. Because CPLR 3211 (a) (7) does double duty in declaratory judgment actions as both a facial sufficiency screening mechanism and an accelerated-judgment mechanism, a motion to dismiss a declaratory claim under that provision must be analyzed in three steps (see generally Matter ofJacobs v. Cartalemi , 156 A.D.3d 635, 637-638, 66 N.Y.S.3d 503 [2d Dept. 2017], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 903, 2018 WL 4354772 [2018] ; Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett , 115 A.D.3d 1165, 1166, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 [4th Dept. 2014] ; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Poughkeepsie , 87 A.D.3d 1148, 1150-1151, 930 N.Y.S.2d 34 [2d Dept. 2011] ). At the first step, the "only question is whether a proper case is presented for invoking the jurisdiction of the court to make a declaratory judgment, and not whether [any party] is entitled to a [particular] declaration" ( County of Monroe v. Clough Harbour & Assoc., LLP , 154 A.D.3d 1281, 1282, 62 N.Y.S.3d 677 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

, 4 A.D.2d 117, 129-130 [2d Dept 1957], affd 4 N.Y.2d 866 [1958]). Because CPLR 3211 (a) (7) does double duty in declaratory judgment actions as both a facial sufficiency screening mechanism and an accelerated-judgment mechanism, a motion to dismiss a declaratory claim under that provision must be analyzed in three steps (see generally Matter of Jacobs v Cartalemi, 156 A.D.3d 635, 637-638 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 903 [2018]; Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165, 1166 [4th Dept 2014]; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 A.D.3d 1148, 1150-1151 [2d Dept 2011]). At the first step, the "only question is whether a proper case is presented for invoking the jurisdiction of the court to make a declaratory judgment, and not whether [any party] is entitled to a [particular] declaration" (County of Monroe v Clough Harbour & Assoc., LLP, 154 A.D.3d 1281, 1282 [4th Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

[s]ince there is no indication in the amended complaint that the SACA was ever approved by the Town Supervisor or ratified by the Town Board , the amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim that a valid and binding contract existed between SRB Convention and the Town that was intended for plaintiff's benefit . See , e.g. , Merrick Gables Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead , 691 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because there was no indication that the alleged agreement[s] were ever approved by the Hempstead Town Supervisor or ratified by the Hempstead Town Board); Plaza Drive Grp. of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett , 115 A.D.3d 1165, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (granting judgment in favor of the Town of Sennett declaring that a certain unsigned letter agreement was not a binding contract and was unenforceable against it because the plaintiff had not alleged that the Sennett Town Board considered or approved the letter agreement as required by [N.Y.] Town Law § 64(6) so as to establish a valid contract.).

Since there is no indication in the amended complaint that the SACA was ever approved by the Town Supervisor or ratified by the Town Board, the amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim that a valid and binding contract existed between SRB Convention and the Town that was intended for plaintiff's benefit. See, e.g. Merrick Gables Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 691 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim because there was no indication that the alleged agreement were ever approved by the Hempstead Town Supervisor or ratified by the Hempstead Town Board); Plaza Drive Grp. of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (granting judgment in favor of the Town of Sennett declaring that a certain unsigned letter agreement was not a binding contract and was unenforceable against it because the plaintiff had not alleged that the Sennett Town Board considered or approved the letter agreement as required by [N.Y.] Town Law § 64(6) so as to establish a valid contract.) Indeed, it is clear from the documents attached to the amended complaint that, unlike the Concession Agreement, the FACA and the Extension Agreement, which were all executed by Venditto as the then-Town Supervisor, the SACA was executed by Genova, as the then-Town Attorney; not by the Town Supervisor. (See Am. Compl., Ex. F).

Thus, respondents failed to meet their burden of submitting documentary evidence that conclusively refuted petitioner's allegations (seeBakos v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 83 A.D.3d 1485, 1486, 920 N.Y.S.2d 552 [4th Dept. 2011] ; see alsoLots 4 Less Stores, Inc. v. Integrated Props., Inc., 152 A.D.3d 1181, 1182–1183, 59 N.Y.S.3d 628 [4th Dept. 2017] ). In addition, deeming the material allegations of the petition-complaint to be true, we conclude that "the allegations in the second cause of action presented a justiciable controversy sufficient to invoke the court's power to render a declaratory judgment," and thus respondents were not entitled to dismissal of that cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) ( Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165, 1165, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 [4th Dept. 2014] ; seeCounty of Monroe v. Clough Harbour & Assoc., LLP, 154 A.D.3d 1281, 1282, 62 N.Y.S.3d 677 [4th Dept. 2017] ).

We conclude that the court properly denied that part of defendant's cross motion seeking to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(7). It is well established that a declaratory judgment is a discretionary remedy (see CPLR 3001 ; Bower & Gardner v. Evans, 60 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 469 N.Y.S.2d 676, 457 N.E.2d 782 ; Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150, cert. denied 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 ), and "the [general] rule in declaratory judgment actions [is] that on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the only question is whether a proper case is presented for invoking the jurisdiction of the court to make a declaratory judgment, and not whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration favorable to him" ( Law Research Serv. v. Honeywell, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 900, 901, 298 N.Y.S.2d 1 ; see Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165, 1166, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the existence of triable issues of fact does not preclude declaratory relief (see Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 99–100, 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 703, 2010 WL 2572017 ; Empire Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 35 A.D.2d 1074, 1074, 316 N.Y.S.2d 395 ; Armstrong v. County of Onondaga, Onondaga County Water Dist., 31 A.D.2d 735, 736, 297 N.Y.S.2d 95 ).

However, “where the court, deeming the material allegations of the complaint to be true, is nonetheless able to determine, as a matter of law, that the defendant is entitled to a declaration in his or her favor, the court may enter a judgment making the appropriate declaration” (DiGiorgio v. 1109–1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102 A.D.3d at 728, 958 N.Y.S.2d 417 ; see Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 A.D.3d 1148, 1150–1151, 930 N.Y.S.2d 34 ; Washington County Sewer Dist. No. 2 v. White, 177 A.D.2d 204, 206, 581 N.Y.S.2d 485 ). Here, deeming the material allegations of the complaint to be true and considering the documents that were attached to and made part of the complaint (see CPLR 3014 ), including the stipulation of settlement, the Supreme Court properly determined, as a matter of law, that Pantorilla was entitled to a declaration in her favor (see Plaza Dr. Group of CNY, LLC v. Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165, 1166, 982 N.Y.S.2d 610 ; Minovici v. Belkin BV, 109 A.D.3d 520, 524, 971 N.Y.S.2d 103 ). The Pilgrims' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Given the foregoing, a motion to dismiss a declaratory claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7) must be analyzed in three steps. Matter of Kerri W.S. v. Zucker. 202 A.D.3d 143 (4th Dept 2021) leave to appeal dismissed 38 N.Y.3d 1028; Plaza Drive Group of CNY, LLC v Town of Sennett, 115 A.D.3d 1165 (4th Dept 2014).

. . . 'If no issue of fact is raised by the pleadings, or if the facts are conceded, a proper case is presented for judgment on the merits on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.'" Fillman v Axel, supra, at 876, quoting Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc., supra at 901; see Hoffman v City of Syracuse, 2 NY2d 484 (1957); Plaza Drive Group of CNY, LLC v Town of Sennett, 115 AD3d 1165 (4th Dept. 2014). Matter of Tilcon, Inc., supra.

. . . 'If no issue of fact is raised by the pleadings, or if the facts are conceded, a proper case is presented for judgment on the merits on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.'" Fillman v Axel, supra, at 876, quoting Law Research Serv. v Honeywell, Inc., supra at 901; see Hoffman v City of Syracuse, 2 NY2d 484 (1957); Plaza Drive Group of CNY, LLC v Town of Sennett, 115 AD3d 1165 (4th Dept. 2014). Matter of Tilcon, Inc., supra.