Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-1321.
April 26, 2007
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Michael J. Piskanin, has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Defendants Detective Gary Hammer, Lieutenant Jim Kostura, and Todd L. Buskirk, alleging that they conspired to violate his civil rights in connection with his pre-trial detention in the Northampton County Prison during March and April 2004 on charges relating to identity theft. Before the Court is Defendants Kostura's and Buskirk's (the "Moving Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
The Amended Complaint also asserted claims against the Colonial Regional Police Department, Richard Lobach and the County of Northampton. Plaintiff's claims against the Colonial Regional Police Department and the County of Northampton were dismissed by our Order dated November 14, 2005. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Richard Lobach on February 7, 2007. The Second Amended Complaint alleged additional claims relating to Plaintiff's March 10, 2004 arrest and certain searches conducted by Detective Hammer prior to and incident to that arrest. Those claims were dismissed by our Order dated March 28, 2007.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was arrested on March 10, 2004 by Detective Gary Hammer at the Microtel Motel on charges related to identity theft. (Piskanin Dep. at 13, 88.) The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the Microtel Motel is located in Lehigh County. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was taken before District Justice Barbara Schlegel of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County for arraignment. (Id. at 107.) After his arraignment, Plaintiff was taken to the Northampton County Prison by Detective Hammer, who escorted Plaintiff to the Prison intake area. (Id. at 119, 122-23.)
After arriving in the Prison intake area, Piskanin was questioned by Corrections Officers for approximately 15 minutes. (Id. at 126-27.) Piskanin told Corrections Officer Laubach, who performed the intake interview, that he had been involved in law enforcement and asked to be placed in protective custody. (Id. at 125-131, 143-44.) After his intake interview, Plaintiff was taken to a holding area, where there were three phones available for use by prisoners. (Id. at 133-35.) Plaintiff made several requests to Corrections Officer Laubach and another Corrections Officer working in the holding area to use one of the phones. (Id. at 135-36.) Neither Corrections Officer permitted Plaintiff to use the phones. (Id. at 136.) After several such requests had been denied, Plaintiff wrote a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the back of a public defender form and gave it to the second Corrections Officer for filing with the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that Lt. Kostura later informed him that he (Kostura) had forwarded the Petition to the Northampton County District Attorney and not to the court. (Id. at 137-38.)
Lt. Kostura met with Plaintiff several times on March 10, 2004. (Id. at 138.) Lt. Kostura was first called by the intake Corrections Officers as a result of Plaintiff's request to be placed in protective custody. (Id. at 139, 143-44.) Kostura was given letters and other papers written by Plaintiff which stated that Plaintiff had worked for numerous law enforcement and governmental agencies, including the FBI, and that he had performed undercover work at various jails, including Northampton County Prison. (Kostura Aff. ¶¶ 1-2.) Kostura was unable to confirm Plaintiff's claims regarding his law enforcement work. (Id. ¶ 2.) Kostura interviewed Plaintiff and became concerned that "he was not of sound mind" and decided that he should be put on suicide watch. (Id. ¶ 3, Def. Ex. D.) Plaintiff was subsequently taken to a suicide watch cell. (Piskanin Dep. at 146-47.) Lt. Kostura and six Corrections Officers met Plaintiff at the suicide watch cell. (Id. at 148.) Lt. Kostura asked Plaintiff to take his clothes off and to remove a "Miraculous Medal" necklace which Plaintiff was wearing. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to remove his "Miraculous Medal" and it was forcibly taken from him by one of the Corrections Officers. (Id. at 148-49.) At a later date, the "Miraculous Medal" was sent to Plaintiff's brother, who returned it to Plaintiff. (Id. at 151.)
On March 14, 2007, while he was in the suicide watch cell, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Alex Thomas, a psychiatrist who works on a contract basis at the Northampton County Prison. (Thomas Aff. ¶¶ 1-2.) As part of his examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Thomas reviewed the letters and other papers which Plaintiff had prepared regarding his history of work in law enforcement. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) As a result of his examination of Plaintiff and review of those letters and other papers, Dr. Thomas determined that Plaintiff should be kept on suicide watch. (Id. ¶ 5, Def. Ex. D.) On March 16, 2004, Plaintiff was examined by another psychiatrist, Dr. Dedania, who discontinued the suicide watch. (Thomas Aff. ¶ 16, Def. Ex. D.)
Following his release from suicide watch, Plaintiff filed many petitions and motions with the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County in connection with his efforts to be released from the Prison and to represent himself in connection with the identity theft charges. On March 20, 2004, Plaintiff prepared an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which was filed on March 24, 2004. (Piskanin Dep. at 162-63, Def. Exs. E, F.) On April 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion asking that any Judges on the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County who are Masons, Freemasons, Shriners, or members of the Skull and Bones Society be recused from his case on the grounds that "[t]he Masons, Freemasons, Shriners, and Skull and Bones Society are secret societies, fraternities and/or satanic cults that have a hidden agenda designed and intended, to overthrow the United States constitutional form of government and oppress Christians, especially Catholics" and because Plaintiff "has been the subject of a Masonic `vendetta'" since 1970. (Def. Ex. J, "Motion for Recusal" ¶¶ 1-2.) On April 19, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Supplement to his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Piskanin Dep. at 165-66, Def. Ex. G.) On April 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Petition seeking the appointment of stand-by counsel to assist with his defense. (Piskanin Dep. at 176-77, Def. Ex. J.) On April 19, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Bail Reduction. (Piskanin Dep. at 174, Def. Ex. H.) On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Petition and Motion to Set Bail. (Piskanin Dep. at 174, Def. Ex. H.) On April 27, 2004, he filed a Notice informing the Court that he was being subjected to a conspiracy to impede his right to self representation and access to legal reference materials. (Piskanin Dep. at 176, Def. Ex. I.) Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied. (Piskanin Dep. at 173.) He filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 5, 2004. (Def. Ex. K.) Plaintiff was given a bail hearing in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County and released on ROR by Judge Garb on May 14, 2004. (Def. Ex. M.)
Defendants seek the entry of summary judgment in their favor on seven counts asserted against them in the Second Amended Complaint for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Count I alleges that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail, and his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts. Count IV alleges that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail, his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts. Counts V and VI allege that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by taking a religious medal from him, denying him access to reasonable bail, subjecting him to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, and denying him the right to access the courts. Count VII alleges that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail. Count VIII alleges that Defendants conspired to violate state law. Count X seeks an injunction staying Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings and requiring the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to release him from prison.
The Second Amended Complaint contains ten separate counts. Counts II, III, and IX of the Second Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff's claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights asserted in Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint were dismissed by our Order dated March 28, 2007.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
III. DISCUSSION
56Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 31732356Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.477 U.S. 242248Id. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 198542 U.S.C. § 1983
A. Plaintiff's Section 1985 Conspiracy Claims
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1985(3) provides a private right of action for an individual who has been injured by a conspiracy of two or more persons to deprive him, or a class of persons, of "the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In order to succeed on a claim brought pursuant to Section 1985(3), Plaintiffs must establish the following the following elements:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving any person or class of person of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. To satisfy the second element, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants were motivated by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.Sutton v. West Chester Area School Dist., Civ.A. No. 03-3061, 2004 WL 999144, at *17-*18 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2004) (citing Kelleher v. City of Reading, Civ.A. No. 01-3386, 2001 WL 1132401, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2001)). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants were motivated by class-based animus and acted to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights because he is a Roman Catholic. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Section 1985(3) encompasses religious animus. Magnum v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, Civ.A. No. 06-CV-2589, 2006 WL 3359642, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006). We need not, however, determine whether Section 1985(3) provides a private right of action for religious animus because there is no evidence in the record before the Court that either Lt. Kostura or Mr. Buskirk acted out of anti-Catholic bias. As there is no evidence that the Moving Defendants acted with "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" we find that they are entitled to the entry of judgment in their favor as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in Counts I, IV-VIII and X of the Second Amended Complaint.
B. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Conspiracy Claims
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 provides a private right of action for an individual injured by the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff "must allege (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Chapman v. Acme Markets, Inc., Civ.A. No. 97-6642, 1998 WL 196400, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1998) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)). In order to succeed on a claim for conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983, Plaintiff must establish "(1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a [deprivation] of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy."Marchese v. Umstead, 110 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citations omitted). There is no question in this case that the Moving Defendants were state actors. The issues before us with respect to Plaintiff's Section 1983 conspiracy claims are, accordingly, whether the Moving Defendants were participants in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's civil rights and whether Plaintiff's civil rights were violated. We will first examine whether Plaintiff's civil rights were violated.
1. Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
Count I of the Second Amendment Complaint alleges that the Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. "[T]he right to counsel attaches `at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226 (1977)). There is no evidence in the record before us that Plaintiff sought the assistance of counsel in connection with the charges brought against him in Northampton County prior to his April 8, 2004 Petition/Motion to Appoint Stand-By Counsel. (Def. Ex. J.) That Petition was filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County while Plaintiff was detained in the Northampton County Prison. (Piskanin Dep. at 176-77.) Stand-by counsel was appointed for Plaintiff. (Id. at 14.) We find, accordingly, that there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated.
2. Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail
Counts I and IV-VII of the Second Amended Complaint assert that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail. The Eighth Amendment right to bail is applicable to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). Consequently, a defendant in a criminal case has a right to reasonable bail pursuant to the Eighth Amendment that is "cognizable under section 1983." Harrison v. Abraham, Civ.A. No. 96-4262, 1997 WL 256970, at *20 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997) (citingHarvin v. Post, Civ.A. No. 95-7888, 1997 WL 116985, at *4 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 1997)), aff'd 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir. 1998).
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants conspired to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining bail after the amount was set, resulting in a practical denial of his right to bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint alleges, generally, that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's right to reasonable bail. Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Detective Hammer violated Plaintiff's right to reasonable bail by transporting Plaintiff from Lehigh County to Northampton County, where he appeared before District Justice Schlegel, rather than taking Plaintiff to be arraigned in Lehigh County. Count V alleges that Detective Hammer and Lt. Kostura violated Plaintiff's right to reasonable bail by denying him the opportunity to use a telephone to arrange bail and by subjecting Plaintiff to suicide watch. Count VI alleges that Detective Hammer, Lt. Kostura, and Mr. Buskirk violated Plaintiff's right to reasonable bail by subjecting him to suicide watch. Count VII alleges that Lt. Kostura and Mr. Buskirk violated Plaintiff's right to reasonable bail as a result of certain detainers for Plaintiffs arrest that had been forwarded to the Northampton County Prison.
There is no evidence in the record before us that Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to obtain bail by virtue of the fact that he was transported to Northampton County for arraignment before District Justice Schlegel. There is evidence that Plaintiff asked to use the phone to call a bail bondsman while in the intake area of the Northampton County Prison and that Corrections Officer Laubach and another Corrections Officer denied these requests. (Piskanin Dep. at 135-36.) There is not, however, any evidence that any of the Defendants were involved in, or even knew of, these denials of Plaintiff's requests. There is also no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's placement on suicide watch obstructed his access to bail. There is evidence in the record that, on March 15, 2004, Dauphin County issued warrants for the arrest of Plaintiff on charges of forgery and that these warrants were lodged as detainers with the Northampton County Prison, briefly preventing Plaintiff's release. (Def. Ex. L, M.) There is, however, no evidence in the record that any of the Defendants caused Dauphin County to issue those warrants. We conclude, accordingly, that there is no evidence in the record before us that Defendants acted to deny Plaintiff access to reasonable bail in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
3. First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts
Counts I and IV-VI of the Second Amended Complaint allege that the Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional right to access the courts. The Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional right to access the courts "has been found in the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses." Gibson v. Supt. N.J. Dept. of Law, 411 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12 (2002)). A plaintiff may bring a suit for denial of the right to access the courts for claims arising from the "`loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, . . . the loss of an opportunity to sue, . . . or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.'" Id. (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414). A plaintiff cannot succeed on a claim for of denial of the right to access the courts unless he can establish that he was actually injured, i.e., "the inmate must show that his or her exercise of the right at issue, the right of accessing the courts to secure judicial relief, has been infringed in some consequential way." Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied U.S., 2007 WL 789156 (Mar. 19, 2007) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996)).
There is evidence in the record that, on March 10, 2004, Plaintiff prepared a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, gave that Petition to a Corrections Officer for filing, and that Lt. Kostura sent the Petition to the District Attorney's office, preventing it from being filed with the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County. (Piskanin Dep. at 136-38.) The Second Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was prevented from filing any other document and there is evidence that Plaintiff was able to file many motions and petitions with the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County while he was detained in the Northampton County Prison. (Piskanin Dep. at 162-63, 165-66, 173-74, 176-77; Def. Exs. E-K.) The record does not contain any information regarding the basis for Plaintiff's first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Plaintiff's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus alleges that Plaintiff was entitled to the issuance of the writ because the charges brought against him were phony and unfounded; the search made incident to his arrest was illegal; the District Justice who issued the warrant for Plaintiff's arrest harbored a personal bias against him and should have recused herself from his case; the warrant for Plaintiff's arrest was not based upon probable cause; Plaintiff was illegally prevented from obtaining bail; and Plaintiff was improperly placed on suicide watch and was deprived of his civil rights. (Def. Ex. E ¶¶ 8-16, 22, 26.) Plaintiff's Supplement to his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus adds additional factual allegations supporting his claim that the warrant for his arrest was issued without probable cause, and adds claims that his arraignment was unconstitutional and that the information containing the charges against him was defective. (Def. Ex. G ¶¶ 3-4, 6-11.) Plaintiff does not claim, in this suit, that his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus contained any factual allegations or claims that were not raised in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or his Supplement to his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied by the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County. (Piskanin Dep. at 177.)
We find that there is no evidence that Lt. Kostura's forwarding Plaintiff's first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the wrong recipient cause Plaintiff to lose the opportunity to obtain a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition ten days after the first petition was misdirected. (Id. at 162-63, Def. Exs. E, F.) He supplemented the Amended Petition with additional claims less than three weeks later. (Piskanin Dep. at 165-66, Def. Ex. G.) The Amended Petition was denied. (Piskanin Dep. at 173.) There is no evidence in the record before us that his right to access the courts was impeded in any other respect. Consequently, we conclude that there is no evidence that Defendants' actions resulted in "`loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, . . . the loss of an opportunity to sue, . . . or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.'" Gibson, 411 F.3d at 441.
4. Fourteenth Amendment Right Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Counts IV-VI allege that Defendants conspired to subject Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him on suicide watch. Claims of cruel and unusual punishment brought by pre-trial detainees are analyzed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 n. 13 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1133 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that "[p]retrial detainees are protected by the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth Amendments, not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth Amendment" (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979))). In determining the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement of a pre-trial detainee, the Court examines "whether those conditions amount to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with law. For under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. A two step inquiry is used to determine whether the pre-trial detainee's conditions of confinement amount to punishment: the court determines "first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by these conditions and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes." Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159 (quoting Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch by Lt. Kostura who, after interviewing Plaintiff and reviewing letters written by Plaintiff which contained claims that he had worked in numerous law enforcement jobs, was concerned that Plaintiff "was not of sound mind." (Def. Ex. B ¶¶ 2-3.) Lt. Kostura's concerns were confirmed by Dr. Alex Thomas, a psychiatrist who examined Plaintiff and reviewed his claims of a history of work in law enforcement four days after Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch. (Def. Ex. C ¶¶ 4-5.) There is no evidence in the record before us which contradicts Lt. Kostura's and Dr. Thomas's determinations that Plaintiff should be placed, and kept, on suicide watch. We conclude, therefore, that Plaintiff's placement on suicide watch served a legitimate purpose. There is evidence in the record that, as a result of his placement in the suicide watch cell, that Plaintiff was required to remove his clothing and a "Miraculous Medal" which he was wearing on a necklace. (Piskanin Dep. at 147-49.) There is no other evidence in the record regarding the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement in the suicide watch cell. There is also no evidence that the removal of Plaintiff's clothing and necklace were unrelated to the purpose of placing Plaintiff on suicide watch. We find, thus, that the requirement that Plaintiff remove items of clothing and a necklace with which he could have harmed himself while in the suicide watch cell are requirements that are rationally related to the purpose for placing him in the cell, i.e., to keep him from killing himself. We conclude, accordingly, that there is no evidence in the record before us that Plaintiff's conditions of confinement in the suicide watch cell amounted to punishment or that his placement on suicide watch amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
Counts V and VI allege that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion through the removal of his "Miraculous Medal" when he was placed on suicide watch. There is evidence in the record that, when Plaintiff was first placed on suicide watch, he was told by Lt. Kostura that he would have to surrender his "Miraculous Medal" necklace. (Kostura Aff. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff refused to take the necklace off and it was removed from him by a Corrections Officer. (Piskanin Dep. at 149.) The necklace was eventually forwarded by prison officials to Plaintiff's brother. (Buskirk Aff. ¶ 3, Piskanin Dep. at 151.) Plaintiff's brother later mailed the necklace to Plaintiff at Northampton County Prison and it was returned to Plaintiff by prison officials. (Piskanin Dep. at 151.) Plaintiff claims that he was without his "Miraculous Medal" for approximately 30 days. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 31.)
The Supreme Court has held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). We examine the following four factors to determine if the prison's action is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests:
first, whether the regulation bears a "valid, rational connection" to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; second, whether prisoners have alternative ways of exercising the circumscribed right; third, whether accommodating the right would have a deleterious impact on other inmates, guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and fourth, whether alternatives exist that "fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests."Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 252 (3d Cir. 2003). As we discussed above, the requirement that Plaintiff remove his necklace while on suicide watch bears a "valid rational connection" to the legitimate and neutral government objective of preventing suicide. Plaintiff does not allege that he was prevented from praying, or from meeting with a priest, or otherwise denied the opportunity to exercise his religion. Moreover, there is no evidence before us that would suggest that Plaintiff's right to exercise his religion through wearing his "Miraculous Medal" necklace could have been accommodated at a de minimis cost to the valid penological interest of preventing suicide. There is also no evidence in the record with respect to the potential impact that allowing Plaintiff to retain his Medal would have had on other inmates, guards or the allocation of prison resources. We find, accordingly, that there is no evidence in the record that would support Plaintiff's claim that his First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion was violated by the removal of his "Miraculous Medal" necklace when he was placed on suicide watch.
6. State law
Count VIII of the Second Amended Complaint alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Con. Stat. A. § 5701, et seq. (the "Act"). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Richard Lobach, Detective Hammer, and certain other individuals and governmental entities conspired to obtain data regarding telephone calls made or received by Plaintiff while he was living in the Holiday Inn in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Section 1983 does not provide a private right of action for violation of state law. See Nellom v. Luber, Civ.A. No. 02-2190, 2004 WL 816922, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2004),appeal dismissed 119 Fed. Appx. 428 (3d Cir. 2004) ("`An alleged violation of state law . . . does not state a claim under section 1983.'" (quoting Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1992))). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot prevail on his Section 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate his rights under the Act. The Act does, however, provide a private right of action for any person whose wire, electronic, or oral communications are used in violation of the Act. 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 5725. Nonetheless, there is no evidence in the record before us that any of Plaintiff's wire, electronic or oral communications have been used in violation of the Act.
7. Request for injunctive relief
Count X of the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is the subject of a masonic, anti-Catholic conspiracy and seeks the entry of an of an injunction which would, among other things, stay Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings and require the state to release Plaintiff from prison, where he is presently serving a sentence of imprisonment for a conviction on charges relating to his March 10, 2004 arrest. There is no evidence in the record before us that Plaintiff is the subject of a masonic, anti-Catholic conspiracy. Moreover, as Plaintiff's appeal of his state court conviction has not been concluded (Piskanin Dep. at 14-15), we lack the power to grant the requested relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."). Indeed, "principles of federalism and comity require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey Police Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1992) (citingYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The policy which bars our interference with a pending state criminal prosecution "can only be overcome if the petitioner shows that he has no adequate remedy at law and that he will suffer irreparable injury that is both great and immediate unless the federal court grants the requested equitable relief, or that the state criminal proceedings were brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment." Death Row Prisoners of Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 948 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-49 and Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975), reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 1017 (1975)). Plaintiff has made no such showing.
We have found that the record before us contains no evidence to support Plaintiff's claims that the Defendants violated his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail, his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the courts, his Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and his First Amendment right to religious freedom. We have also found that there is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's claim that the Defendants obtained his telephone data in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act or to support his claim that he is the victim of a masonic, anti-Catholic conspiracy. In order to succeed on a claim of conspiracy pursuant to Section 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of his civil rights in addition to the existence of a conspiracy involving state action. Since Plaintiff has put forward no evidence which would create a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claims that his civil rights were violated, we need not determine whether there is evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy involving the Moving Defendants. We find, therefore, that the Moving Defendants are entitled to the entry of judgment as a matter of law on all claims asserted against them in the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Section 1983.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Moving Defendants are entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law in their favor, and against Plaintiff, on the claims brought against them in Counts I, IV-VIII, and X of the Second Amended Complaint. The Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is, therefore, granted in all respects.