P.K.B. v. J.R.B.

Full title: P.K.B. APPELLANT v. J.R.B. APPELLEE

Court: Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

Date published: Feb 28, 2014

NO. 2013-CA-000675-ME (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2014)

Opinion

NO. 2013-CA-000675-ME

02-28-2014

P.K.B. APPELLANT v. J.R.B. APPELLEE

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Andrew W. Green Cincinnati, Ohio BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: William R. Adkins Williamstown, Kentucky

THOMPSON

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE STEPHEN L BATES, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 03-AD-00006

OPINION

AFFIRMING

BEFORE: LAMBERT, STUMBO AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. THOMPSON, JUDGE: P.K.B. appeals from the March 6, 2013, order of the Grant Circuit Court denying her motion to reverse her adoption of her two sons, C.J.B. and C.T.B. We affirm.

Appellee J.R.B. is the biological father of C.J.B. and C.T.B. The parties were married in 1999, at which time C.J.B. and C.T.B. were in the sole custody and care of appellee. In 2003, appellant filed a petition for a voluntary adoption of C.J.B. and C.T.B., in which she sought to terminate the parental rights of her stepsons' biological mother, J.R.B., and adopt them. J.R.B. and appellee consented to the adoption. On October 29, 2003, judgments of adoption were entered with respect to each child and appellant became the legal mother of both.

In addition, the parties have two daughters born of the marriage. In March 2010, appellant filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. A copy of the record in that dissolution proceeding has not been provided to this Court. Nonetheless, both parties indicate the dissolution proceeding was contentious, in particular as it pertained to the parties' custody and visitation of C.J.B. and C.T.B. On November 30, 2012, appellant filed, in the underlying adoption action, a motion to reverse adoption/vacate judgment. In a supporting memorandum, appellant indicated she had spent little to no time with her sons since the filing of the dissolution action; the parties had been unable to resolve visitation and parental rights issues; her sons had indicated a refusal to spend time with her; and there was a huge amount of animosity and conflict among herself, appellee, and their sons, that could never be resolved. Appellant then requested the 2003 judgments of adoption be vacated. Following several responsive pleadings from both parties, the trial court denied appellant's motion in an order entered on March 6, 2013, stating:

[t]he movant has essentially provided no real authority for her position. Even if the Court accepts as true all
facts asserted by her attorney in her briefs, there is nothing to support her [m]otion.

This appeal followed.

Appellant argues to this Court the trial court erred in denying her motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant maintains the adoption judgments should be vacated, under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02, because the adoption was a mistake forcing a relationship between her and her sons which does not serve their best interests and the relationship between appellant and her sons is no longer equitable. Appellant further argues the following extraordinary reasons for a reversal: 1) the relationship created by the adoption no longer exists; 2) appellant has been threatened with physical harm by her sons; 3) reversal would be in everyone's best interest; and 4) none of the parties wish for the judgment to continue. For the following reasons, we disagree that the trial court erred in its denial of appellant's motion.

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 199.540(2) provides challenges to a judgment of adoption must be made within one year.

After the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the entry of judgment of adoption, the validity thereof shall not be subject to attack in any action, collateral or direct, by reason of any irregularity or failure to comply with KRS 199.470 to 199.520, either procedurally or substantively.

KRS 199.540(2). This rule has been strictly enforced, even in cases where it was found that the judgment of adoption was erroneously entered. S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky.App. 2008). This Court has previously held:

[t]he public policy expressed in KRS 199.520(2) cannot be circumvented by the equitable doctrines of waiver or estoppel, nor by fallacious legal fictions, but it must yield to the Legislature's mandate, expressed in KRS 199.540(2), that, absent fraud on the court, all aspects of every judgment of adoption, however error-laden, shall be unassailable after the expiration of one year from the date of its entry.

Id. at 832 (emphasis added). Here, appellant has offered absolutely no legal authority for her argument that the judgment should be vacated. Instead, her arguments only relate to the state of the relationship between herself and her sons.

[I]t appears to be generally held that an adoption decree will not be vacated or annulled at the instance of an adoptive parent where his motives are purely selfish, or because of pecuniary interest in changing his position. Courts should not allow abrogation of an adoption if it is premised on the desire of adoptive parents to rid themselves of a bad bargain, or because of a mere change in attitude or regret.

Pierce, 522 S.W.2d at 436. Thus, the transformative nature of appellant's relationship with her sons is an insufficient basis for vacating the judgments of adoption. The one-year statute of limitations imposed by the legislature is clearly driven by public policy and the desire to avert the negative effects of retroactive annulment of adoptions based solely on the evolution of parent-child relationships. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's refusal to grant appellant's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Andrew W. Green
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: William R. Adkins
Williamstown, Kentucky