Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-001472-MR
06-06-2014
TIFFANY PITTMAN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Dupree Assistant Public Advocate Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CR-00144
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE: Tiffany Pittman appeals from the Marshall Circuit Court's August 25, 2013 order holding her in contempt of court for violating the terms of the court's previous order allowing her to attend counseling sessions. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The events that give rise to this appeal occurred while Pittman was incarcerated at the Marshall County Detention Center, awaiting trial on a host of charges. During this time, the trial court believed Pittman needed mental health treatment in order to stand trial. So, the trial court entered an order allowing Pittman to leave jail and attend counseling sessions with her therapist.
These visits were subject to conditions plainly set out in the order. The trial court required that Pittman's mother - and only Pittman's mother - transport Pittman from jail to counseling sessions and back. Additionally, Pittman was to "travel directly to and from the Marshall County Detention Center, other than incidental stops for food, etc." The order also required Pittman's mother post a five-thousand dollar ($5,000) surety bond.
While the court issued several subsequent to this original order, the court incorporated the conditions on Pittman's travel in each order. For purposes of clarity, we refer only to the first in this series of orders.
The trial court became aware that Pittman was likely violating those conditions. Pre-trial services reported to the trial court that Pittman had returned late to the Marshall County Detention Center, and that her boyfriend - not her mother -- dropped Pittman off there. The trial court reacted to this news by decreasing the amount of time allotted to Pittman for counseling. But while the trial court remained suspicious as to whether Pittman was abiding by its order, the court continued to allow her to leave the detention center for treatment.
Eventually, the trial court's suspicions were confirmed - and Pittman's troubles compounded - when she learned she was pregnant. Based on the timing of Pittman's pregnancy in relation to her lengthy incarceration, one thing was certain: Pittman had become pregnant during her period of incarceration. The court reasoned that conception must have occurred during the time allotted to her for counseling.
The trial court issued an Order to Show Cause and held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Pittman violated the court's order and, if so, whether she should be held in contempt. At the hearing, Pittman confessed that she and her boyfriend had intercourse during the time allotted for her mental health treatment, and that she had become pregnant as the result of their intercourse. Pittman, in a tearful apology to the court, stressed her dedication to redeeming herself, and becoming a productive member of society. But Pittman also told the court that at the time, she felt by sneaking away to have sex, she was only breaking a "little rule" imposed by the court's order.
Disagreeing with Pittman's characterization of its order as a "little rule," the trial court found her in contempt and sentenced Pittman to six months in the Marshall County Detention Center. The court also held that if Pittman reimbursed the Commonwealth for all costs incurred during her pregnancy, the court would reduce her contempt sanction by ninety days. On appeal, Pittman challenges the propriety of the court's determination.
Contempt is the willful disobedience - or flagrant disrespect for -- rules and orders of the court. Burge v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 836 (Ky. App. 2001). A trial court's power to punish individuals for contempt is inherent, Newsome v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Ky. App. 2001). We will reverse a finding of contempt only if the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Ky. App. 2007). Put simply, we overturn a trial court's decision to hold a party in contempt only if that decision is "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999) (citing 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 695 (1995)).
We find no such abuse here. Pittman argues that the terms of the court's order did not explicitly prohibit Pittman from having intercourse with her boyfriend during the time allotted to her for counseling sessions. But we are convinced that Pittman's actions were not the sort of "incidental stops" the court had in mind when crafting its order. It is also clear from her testimony that she knew sex with her boyfriend was not within the scope of incidental stops contemplated by the order.
Moreover, the record is clear that the intercourse occurred outside Pittman's mother's supervision; this too violated the terms of the court's order because her mother bore sole supervisory responsibility for Pittman during her release.
We also reject the notion that the court's sole remedy was to forfeit Pittman's surety bond pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.545 and Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.42. Neither provision prevents the court from exercising its inherent contempt authority, nor would forfeiture of her mother's surety bond have the desired punitive effect on Pittman. In light of Pittman's flagrant disregard for the court's order, we think this sentence more appropriate than forfeiture and well within the trial court's discretion.
Finally, Pittman's contentions that the trial court's sentence somehow violated due process rights and constitutional protection against double jeopardy are wholly without merit and, therefore, we reject them summarily.
The judgment of the Marshall Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky