This is a companion case to that of Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, reported in Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 847, writ dismissed, and it was agreed by counsel that the facts adduced upon the trial of the Pittman case should constitute the Statement of Facts in the instant suit. The trial court instructed a verdict for the defendant City, and the plaintiff has appealed.

That case has been cited numerous times by the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals, which have stated that it represents settled Texas law. For example, see North American Dredging Company v. Pugh, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W. 255, 256; and Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, et al. Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 847. If the facts of the case at bar do not distinguish it from Southern Oil Co. v. Church, the defendant would be entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto, inasmuch as there is no evidence that the defendant knowingly furnished a defective derrick to the Oil Production Co. However, it was emphasized in the Southern Oil Co. decision that the defendant retained no control of any kind over the independent contractor in the performance of his work, and that the oil company had no control whatever over the plaintiff who was an employee of the independent contractor. The opinion repeated that the Southern Oil Company "had no control or supervision over Hammil Bros. or their men at the time that the accident occurred."

VI. Assumption of risk doctrine. Artificial I. C. Storage v. Martin, 102 Ind. App. 74, 198 N.E. 446; Benoit v. Troy, 154 N.Y. 223, 48 N.E. 524; Clarke v. Detroit M. Ry. Co., 163 N.W. 964; Cooper v. Cashman, 190 Mass. 75, 76 N.E. 461; Copeland v. Draper, 157 Mass. 558, 32 N.E. 944; McDonald v. Wilmut Gas Oil Co., 180 Miss. 350, 176 So. 395; Milestone v. Gashior, 160 Md. 131, 152 A. 810; Mississippi Power Co. v. Griffith, 81 F.2d 292; Mobile O.R.R. Co. v. Clay, 156 Miss. 463, 125 So. 819; Moore v. City of Ardmore (Okla.), 106 P.2d 515; Moore v. Gholson, 34 Miss. 372; Nesmith v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 82 S.W.2d 721; Ortoland v. U-Dryvit, 296 Mass. 439, 6 N.E.2d 346; Parker v. Loving Co., 13 Ga. 284, 79 S.E. 77; Pittman v. City of Wichita, 120 S.W.2d 847; Plumpe v. Tanner Motor Livery, 137 Colo. App. 509, 20 P.2d 1020; Reynolds v. Kenwood Riding Club, 18 N.E.2d 612; Robirtson v. Gulf S.I.R.R. Co., 171 Miss. 628, 158 So. 390; Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So.2d 646; Schiffler v. Moron T. T. Co., 68 F.2d 111; Sidwell v. E.C. Coal Co., 154 Iowa 475, 135 N.W. 59; Skoler v. Lehigh V.R. Co., 60 F.2d 893; Smith v. Onderdonk, 20 Ont. App. 171; Troop A Riding Academy v. Miller, 127 Ohio St. 545, 189 N.E. 647; Troop A Riding Academy v. Stwerding (Ohio), 177 N.E. 601; Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 22 S.W.2d 226; Yazoo M.V.R.R. Co. v. Skaggs, supra; Sec. 1456, Code 1942; 6 Am. Jur., Sec. 190 p. 307; 8 C.J.S., Sec. 25 p. 260; Berry on Automobiles (4th ed.), Par. 1433; Vol. IV, Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Auto. Law Practice, Sec. 2256 p. 294. VII. Contract of parties as to bailed property, and reply to appellant's brief.

The relationship between the Federal government and a municipality arising in somewhat similar situations has been considered in some cases. See Balter v. Ickes, 89 F.2d 856, 858; Haga v. Seattle, 3 Wn.2d 31; Oklahoma City v. Caple, 187 Okla. 600; Shelton v. Greeneville, 169 Tenn. 366; Walter v. Everett School District No. 24, 195 Wn. 45; Hughes v. Duluth, 204 Minn. 1, 3; Jones v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 64 Ohio App. 36; Pittman v. Wichita Falls, 120 S.W.2d 847; Dabelstein v. Omaha, 132 Neb. 710; Waco v. Hurst, 131 S.W.2d 745; Heidt v. State Highway Department, 189 S.C. 310. In the light of what has been said in some of the cases to which reference has been made, and from an examination of the Federal statutes, three things stand out: (1) the W.P.A., as a Federal agency, is concerned only with the question of unemployment; (2) before any project can be approved and commenced, the "sponsor" is required to make "a written agreement to finance such part of the entire cost thereof as is not to be supplied from Federal funds" (50 U.S. Sts. at Large, 352, 353); (3) once the project is approved, no town official or agent has any authority over it. It would seem to follow that once the project is approved, the W.P.A. carries it through, provided the appropriation is not exhausted, and all that the sponsor has to do is to fulfill the provisions of its written agreement.

A person drawing wages from the Works Progress Administration is receiving pay for work which he has done. Clark v. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 66 N.D. 17, 262 N.W. 249; Pittman v. Wichita Falls (Tex. Civ. App.) 120 S.W.2d 847; Taylor v. Los Angeles, 29 Cal.App.2d 181, 84 P.2d 242; Baker v. Western Power L. Co. 147 Kan. 571, 78 P.2d 36. The Workmen's Compensation Acts have been repeatedly construed as requiring substantial regularity of contributions as an essential element of partial dependency.

Under the facts enumerated, the appellant contends that Phillips was not in its employ at the time he was injured, but was an employee of RFC. In support of its contention, it cites and quotes at length from a number of decisions; among them are: Dempster Mill Mfg. Co. v. Lester, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 254; Dempster Mill Mfg. Co. v. Wiley, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 257; Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 847; 96 A.L.R. 1155; Shelton v. City of Greenville, 169 Tenn. 366, 87 S.W.2d 1016; Taylor v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.App.2d 181, 84 P.2d 242; Reid v. Department of Labor Industries, 194 Wn. 108, 77 P.2d 589; Ford v. Independent School District of Shenandoah, 223 Iowa 795, 273 N.W. 870; Hoover v. Independent School District, 220 Iowa 1364, 264 N.W. 611; City of Waco v. Hurst, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 745. We have carefully read the cited cases, but the holdings are all based upon a different situation to that involved here.

For the same reason, when these laborers so selected, controlled and paid by the Works Progress Administration were performing labor which that agency had obligated itself to perform, they were working for and were the employees of the Works Progress Administration and not of the city of Waco. A similar state of facts was before the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in the case of Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, 120 S.W.2d 847, and that court held that relief workers furnished by the Works Progress Administration under circumstances such as are here under consideration were employees of the Works Progess Administration and not of the city that sponsored the project. Similar holdings have been made by the courts of other states in the following cases: Brooks v. City of Seattle, 193 Wn. 253, 74 P.2d 1008; City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, 9 Cal.2d 705, 72 P.2d 540; State ex rel. v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 55 Nev. 343, 34 P.2d 408; Shelton v. City of Greenville, 169 Tenn. 366, 87 S.W.2d 1016; Hoover v. Independent School Dist., 220 Iowa 1364, 264 N.W. 611; Todaro v. City of Shreveport, La.App., 170 So. 356; Dabelstein v. City of Omaha, 132 Neb. 710, 273 N.W. 43; Ford v. Independent School Dist., 223 Iowa 795, 273 N.W. 870.

The mere fact that Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company furnished a supervisor to give instructions as to how the technical work should be performed in connection with the erection of the tower and tank did not render those who labored on the tower its employees. A like holding has been made under similar facts in numerous other cases. City of Waco v. Hurst, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 745, this day decided; Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex. Civ. App. 120 S.W.2d 847; Brooks v. City of Seattle, 193 Wn. 253, 74 P.2d 1008; City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, 9 Cal.2d 705, 72 P.2d 540; State ex rel. State Board of Charities v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 55 Nev. 343, 34 P.2d 408; Shelton v. City of Greenville, 169 Tenn. 366, 87 S.W.2d 1016; Hoover v. Independent School Dist., 220 Iowa 1364, 264 N.W. 611; Todaro v. City of Shreveport, La.App., 170 So. 356; Dabelstein v. City of Omaha, 132 Neb. 710, 273 N.W. 43; Ford v. Independent School Dist., 223 Iowa 795, 273 N.W. 870. This case does not come within the borrowed servant rule, so as to make Lester the servant of the defendant, as contended for by defendant, for the simple reason that the servant at the time of his injury was performing labor which the Works Progress Administration had obligated itself to do and was not performing work which Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company had obligated itself to do.