Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5475-13T1
11-06-2015
KENNETH PITTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Defendant-Respondent.
Swartz Swidler, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Joshua S. Boyette, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Benjamin H. Zieman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz and Higbee. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4628-11. Swartz Swidler, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Joshua S. Boyette, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Benjamin H. Zieman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Kenneth Pitts, appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, the State of New Jersey, Department of the Treasury, dismissing his complaint seeking compensation pursuant to the Mistaken Imprisonment Act (MIA), N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 to -6 (1997), amended by L. 2013, c. 171, § 1. The motion judge determined plaintiff was ineligible for relief for wrongful conviction and imprisonment as he had entered a guilty plea resulting in his conviction. We affirm.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal. Plaintiff pled guilty to a drug offense in 2009, and was sentenced to prison. In 2010, members of the City of Camden's Police Department were indicted and charged with conspiracy to deprive criminal defendants of their constitutional rights. Some of the indicted officers were directly involved in plaintiff's arrest. Following their indictment, the Camden County Prosecutor's Office moved to vacate guilty pleas and dismiss indictments against approximately 200 criminal defendants. Plaintiff's guilty plea was vacated and his indictment dismissed on December 7, 2010. Plaintiff had served approximately eleven months of his prison term.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant seeking damages pursuant to the pre-amendment MIA for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. The State moved for summary judgment arguing, plaintiff's conduct caused his conviction when he entered a guilty plea under oath.
We review the trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard as the motion judge. R. 4:46-2(c); Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014). We consider the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). The court must analyze the evidence "to identify whether there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).
When the trial court in this matter granted summary judgment for defendant, it held Mills v. State Dep't of the Treasury, 4 35 N.J. Super. 69 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 218 N.J. 273 (2014) controlled, and plaintiff was precluded from recovery under the pre-amendment MIA as a matter of law because he pled guilty. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's order of summary judgment, arguing Mills was incorrectly decided. We disagree.
The pre-amendment form of the MIA, which applied in Mills and applies here, requires the claimant to establish by clear and convincing evidence:
a. That he was convicted of a crime and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment, served all or any part of his sentence; and
b. He did not commit the crime for which he was convicted; and
c. He did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction.
[N. J.S.A. 52:4C-3 (1997) (emphasis added).]
In Mills, we reversed an order, which held a guilty plea was not a per se bar to recovery under the MIA. Mills, supra, 435 N.J. Super. at 74-75. We reversed, holding the Legislature did not intend for claimants who pled guilty to recover. Id. at 84. The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in Mills. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, he was the victim of wrongful police activity; however, his own conduct in entering a guilty plea caused his conviction.
The MIA has been amended. The post-amendment form, which took effect on December 27, 2013, modifies section (c) and adds section (d) as follows:
d. He did not plead guilty to the crime for which he was convicted.
[N. J.S.A. 52:4C-3 (1997), amended by L. 2013, c. 171, § 1 (emphasis added).]
Under the amended Act, it is undisputable defendants who enter guilty pleas are not entitled to compensation. The amendment confirmed our statutory interpretation set forth in Mills, as follows:
It could be argued that the Legislature might nevertheless have taken a different
view, consistent with the underlying remedial purposes of the Act, and that it did not intend to exclude recovery by innocent defendants who had pled guilty. However, we find nothing in the Act's legislative history or the wording of N.J.S.A. 52:4C-3 to suggest that the Legislature intended to do so.
[Mills, supra, 435 N.J. Super. at 84.]
Defendant claims Mills was wrongly decided because it did not require a hearing to determine if a plea was coerced. We now find, as we did in Mills, the Legislature did not intend to compensate defendants who admit their guilt under oath even if they subsequently claim they testified falsely in order to obtain a more favorable sentence. As was stated in Mills
Just because we are powerless to control or eliminate every negative practice in our criminal justice system does not mean that we must condone those practices. Though we recognize that sometimes an accused, unknown to the trial judge, will perjure himself to put through a plea agreement, a court cannot give official license to such a practice.
[Id. at 83 (quoting State v. Tacetta, 200 N.J. 183, 198 (2009).]
We find defendant's argument admitting he lied under oath to get a reduced sentence, unavailing. Defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea, providing a factual basis for his conviction under oath. Therefore, he does not qualify for compensation under N.J.S.A. 52:4C-3 (1997), amended by L. 2013, c. 171, § 1. The motion judge properly entered the summary judgment dismissal.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION