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Pizzi v. Scott

Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 22, 2014
160 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2014)

Opinion

No. SC14–1634.

12-22-2014

Michael A. PIZZI, Jr., Petitioner(s) v. Rick SCOTT, Governor, Respondent(s).


Opinion

On August 6, 2013, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida filed a criminal complaint charging Petitioner Michael A. Pizzi, Jr., who was then Mayor of the Town of Miami Lakes, Florida, with multiple counts stemming from alleged actions taken in his official capacity as mayor. On the following day, Governor Rick Scott issued Executive Order Number 2013 –217, which suspended Petitioner from office pursuant to section 112.51, Florida Statutes (2013). During Petitioner's suspension, the Town held a special election for mayor in accordance with the requirements of its charter. The permanent replacement mayor assumed office on October 8, 2013, and the new mayor's term will run until the next regularly scheduled election in November 2016.

Petitioner's trial commenced on July 8, 2014. The jury returned a verdict on August 14, 2014, finding Petitioner not guilty on all charges. On the following day, Petitioner requested the Governor to revoke Executive Order Number 2013 –217. On the same day, the Governor's office responded by letter declining to grant Petitioner's request. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court seeking an order compelling the Governor to revoke Executive Order Number 2013 –217. The Governor filed a response opposing Petitioner's petition.

Based on a preliminary determination that the mandamus petition filed in this case demonstrates a basis for relief, on September 29, 2014, this Court issued an order that provided the Governor with the opportunity to show cause on the narrow issue of why Executive Order Number 2013 –217 should not be revoked, pursuant to section 112.51(6), Florida Statutes (2013). This Court concluded that the Governor's response was warranted in light of the jury's verdict, on August 14, 2014, acquitting Petitioner of all federal felony charges. In the order to show cause, this Court stated that it was not suggesting that the Governor is required to reinstate Petitioner to his former municipal office, which has been filled by operation of a special election in accordance with the Town's charter.

The Governor timely filed a response in which he argued that because he is not required to reinstate Petitioner to his former municipal office, the Governor is not required to revoke Executive Order Number 2013 –217. Petitioner timely filed a reply in which he argued that in light of his full acquittal from federal charges, the Florida Constitution requires the forthwith revocation of Executive Order Number 2013 –217.

A petitioner is entitled to relief under this Court's authority to issue a writ of mandamus when: (1) the petitioner establishes a clear legal right to the performance of the requested act, (2) the respondent has an indisputable legal duty to perform that act, and (3) no other adequate remedy exists. See Pleus v. Crist, 14 So.3d 941, 945 (Fla.2009) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.2000) ).

This Court has carefully considered the Governor's response to this Court's September 29, 2014, order requesting him to show cause why the petition for writ of mandamus should not be granted as to the narrow issue of why Executive Order Number 2013 –217 should not be revoked, pursuant to section 112.51(6), Florida Statutes (2013). We have also considered the petitioner's reply to the Governor's response.

Under the Florida Constitution, when a municipal officer is indicted or otherwise charged with crimes, the Governor has discretion to suspend that municipal officer from office until acquitted. Art. IV, § 7(c), Fla. Const. However, upon acquittal of criminal charges, the governing statute states that the Governor has a mandatory duty to revoke the order that authorized the municipal officer's suspension. § 112.51(6), Fla. Stat. (2013).

In light of the Governor's duties set forth in section 112.51, Florida Statutes, and under article IV, section 7, Florida Constitution, the petition for writ of mandamus is hereby granted. However, because we believe that the Governor will fully comply with this order, by forthwith revoking Executive Order Number 2013 –217, we withhold issuance of the writ until January 2, 2015.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

CANADY, J., dissenting.

Because the Governor does not have an indisputable legal duty to revoke the executive order that suspended the Petitioner from office, the petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. Accordingly, I dissent.

The Petitioner's purported right to action by the Governor hinges on the meaning of section 112.51, Florida Statutes (2013), which provides that when a suspended municipal official is cleared of the charge on which the suspension was based “the Governor shall forthwith revoke the suspension and restore such municipal official to office.”

Ordinarily, the application of this statutory provision would create an indisputable legal duty both to revoke the suspension order and to restore the suspended official to office. Here, however, the Petitioner does not suggest that the Governor has a duty to restore him to office and thus oust the Mayor elected in a special election under the charter of the municipality.

To the extent that the Governor has no indisputable legal duty to restore the Petitioner to office, the Governor likewise has no indisputable legal duty to revoke the suspension order. The statute links the act of revoking an order of suspension with the act of restoring to office. If the act of restoring to office is not required to be performed, it is not clear that the linked act of revoking the order of suspension is required. And it is not clear that the Petitioner would benefit in any way from the act of revocation unaccompanied by an act of restoration.

Given these murky legal circumstances, a proper basis for granting mandamus relief does not exist. “[A] writ of mandamus will not be allowed in a case of doubtful right” and mandamus “will not lie to compel [the] part[y] against whom it is directed to do a vain or useless thing.” State ex rel. Bergin v. Dunne, 71 So.2d 746, 749 (Fla.1954).

POLSTON, J., concurs.


Summaries of

Pizzi v. Scott

Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 22, 2014
160 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2014)
Case details for

Pizzi v. Scott

Case Details

Full title:Michael A. PIZZI, Jr., Petitioner(s) v. Rick SCOTT, Governor…

Court:Supreme Court of Florida.

Date published: Dec 22, 2014

Citations

160 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 2014)