v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N.E. 696, 43 A.L.R., 1086. The imposition of local taxes on professions and trades is another matter. State ex rel. Wooldridge v. Morehead, 100 Neb. 864, 161 N.W. 569.

It is equally well settled that no act of the General Assembly ought to be declared violative of any constitutional provision unless the conflict is so clear that no reasonable doubt can arise. Coble v. Comrs., 184 N.C. 342; Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N.C. 452; S. v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498; Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446; Glenn v. Board of Education, 210 N.C. 525. The act provides that the board shall issue certificates and licenses "to anyone who shall qualify as to competency, ability and integrity."

If the effect of C. S., 6291, is to exempt insurance companies from the provisions of C. S., 2305, which provides that the legal rate of interest in this State shall be six per centum per annum, for such time as interest may accrue, and no more, and also from the provisions of C. S., 2306, which prescribes penalties for usury, and thereby to authorize insurance companies to charge, retain, or receive interest on loans made by them in this State at a greater rate of interest than six per centum per annum, this contention must be sustained. See Edgerton v. Hood, Comr., 205 N.C. 816, 172 S.E. 481; Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; Motley v. Warehouse Co., 122 N.C. 347, 30 S.E. 3; Rowland v. B. L. Assn., 116 N.C. 877, 22 S.E. 8; Meroney v. B. L. Assn., 116 N.C. 882, 21 S.E. 924; and Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 503. In the last cited case it is said that if the provision in the charter of the Bank of Statesville, which was involved in that case, must be construed as authorizing the bank to charge, retain, or receive interest at a greater rate than six per centum per annum, as contended by the plaintiff, then such provision was void, for the reason that it was in violation of section 7, and also of section 31, of Article I of the Constitution of this State.

The act, as written, has a tendency to create a monopoly and turn the business over to a privileged class without allowing personal surety or sureties, which was, until recent years, the kind of bond usually required and given. A statute applicable to Buncombe County, North Carolina, involving the same principle, was held void in Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446. See Flemming v. Asheville, 203 N.C. 810; S. c., 205 N.C. 765; In the Plott case, supra, at page 451, it is said: "The passage of laws not of uniform operation, the granting of special privilege and the like, are ordinarily contrary to our constitutional limitations.

he letter and spirit of the provision, because (1) it attempts to confer an exclusive and separate privilege on one class of creditors and debtors of a closed bank, which it denies to another class, with no just or reasonable ground for the classification; (2) it attempts to confer an exclusive and separate privilege on the creditors and debtors of one class of closed banks in this State, which it denies to the creditors and debtors of another class, with no just or reasonable ground for the classification; and (3) it attempts to confer an exclusive and separate privilege on the creditors and debtors of one class of closed banks in the counties, townships and towns designated in the statute, which it denies to the creditors and debtors of another class, with no just or reasonable ground for the classification. Statutes enacted by the General Assembly in violation of section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of this State have been declared unconstitutional and void by this Court in Plott v. Ferguson, 202 N.C. 446, 163 S.E. 688; S. v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709; Motley v. Warehouse Co., 122 N.C. 347, 30 S.E. 3; Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 498. The question as to whether a statute enacted by the General Assembly of this State, applicable to all creditors and all debtors of all closed banks in the State, providing that any creditor of such bank shall be authorized to sell and convey his claim against such bank to a purchaser who is indebted to said bank, and that such purchaser shall be entitled to apply such claim to the discharge of his debt to the bank at its full face value, would contravene section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting any state from passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, is not considered or decided on this appeal. For the reason stated in this opinion the judgment of the Superior Court is