Opinion
CV166027026S
03-11-2019
PLEASANT BEGINNINGS, LLC v. James F. CAMPISI et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Calmar, J.
On October 25, 2018, this court issued its decision in this matter, finding for the plaintiff, Pleasant Beginnings, LLC, on its claim of unjust enrichment in the amount of $ 15, 632 and allowed it to foreclose on its mechanic’s lien in that amount. On November 13, 2018, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-249, filed a motion for attorneys fees. On November 21, 2018, the defendants, James and Jennifer Campisi, filed their objection. Both parties filed supplemental memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. The court held a hearing on the attorneys fees on December 17, 2018. Afterwards, on January 8, 2019, the parties attempted to mediate their dispute, but could not resolve the matter. The court allowed the plaintiff to file a supplemental brief, which it did on January 18, 2019.
The plaintiff claims it is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to § 52-249 in the amount of $ 50, 633.50. The defendants object, arguing that the fees are excessive.
The defendants, in their initial objection to the plaintiff’s claim for attorneys fees, argued that the plaintiff is only entitled to fees incurred in the foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien, not the breach of contract or unjust enrichment claims. The court interprets this argument as an extension of the defendants’ argument that the fees are excessive. The defendants also initially argued that the fees exceed the amount permitted by General Statutes § 42-150aa(b). However, § 42-150aa(b) does not apply here because, although a contract between the parties existed, it did not include an attorneys fees clause, and, thus, is not a contract contemplated by § 42-150aa(b). See Clem Martone Construction, LLC v. DePino, 145 Conn.App. 316, 331 n.12, 77 A.3d 760, cert. denied, 310 Conn . 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013).
Section 52-249(a) provides in relevant part: "The plaintiff in any action of foreclosure of a mortgage or lien, upon obtaining judgment of foreclosure, when there has been a hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation of time for redemption, shall be allowed the same costs, including a reasonable attorneys fee, as if there had been a hearing on an issue of fact." "Section 52-249(a) has been construed as succinctly and unambiguously providing for the allowance of attorneys fees in actions for foreclosure of mortgages or liens." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 118 Conn.App. 367, 370, 984 A.2d 1084 (2009). The court must consider the legal work related to the plaintiff’s prosecution of an action, including work spent to defend the action against counterclaims. Clem Martone Construction, LLC v. DePino, 145 Conn.App. 316, 331, 77 A.3d 760, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 947, 80 A.3d 906 (2013); accord TDS Painting & Restoration, Inc. v. Copper Beech Farm, Inc., 73 Conn.App. 492, 519-20, 808 A.2d 726, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 925, 814 A.2d 379 (2002). "Section 52-529 plainly provides for attorneys fees in a foreclosure action when there has been a hearing as to the form of the judgment or the limitation of time for redemption." A&A Mason, LLC v. Montagno Construction, Inc., 49 Conn.Supp. 405, 412, 889 A.2d 278 (2005) .
As to the procedural aspects in this case, there is no dispute that this action is for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien, the plaintiff obtained a judgment of foreclosure by this court’s October 25, 2018 memorandum of decision, and that a hearing occurred on December 17, 2018. James Snyder and attorney Michal Bonnano testified to the scope of work done in this case and were subject to cross examination. The plaintiff also introduced exhibits, showing the time spent on all aspects of the litigation and the rates charged to the plaintiff. Thus, the procedural aspects of § 52-249 are met. The plaintiff is entitled to fees. The question, then, is how much in fees should the plaintiff receive.
"An award of attorneys fees is not a matter of right. Whether any award is to be made and the amount thereof lie within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of a case ... A court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bobinski v. Kalinowski, 107 Conn.App. 622, 628, 946 A.2d 283, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 919, 958 A.2d 150 (2008). "[T]o support an award of attorneys fees, there must be a clearly stated and described factual predicate for the fees sought, apart from the trial court’s general knowledge of what constitutes a reasonable fee ... [C]ase law demonstrates that a threshold evidentiary showing is a prerequisite to an award of attorneys fees." Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 477, 839 A.2d 589 (2004). "The burden of showing reasonableness rests on the party requesting the fees, and there is an undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorneys fees and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing ... That [showing] must include a statement of the fees requested and a description of services rendered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Zajaczkowski, 172 Conn.App. 405, 423, 160 A.3d 363, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 906, 163 A.3d 1205 (2017). The court "may assess the reasonableness of the fees requested using any number of factors ..." Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267 Conn. 480.
The fact that the claimed attorneys fees are more than the damages awarded at trial does not, standing alone, merit a reduction of the fees. See Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 200 Conn. 172, 195-96, 510 A.2d 972 (1986). Rather, the key consideration in evaluating a claim for litigation expenses is the overall extent of the success achieved. "Where a party succeeds on his [statutory] claim, but fails on other claims brought in the same suit, the size of his [attorney fee] award should reflect his success, as determined by the trial court, in securing redress for the injuries that prompted his [statutory] claim and reasonable legal cost incurred in pursuing this success. Consequently, even when the plaintiff’s claims are interrelated, the lodestar amount may be excessive when the plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success ... Again, the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcoff v. NCT Group, Inc., 52 Conn.Supp. 363, 376, 50 A.3d 1004 (2011), aff’d, 137 Conn.App. 578, 49 A.3d 282, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 924, 55 A.3d 566 (2012); accord Rice v. Ryders Health Management, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-11-6008602-S (June 16, 2016, Vacchelli, J.) (62 Conn.L.Rptr. 546).
In the present case, after consideration of all the facts and legal issues presented, the court orders attorneys fees in the amount of $ 12, 000 and costs in the amount of $ 1, 209.15. The court’s considerations included, but were not limited to, the following: The original lien sought $ 29, 177; the hearing on the defendant’s motion to discharge the mechanic’s lien; the plaintiff’s claimed damages of $ 59, 177; the plaintiff’s failure to prove breach of contract; the plaintiff’s claimed attorneys fees of $ 50, 633.50 and costs of $ 1, 209.15; the defendants’ claimed damages of $ 79, 420; and the defendants’ failure to prove its claims at trial.
In light of these considerations, both parties overreached. The plaintiff was not successful on all of its claims and the defendants did not succeed in their claims. Thus, the plaintiff’s limited success in this matter merits a reduction in attorneys fees. See Metcolf v. NCT Group, Inc., supra, 52 Conn.Supp. 376. Attorneys fees in the amount of $ 12, 000 and costs in the amount of $ 1, 209.15 are a reasonable reduction of fees that accurately reflects the degree of the plaintiff’s success in this matter.
Therefore, the court awards the plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of $ 12, 000 and costs in the amount of $ 1, 209.15.