He further argues that the instructions given by the judge were sufficient because, based on common sense and common experience, jurors understand that the duty to drive at a reasonable and prudent speed of necessity also requires a driver to reduce his speed when, under the conditions existing, the speed at which he travels ceases to be reasonable and prudent. Although we find this argument persuasive, we are constrained by precedent established in Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814 (1961), and accordingly we reject Neal's argument. In Pittman, a teenager's car overturned at a sandy curve in the road, injuring a passenger.
Foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause. Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863; Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814. This does not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred, but that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected.
Jenkins v. Electric Co., 254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d 767. Foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause. Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863; Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814. This does not mean that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form in which it occurred, but that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683; Bondurant v. Mastin, 252 N.C. 190, 113 S.E.2d 292.
It is well settled by our decisions that foreseeability of injury is a requisite of proximate cause. Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814; McNair v. Richardson, supra. It is hornbook law that negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care for others' safety, which an ordinarily prudent man, under like circumstances, would exercise.
Westmoreland v. Gregory, 255 N.C. 172, 177, 120 S.E.2d 523, and cases cited. This requirement applies to the statutory law as well as to the common law. Pittman v. Swasson, 255 N.C. 681, 685, 122 S.E.2d 814, and cases cited; Greene v. Harmon, 260 N.C. 344, 132 S.E.2d 683. The question presented by defendant's assignments is whether the court's instructions relating to the contributory negligence issue substantially comply with these requirements. Defendant pleaded, inter alia, as contributory negligence, the violation by plaintiff of G.S. 20-129 and of G.S. 20-134.
The judge did not instruct the jury that defendant's failure to give audible warning was negligence per se. On the other hand, he did not read the statute to the jury, nor state in totidem verbis that failure to give audible warning is not negligence per se. To have done so would have had little, if any, meaning for the jury. The judge is not required to read to the jury the technical language of statutes; a plain and simple application of the principles involved is preferable. Pittman v. Swasson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814; Chambers v. Allen, 233 N.C. 195, 63 S.E.2d 212. It is clear from a consideration of the charge as a whole that the jury was told that defendant's duty was reasonable care under the circumstances.
(Citations)." Westmoreland v. Gregory, 255 N.C. 172, 177, 120 S.E.2d 523; Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 685, 122 S.E.2d 814. Under the circumstances, it cannot be determined in what way the jury, by its answer to the first issue, found plaintiff had breached its contract with defendant.
An examination of the charge reveals that the court instructed the jury with respect to negligence according to the common law rule of the prudent man only. In Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814, it is said: "Our decisions are as one in holding that the positive duty of the judge, as required by G.S. 1-180, to declare and explain the law arising upon the evidence in the case means that he shall declare and explain the statutory law as well as the common law arising thereon. Barnes v. Teer, 219 N.C. 823, 15 S.E.2d 379; Kolman v. Silbert, 219 N.C. 134, 12 S.E.2d 915; Spencer v. Brown, 214 N.C. 114, 198 S.E. 630; Williams v. Coach Co., 197 N.C. 12, 147 S.E. 435; Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N.C. 248, 114 S.E. 170.
" In Whitley, a new trial was awarded on the ground's "(t)he court in its charge on proximate cause omitted to give the essential element of foreseeability of injury." See Pittman v. Swanson, 255 N.C. 681, 685, 122 S.E.2d 814. In the decisions cited by plaintiff in support of the quoted instruction, whether the court erred for failure to instruct that foreseeability of injury is an essential element of proximate cause was not presented or considered.
In contrast to this case, evidence was adduced at the Hinnant trial about the speed of the vehicle. Guided by our Supreme Court's holding in Pittman v. Swasson, 255 N.C. 681, 122 S.E.2d 814 (1961), a case in which evidence of speed was also introduced at trial, we held in Hinnant that when the evidence suggests a breach of the duty to decrease speed, it is error for the trial judge to fail to submit that instruction, even if the judge does instruct on the driver's duty to observe a reasonable and prudent speed under the existing conditions. A critical distinction between this case and Hinnant is that, here, no evidence concerning Ms. Stutts' speed was introduced at trial.