Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-0697, Section "N".
November 22, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
On January 7, 2000 the Social Security Administration Appeals Council upheld an Administrative Law Judge's determination that Plaintiff Darryl Plains is not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplementary security income. The ALJ rejected Mr. Plains' contention that a combination of impairments — hypertension, a fused left ankle which causes severe pain, degenerative joint disease of the lower spine, and suspected myocardial ischemia — had left him totally disabled. Mr. Plains now appeals the Commissioner's final decision. For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.
A. BACKGROUND
In 1981 and 1991, Darryl Plains sustained significant injuries to his left ankle. But for two days in 1997, Mr. Plains has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the 1991 injury. On November 20, 1996, an Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Plains disabled for the closed period from October 20, 1994 through March 31, 1996.
On May 9, 1997, Mr. Plains filed subsequent applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSI) for alleged disability beginning November 1996 due to back and ankle pain. These applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, and Mr. Plains requested a hearing de novo before an ALJ. The hearing was held on May 13, 1998. On July 20, 1998, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Mr. Plains' requests for benefits. The ALJ concluded that Mr. Plains had a severe impairment or combination of impairments due to a solid fusion of his left ankle, high blood pressure, an anomalous T wave in his EKG, mild degenerative disc disease in his spine, and chronic back pain, but found that he retained the residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work. Consequently, the ALJ determined that Mr. Plains was not disabled within the relevant Medical Vocational Guideline and the Social Security Act. On January 7, 2000, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Plains' request to review the ALJ's decision.
On March 3, 2000, Mr. Plains filed the civil action presently before the Court. Mr. Plains seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mr. Plains asserts that his pain alone renders him totally disabled and contends that "the ALJ failed to give [sufficientj weight to the objective, findings which support [his] complaints of severe pain." Pl.'s Mem. pp. 3-4.
1. Definition of Disability
Disability under the Act is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of receiving either disability insurance benefits or SSI, a five-step "sequential evaluation" is used:
1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical findings.
2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found to be disabled.
3. An individual who meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors.
4. If an individual is capable of performing the work he has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made.
5. If an individual's impairments preclude him from performing his past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed.Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 1984, 131 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995) (paraphrasing relevant sections of the C.F.R.). "A finding that a claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Id. (quoting Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987)). The applicant bears the initial burden of showing that he is disabled, which means that he bears the burden of proof on the first four steps of the sequential analysis. See id. Once this initial burden is satisfied, the Secretary bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. See id.
As noted above, the ALJ determined that, despite his impairments, Mr. Plains was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Although Mr. Plains was not working, was severely impaired, and could not perform his past relevant work, the ALJ found that his age, education, past relevant work, transferability of skills and residual functional capacity directed a finding that Mr. Plains was not disabled. Admin Tr. pp. 20-22 (Findings 8, 9, 14, 18, 19). The ALJ's decision entailed an evaluation of Mr. Plains' credibility with respect to his subjective complaints of pain, as discussed below.
2. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision under the Act is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and (2) whether the proper legal standards were used in evaluating the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. Substantial evidence "is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings as to any fact are treated as conclusive and must be affirmed. See id. at 390, 91 S.Ct. at 1422. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only where no credible evidence or medical findings exist to support the decision. See Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). In applying the substantial evidence standard, the Court must scrutinize the record to determine whether such evidence is present but may not re-weigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner's. See Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.
Where, as here, a claimant's pain is at issue, the Court must be mindful that "[t]he evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms is a task particularly within the province of the ALJ, who has had an opportunity to observe whether the person seems to be disabled." Loya v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1983). However, "an ALJ's unfavorable credibility evaluation of a claimant's complaints of pain will not be upheld on judicial review where the uncontroverted medical evidence shows a basis for the claimant's complaints unless the ALJ weighs the objective medical evidence and assigns articulated reasons for discrediting the claimant's subjective complaints of pain." Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1988)
3. Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Plains suggests that the ALJ improperly relied exclusively upon his demeanor at the hearing in determining the credibility of his complaints of plain. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990) ("exclusive reliance upon demeanor in credibility determinations is inappropriate"). He contends that "the ALJ failed to give weight to the objective findings which support [his] complaints of severe pain." Pl.'s Mem. pp. 3-4. Specifically, Mr. Plains notes that
· a January 26, 1996 x-ray of his left ankle reveals mild generalized soft tissue edema;
· January 13, 1997 x-rays of his left ankle show a previous fracture of the fibula with some resorption of the distal end, ankylosis of the remaining distal fibula with the tibia, and two screws affixing a bony fusion of the whole joint between the talus and the distal tibia;
· a July 23, 1997 examination by Dr. Williams, the consultative orthopedist, indicates swelling of the left ankle; and
· April 23, 1998 x-rays of his left ankle reveal a likely small extosis from the proximal phalanx of the fourth toe.
Although he contends that several maladies cause him pain, Mr. Plains' chief complaint involves pain originating in his left ankle. Pl.'s Mem. p. 3 ("Mr. Plains suffers from severe pain on a daily basis mostly due to his left ankle.").
The ALJ found that Mr. Plains' "statements concerning his impairments and their impact on his ability to work . . . [were] not entirely credible." Admin. Tr. 21 (Finding 10). Part of this determination did, in fact, rest on an evaluation of Mr. Plains' demeanor: the ALJ noted that, in contrast to his complaints of constant pain in his left ankle, Mr. Plains "showed no sign of distress from his alleged constant pain" at the hearing. Admin. Tr. 17-18. However, the written decision indicates that the ALJ also considered all of the objective and subjective evidence in the record, including the evidence Mr. Plains cites in his memorandum, in making his decision. The ALJ discussed this evidence in detail in the "Rationale" section of his written decision and, quite notably, found that Mr. Plains was more impaired than had the state medical consultants who had considered the evidence previously. See Admin. Tr. 17-18 (giving little weight to the state consultants' determinations regarding Mr. Plains' residual functional capacity and the severity of his impairments and reaching independent conclusions).
Evidence that supports a finding of impairment, however, does not necessarily support a finding of disabling pain, and the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the record lacks objective evidence that would support such a finding. For example, there is no recent evidence regarding limitations on Mr. Plains' range of motion, muscular atrophy, weight loss, or impairment of general nutrition. See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Nor is there evidence that Mr. Plains required frequent or extraordinary treatment to relieve his pain; the evidence indicates that he used ibuprofen, Advil, and non-steroidal anti-inflammatories, on an infrequent, "as needed" basis. See Villa, 895 F.2d at 1024 (holding that an ALJ may consider lack of treatment as an indication of nondisability). Perhaps most important, no physician stated that Mr. Plains' pain is severe or disabling. See Harper v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact that no physician had stated that the claimant was physically disabled supported the ALJ's determination of nondisability). Dr. Williams opined that Mr. Plains "should not work in any capacity which requires prolonged, uninterrupted standing or walking, climbing, squatting, kneeling or walking on uneven surfaces . . .," but did not state that Mr. Plains should not engage in sedentary work. Admin. Tr. 195 (July 23, 1997). Dr. Williams also noted that Mr. Plains "did not complain of pain when pressure was applied to various points about his ankle." Id.
Based on the record evidence and the ALJ's written decision, it is clear to the Court that the ALJ properly considered both the subjective and objective evidence of Mr. Plains' pain when he determined that Mr. Plains is not disabled and that this decision is supported by substantial evidence.
C. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court finds that the ALJ's determination of nondisability is supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.