Summary
In Pittman v. Pittman, 247 Ala. 458, 25 So.2d 26 (1945), a party claiming a reversionary interest in certain real property asserted that the recording of a mortgage and deed evidencing his title in the property had put certain individuals from whom he had purported to purchase his interest on notice of his claim.
Summary of this case from Brown v. First Fed. BankOpinion
4 Div. 388.
December 20, 1945. Rehearing Denied March 7, 1946.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Bullock County; J. S. Williams, Judge.
Bill to cancel a deed as a cloud upon title by Mary Cowper Pittman and Virginia Pittman Ravenscroft against James Foster Pittman and others. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, the named respondent appeals.
Affirmed.
The bill is in substance as follows:
On December 5, 1882, J. M. Foster, now deceased, grandfather of the parties to the suit, conveyed by deed the lands involved to S. J. Foster (now deceased) in trust for Mary Pittman, daughter of the grantor, and mother of complainants and respondents, for the term of her life, and at her death to her children. Another child of Mary Pittman is Anastasia Holmes Pittman, a non compos mentis, whose interest is not here involved. Mary Pittman, now more than 85 years of age, is still living and continues to reside upon the lands.
In 1914 or 1915 James Foster Pittman offered to purchase from complainants and the other respondents the reversionary interest in the land acquired by them as children of Mary Pittman by virtue of said deed of trust, and such interest as they might acquire in the future by descent, inheritance or purchase from said Anastasia Pittman, at a price of $2,000, to be paid upon the death of the life tenant, for which he offered to execute promissory notes payable to complainants and two of the respondents, in the sum of $500 each. All of the parties interested employed one J. T. Norman, an attorney, now deceased, to draft a deed and notes secured by mortgage in keeping with the offer made. Such papers were drawn and the deed was executed by complainants and the other respondents, and the notes and mortgage were executed by respondent James Foster Pittman. During the process of negotiation and prior to the completion of the transaction and delivery of the papers, complainants called upon Norman to deliver to them the deed and to James Foster Pittman his mortgage, in that complainants had decided not to accept the offer of James Foster Pittman. Norman declined to do so without all parties interested being present, but agreed to hold the papers pending instructions of all said parties. During the month of December, 1915, by some manner or means, and without the knowledge or consent of complainants the mortgage executed by James Foster Pittman was placed of record. On December 20, 1927, the attorney J. T. Norman died, and his son, C. D. Norman, came into possession of his files, containing the deed. Learning the whereabouts of the deed complainants made demand upon C. D. Norman for its return to them, but were unable to obtain possession of said deed. Thereupon they requested respondent James Foster Pittman to take necessary steps for the return of the deed to them. Subsequently without the knowledge, consent or authorization of complainants, C. D. Norman delivered said deed to respondent James Foster Pittman, who in turn and without the knowledge, consent or authorization of complainants, and against their will, placed the same of record. It is averred that the notes referred to in said mortgage were not delivered to complainants when said mortgage was recorded, and have not yet been delivered to them; that the lands involved have not inhanced in value since execution of said mortgage and deed, but remains the same as it was at that time; that since obtaining knowledge of the recordation of said deed complainants have made repeated demands upon said James Foster Pittman to take necessary action to remove said deed from the record as a cloud upon their title, but he refuses to take such action and claims title to the land, subject to the life estate, expressing his purpose to take possession upon the falling in of the life estate. It is averred that said deed is void in that same has never been delivered, and it is prayed that same be canceled as a cloud upon complainants' title. There is also a prayer for general relief.
Moseley McIlwain, of Union Springs, and Meader, Jones Murray, of Montgomery, for appellant.
Laches is a defense which may be raised by demurrer when the bill shows long delay in asserting the rights claimed. It is sufficient alone to bar equitable relief, especially where it has been so long confined as to render relief doubtful, uncertain, unfair or unjust. Gayle v. Pennington, 185 Ala. 53, 64 So. 572; Greenlees v. Greenlees, 62 Ala. 320; Scruggs v. Decatur Min. Co., 86 Ala. 173, 5 So. 440; Fowler v. Ala. I. S. Co., 164 Ala. 414, 51 So. 393; Ussery v. Darrow, 238 Ala. 67, 188 So. 885; Drummond v. Drummond, 232 Ala. 401, 168 So. 428; Wood v. Master Schools, 221 Ala. 645, 130 So. 178; Lewis v. Belk, 219 Ala. 343, 122 So. 413. The action is barred under the ten and twenty year statutes of limitations. Code 1940, Tit. 7, §§ 18, 20, 31; Drummond v. Drummond, supra. Lapse of twenty years without recognition of right or admission of liability operates as an absolute rule of repose. Alabama Coal Coke Co. v. Gulf Coal Coke Co., 171 Ala. 544, 54 So. 685; Jellerson v. Pettus, 132 Ala. 671, 32 So. 663; Black v. Pratt Co., 85 Ala. 504, 5 So. 89; McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala. 75, 70 Am.Dec. 529; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 24 Am.St.Rep. 894; Herren v. Beck, 231 Ala. 328, 164 So. 904. Rule of prescription is not affected by circumstances or situations. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 230 Ala. 567, 161 So. 820; Courson v. Tollison, 226 Ala. 530, 147 So. 635; Oxford v. Estes, 220 Ala. 606, 158 So. 534. Failure of memory, loss of evidence, death of parties, probability that whole truth cannot be ascertained and justice done, enter into equation as a reasonable basis for the rule. It is not a presumption merely, but a rule of law raising an absolute bar to ancient cause of action. It is broader and more comprehensive that a mere statute of limitation. Harrison v. Heflin, 54 Ala. 552; James v. James, 55 Ala. 525; Nettles v. Nettles, 67 Ala. 599; Garrett v. Garrett, 69 Ala. 429; Smith v. Gillam, 80 Ala. 296; Woodstock Iron Co. v. Roberts, 87 Ala. 436, 6 So. 349; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 6 So. 46, 9 So. 265, 24 Am.St.Rep. 894; Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578, 135 Am.St.Rep. 107; Scott v. Scott, 202 Ala. 244, 80 So. 82; Peters Min. Land Co. v. Hooper, 208 Ala. 324, 94 So. 606; Laird v. Columbia L. I. Co., 216 Ala. 619, 114 So. 208; Ala. Coal Coke Co. v. Gulf Coal Coke Co., supra; Salvo v. Coursey, 220 Ala. 300, 124 So. 874; Salmon v. Wynn, 153 Ala. 538, 45 So. 133, 15 Ann.Cas. 478; Rives v. Morris, 108 Ala. 527, 18 So. 743; Patterson v. Weaver, 216 Ala. 686, 114 So. 301; Meeks v. Miller, 214 Ala. 684, 108 So. 864; Veitch v. Woodward Co., 200 Ala. 358, 76 So. 124; 21 C.J. 3229, Equity; Dunn v. Ponceler, 235 Ala. 269, 178 So. 40; Bromberg v. First Nat. Bank, 235 Ala. 226, 178 So. 48; Johnson v. Delony, 241 Ala. 16, 1 So.2d 11. Unless there are special circumstances avoiding laches (in equity) or period of limitations, the rules apply and such special circumstances must be averred and proved. Drummond v. Drummond, supra; Peters Min. Land Co. v. Hooper, supra; Gayle v. Pennington, supra; Woodlawn Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 186 Ala. 234, 65 So. 183; Phoenix Chain Co. v. Daniel, 228 Ala. 579, 155 So. 363. When remainderman's title passes out of him, but subject to his equitable right to have it reinvested or to be subjected to a lien or trust, such right and duty to sue occurs as soon as the instrument is executed, not affected by the circumstances of its recordation. That duty is not postponed because grantor in instrument does not have immediate right of possession but is subject to life estate. He must not wait until life estate terminates without being chargeable with time intervening, since action does not affect his possession but his title. So that period of time necessary to complete bar of prescription is not in that event affected by period of such life estate. Herren v. Beck, 231 Ala. 328, 164 So. 904; Lewis v. Belk, 219 Ala. 343, 122 So. 413; Bishop v. Johnson, 242 Ala. 551, 7 So.2d 281, 287; Ussery v. Darrow, supra. Record of the instruments was notice of the contents thereof. Code, Tit. 47, §§ 95, 102. Whatever is sufficient to put one on inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry would lead. 15 Ala.Dig., Notice, 6; Gamble v. Black Warrior Coal Co., 172 Ala. 669, 55 So. 190; Alexander v. Fountain, 195 Ala. 3, 70 So. 669; Roberts v. Grayson, 233 Ala. 658, 173 So. 38. Record of the mortgage was the strongest notice that could be given complainants of appellant's claim. United States v. Shelby Iron Co., 273 U.S. 571, 47 S.Ct. 515, 71 L.Ed. 781; Herren v. Beck, supra.
Lawrence K. Andrews and R. E. L. Cope, Jr., both of Union Springs, for appellees.
Delivery of a deed is essential to its validity as a conveyance. 7 Ala.Dig., Deeds, p. 557, 54; Williams v. Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389, 30 So. 553; Culver v. Carroll, 175 Ala. 469, 57 So. 767, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 103; Perkins v. Perkins, 206 Ala. 571, 91 So. 256; Dawson v. Lindsey Co., 223 Ala. 169, 134 So. 662; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, p. 245, § 44. A remainderman, pending possession by life tenant, can maintain an action to quiet title. 16 Ala.Dig., Quieting Title, 12(6); Worthington v. Miller, 134 Ala. 420, 32 So. 748; Screws v. Wall, 203 Ala. 178, 82 So. 428; Miller v. Thompson, 205 Ala. 671, 89 So. 51. Laches rest in large degree on acquiescence, which presupposes notice of a status opposed to the title or equity sought to be enforced. Butt v. McAlpine, 167 Ala. 521, 52 So. 420. One cannot be deprived of remedy in equity because of laches unless he had knowledge of his rights. Norwood v. Am. Trust Sav. Bank Co., 216 Ala. 602, 114 So. 220. As respects defense of laches, want of diligence cannot be imputed to those under disability or to those who without their fault have no notice or knowledge of equity sought to be asserted; but rule of diligence applies to ascertainment of rights as well as asserting them by action. Oxford v. Ests, 229 Ala. 606, 158 So. 534.
Bill in equity to cancel a deed to defendant, James Foster Pittman (appellant), as a cloud on complainants' title.
General demurrers were interposed assigning laches, the statute of limitations and prescription, the permissible practice if such appears from the face of the bill. Ussery v. Darrow, 238 Ala. 67, 188 So. 885; Lewis v. Belk, 219 Ala. 343, 122 So. 413. This appeal is from the decree overruling the demurrers.
The salient facts presented by the bill will appear in the report of the case but, boiled down, the bill makes a clear showing that pending negotiations between the complainants (who owned the reversionary interest in the property subject to the life estate of their mother) and the respondent, James Foster Pittman (who was seeking to purchase the property), the complainants entirely withdrew from the transaction and before its consummation, while the deed and mortgage were still in possession of the attorney representing the parties, so notified said attorney, who agreed to keep possession of the documents and not to deliver them; that some years later the deed was delivered to the respondent and placed of record, without the knowledge or consent and against the express wishes and request of the complainants, all of which was only recently discovered by them. These averments show cause for the relief sought and sufficiently acquit the complainants of lack of diligence.
To have been efficacious as a conveyance of title, delivery of the deed was an indispensable requisite. Fitzpatrick v. Brigman, 130 Ala. 450, 455, 30 So. 500; Culver v. Carroll, 175 Ala. 469, 57 So. 767, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 103.
The "mere deposit of a writing complete in other respects as a deed with a person other than the one named as grantee or his agent, when unaccompanied with any intention of passing title, is not a delivery such as is necessary to constitute a deed." Tarwater v. Going, 140 Ala. 273, 275, 37 So. 330.
The deed was subject to be, and was, recalled by the grantors before delivery to the grantee and was therefore ineffectual to divest or pass title, Culver v. Carroll, supra, 175 Ala. 469 at page 472, 57 So. 767, Ann.Cas. 1914D. 103; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 11 Am.Rep. 592; Davis v. Cross, 14 Lea 637, 82 Tenn. 637, 52 Am.Rep. 177, and its delivery and recordation under the described circumstances in no way affected the complainants' instant rights unless the respondent's claim of title was brought to their knowledge for such a length of time as to place the responsibility on the complainants of contrary action to avoid the effect of laches.
There is no arbitrary rule as to when equity will refuse to intervene because of laches and each case turns much on its own facts. Oxford v. Estes, 229 Ala. 606, 611, 158 So. 534; Bromberg v. First National Bank, 235 Ala. 226, 178 So. 48.
There may be qualifying circumstances which will avert the application of the doctrine, as the complainant's justifiable ignorance of his rights, his disability from infancy or mental unsoundness, or that he was in undisputed possession of the property, or the pendency of another suit to enforce the same right, the existence of confidential relations, estoppel of the defendant, etc. Fowler v. Alabama Iron Steel Co., 164 Ala. 414, 420, 51 So. 393.
Laches is based on lack of diligence in seeking the aid of equity (Oxford v. Estes, supra, 229 Ala. page 611, 158 So. 534) and rests in large degree upon acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights and unreasonable delay of the complainant in not asserting his own to the prejudice of his adversary; and such acquiescence presupposes notice or knowledge of a status opposed to the title or equity sought to be enforced. Haney v. Legg, 129 Ala. 619, 625, 30 So. 34, 86 Am.St.Rep. 81; Butt v. McAlpine, 167 Ala. 521, 530, 52 So. 420; Norwood v. American Trust Savings Bank, 216 Ala. 602, 114 So. 220; Shepherd v. Kendrick, 236 Ala. 289, 181 So. 782; Dunn v. Ponceler, 235 Ala. 269, 178 So. 40; Montgomery Light Co. v. Lahey, 121 Ala. 131, 25 So. 1006.
Thus, laches will not preclude equitable relief unless he who seeks it has knowledge of his rights or of the claim of the opposing party or was possessed of such information as would put a person of ordinary prudence and diligence on inquiry which if followed up would reasonably lead to discovery of the situation.
Hence no want of diligence may be imputed to one who through no fault is without notice or knowledge of the situation which might otherwise call for earlier action.
This is our view of the case made by the bill of complaint.
The allegation that the delivery and recordation of the said documents were without the knowledge of the complainants in this cause and were not discovered "until recently" was not challenged by demurrer and, if it could be regarded as indefinite or a mere conclusion, was amendable to this extent. Williamson v. State, 244 Ala. 609, 14 So.2d 587. Standing unamended, the question of whether or not the discovery was of such recent origin as to preclude a bar of relief for laches will resolve itself into a question of fact should later pleading properly present the issue.
It is contended for appellant that notice of the status of the title and of the appellant's claim should be imputed to complainants because of the long past registration of the purchase-money mortgage and deed, even though recorded without the complainants' authority or knowledge.
The recording statutes, as constructive notice (Code 1940, Title 47, §§ 95 and 102), have no application. The notice arising thereunder applies only to those whose duty it is to search the record and no such duty devolved upon the complainants. 66 C.J. 1137, § 971, 1187, § 1042.
Generally, the constructive notice designed by these statutes purposes to affect subsequent parties and not those antecedent in the chain of title and "to protect innocent purchasers and creditors without notice, by preventing prejudice to them from prior unrecorded conveyances, made by those under whom they claim." Gimon v. Davis, 36 Ala. 589, 593.
Application of the principle is further illustrated in: New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Fry, 143 Ala. 637, 647, 42 So. 57, 111 Am.St.Rep. 62; Tennessee C., I. R. R. Co. v. Gardner, 131 Ala. 599, 32 So. 622; Winters v. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. 96; Blocker v. Boyd, 242 Ala. 345, 6 So.2d 19; Hendley v. First National Bank of Huntsville, 235 Ala. 664, 180 So. 667.
Likewise untenable is the insistence that enforcement of the equity appears from the averments of the bill to be barred by the statute of limitations and prescription.
The bill makes no case of adverse possession by appellant but, on the contrary, the life tenant is shown to be in the possession of the property. We follow the analogies of the law in such case and application of the principle presupposes adverse possession by the defendant. Scruggs v. Decatur Mineral and Land Co., 86 Ala. 173 (2), 5 So. 440; Waddail v. Vassar, 196 Ala. 184, 72 So. 14; Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92, 5 So.2d 73; Rowe v. Bonneau-Jeter Hardware Co., 245 Ala. 326, 16 So.2d 689.
We conclude the averments of the bill set up a sufficient equity as against the asserted demurrers and that the judgment overruling the demurrers should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARDNER, C. J., and BROWN and LIVINGSTON, JJ., concur.