"1.(a) In view of the provisions in each of the leases that `It is expressly agreed and understood that Lessee releases Lessor and/or Agent from any and all damage or injury to person or property of Lessee suffered upon the premises herein leased, and will hold the Lessor and/or Agent harmless from all damages sustained during the term of this lease,' there was no error in sustaining the motion for summary judgment in those cases brought by all appellees who were signatories to the leases ... Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 366 ( 183 S.E.2d 579); Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428 ( 144 S.E. 135); Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298 ( 163 S.E.2d 348)." Camp v. Roswell Wieuca Court Apts., 127 Ga. App. 67 ( 192 S.E.2d 499).

1. Where a lease contains a provision that "tenant for himself, his family, servants and guests releases landlord for any damage from water or steam, which risk tenant hereby assumes," the landlord cannot be held liable for damages by water to the lessee's data processing equipment located on the leased premises, nor for loss of business occasioned thereby, the water being caused by excessive water standing on the roof of the building, of which the leased premises was a part, because of lack of proper drainage from the roof caused by the landlord's negligence. Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428 (1) ( 144 S.E. 135); Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460, 462 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298 (2) ( 163 S.E.2d 348); Camp v. Roswell Wieuca Court Apts., 127 Ga. App. 67 ( 192 S.E.2d 499). That the leased premises was a part of a building and on a ground floor thereof, with six floors between the leased premises and the roof from which the water came, does not bring this case within the ambit of Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 106 Ga. App. 382, 388 ( 127 S.E.2d 43), this for the reason that the breach of duty sued upon in the present case is the breach of a duty of a landlord owed to a tenant, whereas, in the Gulf case, "The negligence upon which the ... suit is based was not negligence of Gulf as lessor in performing any duty with respect to the leased premises, but was committed outside the leased premises and had no relationship to the rights and duties created by the lease."

That such language does not specifically exclude warranties of fitness or warranties against latent defects does not mean the above disclaimer is ineffective. See Sport Shop v. Churchwell, 131 Ga. App. 718 (2) ( 206 S.E.2d 715); Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847 ( 156 S.E.2d 130); Plaza Hotel v. Fire Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Reid, 60 Ga. App. 119, 123 ( 3 S.E.2d 121). Both Plaza Hotel and Tribble deal with lease language exculpating the landlord's statutory duty to keep the leased premises safe, and are authority for exculpating the statutory duty sought to be imposed by plaintiff here.

Held: While provisions in rental contracts absolving landlords of liability for damages resulting from simple negligence have been upheld as not contravening public policy (see, King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 364 (2) ( 170 S.E. 546); Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428 ( 144 S.E. 135); Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372) such provisions in a lease contract will not release landlords from acts or omissions which are either wilful in nature or so reckless or so charged with indifference to consequences as to evidence a wantonness equivalent to an actual intent. See, Brady v. Glosson, 87 Ga. App. 476, 480 ( 74 S.E.2d 253); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Reid, 60 Ga. App. 119, 122 ( 3 S.E.2d 121).

Such exculpatory provisions between a lessor and lessee effectively release the lessor from liability which results from damage to person or property which is due to the ordinary negligence of the lessor. Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298 ( 163 S.E.2d 348); Camp v. Roswell Wieuca Court Apts., 127 Ga. App. 67 ( 192 S.E.2d 499). However, such release clauses cannot relieve a lessor from liability for wilful or wanton conduct.

1. Provisions in rental contracts absolving landlords of liability for damages resulting from simple negligence have been upheld as not contravening public policy. See King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360, 364 (2) ( 170 S.E. 546); Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428 ( 144 S.E. 135); Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372). 2.

1. If the doctor is, in effect, giving a legal opinion in the letter for use in interpreting the contract, it goes beyond permissible limits of testimony and should not be considered. See Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Co., 87 Ga. App. 460, 462 ( 74 S.E.2d 372). Construction of all contracts, even an ambiguous one, is for the court, and this applies to insurance contracts as well as to others.

It was held to constitute a release as between the lessor and the lessee. In subsequent cases ( Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460, 462 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298 (1) ( 163 S.E.2d 348); Camp v. Roswell Wieuca Court Apartments, 127 Ga. App. 67 ( 192 S.E.2d 499)), this court reiterated the rule that a release would serve to absolve the lessor from liability. Scarboro Enterprises v. Hirsh, 119 Ga. App. 866, 869 ( 169 S.E.2d 182) involved the application of an indemnity agreement which we held would not preclude the lessee from suing the lessor.

Held: 1. (a) In view of the provisions in each of the leases that "It is expressly agreed and understood that Lessee releases Lessor and/or Agent from any and all damage or injury to person or property of Lessee suffered upon the premises herein leased, and will hold the Lessor and/or Agent harmless from all damages sustained during the term of this lease," there was no error in sustaining the motion for summary judgment in those cases brought by all appellees who were signatories to the leases, to wit: Dorothy L. Camp, Martha Heath, Richard B. Sands, Kathryn Spano and Mr. Lai Quan. Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 366 ( 183 S.E.2d 579); Capital Wall Paper Co. v. Callan Court Co., 38 Ga. App. 428 ( 144 S.E. 135); Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Carter v. Noe, 118 Ga. App. 298 ( 163 S.E.2d 348). (b) That Mrs. Quan, a complainant in the suit with her husband, negotiated the lease and signed the husband's name thereto, who ratified such action and that she had notice of the contents of the lease did not make her a signatory thereto so as to be bound as a lessee by the release clause.

While a release has the effect of freeing the landlord from responsibility, an indemnity agreement will not, in the absence of explicit language to this effect, release the indemnitee from the consequences of his own negligence. Batson-Cook Co. v. Ga. Marble c. Co., 112 Ga. App. 226, 230 ( 144 S.E.2d 547); Scarboro Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirsh, 119 Ga. App. 866, 870, supra; Plaza Hotel Co. v. Fine Products Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460 ( 74 S.E.2d 372); Bohannon v. Southern R. Co., 97 Ga. App. 849 ( 104 S.E.2d 603); Ins. Co. of North Amer. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 106 Ga. App. 382, 389 ( 127 S.E.2d 43). The lease provisions applicable in the present case are as follows: "Tenant accepts premises in the condition in which they now are and as suited for the use intended by tenant.