City of Kalamazoo v Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 262; 175 NW 480 (1919), quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed), pp 163, 264 ff. A county board of commissioners may not exercise a power not vested in it by statute. Pittsfield School Dist No 9 v Washtenaw Co Bd of Sup, 341 Mich. 388, 398; 67 NW2d 165 (1954). A county can exercise only such authority as is expressly or impliedly granted by a superior level of government, and always subject to such restrictions as are annexed to the grant.

Our decision of In re Appeal of General Motors Corp, 376 Mich. 373; 137 N.W.2d 161 (1965) said it is "the purpose of these procedures to adjust or correct all of the different modes of assessment to achieve uniformity among governmental units within a county and uniformity among all of the counties of the State. School District No. 9, Pittsfield Township, Washtenaw County, v. Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 405 [ 67 N.W.2d 165 (1954)], and Calumet Hecla, Inc., v. Township of Allouez, 363 Mich. 671 [ 110 N.W.2d 585 (1961)]." The STC's final order in this case intended to achieve uniformity within Washtenaw County.

The former language of MCL 211.24b specified that taxes were assessed on the basis of a parcel of property's state equalized valuation. See School Dist No 9, Pittsfield Twp, Washtenaw Co v Washtenaw Co Bd of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 406-407; 67 N.W.2d 165 (1954); Consumers Power Co v Muskegon, 13 Mich. App. 334, 341; 164 N.W.2d 398 (1968). The current version of MCL 211.24b provides in pertinent part:

"Equalization procedures attempt to meet the problem, it being the purpose of these procedures to adjust or correct all of the different modes of assessment to achieve uniformity among governmental units within a county and uniformity among all of the counties of the State. See School District No 9, Pittsfield Township, Washtenaw County v Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 405; 67 N.W.2d 165, 173 (1954), and Calumet Hecla, Inc v Township of Allouez, 363 Mich. 671; 110 N.W.2d 585 (1961). But apparently equalization never quite succeeds in overcoming the race for advantage.

See also MCLA 24.312; MSA 3.560(212) whereby a reference to the 1952 administrative procedures act in any other law is deemed to be a reference to the 1969 act.School District No 9, Pittsfield Twp, Washtenaw County v Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388; 67 N.W.2d 165 (1954); Calumet Hecla, Inc v Township of Allouez, 363 Mich. 671; 110 N.W.2d 585 (1961): MCLA 211.34; MSA 7.52. III

The State Tax Commission is the final arbiter of value in intercounty equalization disputes. Pittsfield Twsp. v. Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 404, 67 N.W.2d 165 (1954). The overall responsibility for statewide equalization was transferred in 1965 from the State Board of Equalization to the State Tax Commission.

"Equalization procedures attempt to meet the problem, it being the purpose of these procedures to adjust or correct all of the different modes of assessment to achieve uniformity among governmental units within a county and uniformity among all of the counties of the state. See School Dist No. 9, Pittsfield Twp, Washtenaw County, v Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 405 [67 N.W.2d 163 (1954)], and Calumet Hecla, Inc., v Township of Allouez, 363 Mich. 671 [ 110 N.W.2d 585 (1961)]."

Equalization procedures attempt to meet the problem, it being the purpose of these procedures to adjust or correct all of the different modes of assessment to achieve uniformity among governmental units within a county and uniformity among all of the counties of the State. See School District No. 9, Pittsfield Township, Washtenaw County, v. Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 405, and Calumet Hecla, Inc., v. Township of Allouez, 363 Mich. 671. But apparently equalization never quite succeeds in overcoming the race for advantage.

by the State's geologist because, by legislative definition, the value the geologist determines is true cash value. The difficulty with plaintiff's theory is that it proves too much. If the geologist's determination of value of mineral properties cannot be modified by equalization processes because it is true cash value, why cannot it be said that the township supervisors' and the city assessors' determinations of value of other properties cannot be modified by equalization, either, because they are required by law to assess at true cash values, too? The fact is that assessments of property are required to be made at cash value as determined by the assessing officer, whether township supervisor, city assessor, or State geologist. Their determinations of cash value are by no means final until subjected to the statutory process of county and State equalization. See Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors of Five Counties, 304 Mich. 328, and School District No. 9, Pittsfield Township v. Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388, 400-407. By specifying the formula by which the value of mineral properties are to be determined initially by the geologist, the legislature cannot override the constitutional mandate found in article 10, § 8 that —

The language of this statute, therefore, leaves no room for judicial construction. In re Merrill, 200 Mich. 244; City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178; City of Detroit v. Township of Redford, 253 Mich. 453; Detroit Trust Co. v. Hartwick, 278 Mich. 139; People v. Powell, 280 Mich. 699 (111 ALR 721); Detroit Edison Co. v. Secretary of State, 281 Mich. 428; In re Chamberlain's Estate, 298 Mich. 278; In re Gay's Estate, 310 Mich. 226; Geraldine v. Miller, 322 Mich. 85; Knapp v. Palmer, 324 Mich. 694; Van Antwerp v. State, 334 Mich. 593; Mercy Hospital v. Crippled Children Commission, 340 Mich. 404; Bartkowiak v. Wayne County, 341 Mich. 333; School District No. 9, Pittsfield Township, Washtenaw County v. Washtenaw County Board of Supervisors, 341 Mich. 388: Big Bear Markets of Michigan, Inc., v. Liquor Control Commission, 345 Mich. 569. No intent may be imputed to the legislature in the enactment of a law other than such is supported by the face of the law itself.