Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.

146 Citing cases

  1. Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.

    197 N.J. 543 (N.J. 2009)   Cited 494 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Noting that, when interpreting a statute, a court "look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen." (quoting Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008))

    As we have explained, in carrying out this important role, "we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen." Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.,196 N.J. 251, 264, 952 A.2d 1077 (2008). We will, in this effort, read the words selected by the Legislature in accordance with their ordinary meaning, D'Annunzio,supra, 192 N.J. at 119" 20, 927 A.2d 113, unless the Legislature has used technical terms, or terms of art, which are construed "in accordance with those meanings," In re Lead Paint Litig.,191 N.J. 405, 430, 924 A.2d 484 (2007).

  2. Long v. Mercury Ins. Grp.

    DOCKET NO. A-3238-10T1 (App. Div. Jan. 17, 2012)

    When interpreting the contract, we "examine the plain language of the policy and, if the terms are clear, they 'are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning.'" Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 270 (2008) (quoting Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001)). Our analysis also requires that any interpretation "fulfill the expectations of the parties," Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 206 N.J. 596, 608 (2011), interpret "the policy as written" and "avoid writing a better insurance policy than the one purchased."

  3. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Intermodal Properties, LLC

    215 N.J. 142 (N.J. 2013)   Cited 39 times
    In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Intermodal Properties, LLC, 215 N.J. 142, 147, 71 A.3d 830 (2013), a case involving the eminent domain powers of a railroad, our Supreme Court has provided us a good model.

    As we have long recognized, in general, “[i]n any matter requiring our consideration of a statute, our essential task is to understand and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264, 952 A.2d 1077 (2008); see also Roberts v. State, Div. of State Police, 191 N.J. 516, 521, 924 A.2d 550 (2007) (construing meaning of police disciplinary statute through use of extrinsic aids); Bunk v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 194, 676 A.2d 118 (1996) (construing intent of Legislature's amendment to Worker's Compensation Act). In engaging in that important task, “we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen.”

  4. Sanders v. Langemeier

    199 N.J. 366 (N.J. 2009)   Cited 5 times

    We begin, as we must, with a brief review of the principles that govern our analysis of the statutes that are central to this appeal. "In any matter requiring our consideration of a statute, our essential task is to understand and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.Co., 196 N.J. 251, 263-64, 952 A.2d 1077 (2008). "In doing so, we look first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen."

  5. Banach v. Tarakanov

    DOCKET NO. A-5505-14T1 (App. Div. Sep. 12, 2017)

    We also appreciate, however, that insistence on meticulous compliance with the applicable coverage selection form requirements is the legislative trade-off, as it were, for according the immunity. In Pizzullo v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, 196 N.J. 251 (2008), our Supreme Court addressed the immunity provision at issue in another UIM coverage case involving NJM. In Pizzullo, NJM argued that "because it is a direct-writing insurer and does not employ brokers or agents, it had no duty to plaintiffs other than to comply with the statutory notification requirements."

  6. Frank v. Reassure Life Ins. Co.

    548 F. App'x 706 (2d Cir. 2013)   Cited 2 times

    Under New Jersey law, a court interpreting an insurance contract must "first examine the plain language of the policy and, if the terms are clear, they are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning." Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 952 A.2d 1077, 1088 (N.J. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, however, "there is ambiguity . . . courts interpret the contract to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured, even if a close reading of the written text reveals a contrary meaning."

  7. G-I Holdings v. Reliance

    586 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2009)   Cited 95 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that judicial estoppel can apply if the party asserting a new position previously "convince[ed] the District Court to accept its earlier position"

    Thus, it is open to G-I to argue that (1) it was reasonable to expect that the Hartford policy period would include the period initially covered by the Reliance policy, and (2) this is one of those situations in which its reasonable expectations should trump the plain meaning of the policy. See Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 952 A.2d 1077, 1089 (2008) ("[I]n some circumstances, we have recognized that it might be appropriate to permit an insured's reasonable expectation to overcome the plain meaning of a policy."). This "reasonable expectations" approach to interpreting insurance contracts applies even where, as here, the insured is a sophisticated actor.

  8. Pieper v. USAA Cas. & Prop. Ins. Co.

    Civil Action 23-2331 (MAS) (JTQ) (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2024)

    Upon closer review, however, it appears that each cite that Plaintiff provides leads invariably to a 2008 New Jersey Supreme Court holding that the common-law duty which Plaintiff seeks to impose upon Defendant was abrogated. Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 952 A.2d 1077, 1086 (N.J. 2008) (finding that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1.9 “was enacted to abrogate the duty imposed on insurers, insurance agents, and brokers by earlier judicial decisions making them ‘liable for failing to advise their customers of the availability of additionalcoverage'”); (Am. Compl.

  9. Shoren Ventures LLC v. Freida Rothman LLC

    Civil Action 21-15544 (SRC) (D.N.J. Sep. 27, 2023)

    Courts typically are limited to the “plain, ordinary meaning” of contractual terms. Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 952 A.2d 1077, 1088 (N.J. 2008). Moreover, “[w]here the parties have made the writing the sole repository of their bargain, there is the integration which precludes evidence to antecedent understandings and negotiations to vary or contradict the writing.

  10. Castlepoint Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa.

    Civ. No. 1:14-cv-0792 (M.D. Pa. May. 13, 2015)

    Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010). In considering the meaning of an insurance policy, the court should interpret the language "according to its plain and ordinary meaning," id. (quoting Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.J. 1992)), and "avoid writing a better insurance policy than the one purchased," Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 952 A.2d 1077, 1089 (N.J. 2008). However, if the policy contains an ambiguity, it should be interpreted "to comport with the reasonable expectations of the insured, even if a close reading of the written text reveals a contrary meaning."