Pisano v. Security Management Co.

16 Citing cases

  1. Jack V. Heard c. Inc. v. A. L. Adams c. Co.

    155 Ga. App. 409 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 9 times

    However, "[t]here is no construction required or even permissible when the language employed by the parties in the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Pisano v. Security Management Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798). Moreover, "`[t]he law leans against the destruction of contracts on the ground of uncertainty, and a contract will not be declared void on that ground unless, after reading it and interpreting it in the light of the circumstances under which it was made and supplying or rejecting words necessary to carry into effect the reasonable intention of the parties, their intention cannot be fairly collected and effectuated' ..." Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Georgia c. Retailers, 219 Ga. 665, 672 ( 135 S.E.2d 330).

  2. Hodsdon v. Whitworth

    266 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 10 times

    The law is clear that the construction of an agreement which is plain and unambiguous is a matter of law for the court. Pisano v. Security Management Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798). See also Hyman v. Horwitz, 148 Ga. App. 647, 649 ( 252 S.E.2d 74).

  3. U.S. Enterprises v. Mikado Custom Tailors

    250 Ga. 415 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 9 times

    Rather than applying the "doubt or uncertainty" test adopted by the Court of Appeals, I would apply the rule that no construction of a contract is required or permissible where there is only one reasonable interpretation of the language used by the parties. Pisano v. Security Management Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). Here, the language used by the parties, which includes words of art, to wit: "Lessee has first right of refusal ...", can only be reasonably interpreted as giving the lessee a right of first refusal at the end of the lease; i.e., those words cannot be reasonably interpreted as giving the lessee an option to renew.

  4. DeKalb County v. Beacon Industries, Inc.

    370 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). Under appellant's interpretation of the above-quoted contractual provision, it was granted the unilateral right to reshape the entire scope of the Project and of the contract, while appellee would be kept completely bound by the strict terms of the contract.

  5. Thornton v. Ellis

    363 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). "`As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected to do so, and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be taken most strongly against himself.' [Cits.

  6. Taylor v. Career Concepts, Inc.

    184 Ga. App. 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 12 times

    Another section of the contract provided that, if appellant worked for the employer for more than ten weeks and the employer paid a fee to appellee, then appellant would not be liable to appellee for the fee. "[W]here no dispute of fact is involved, the construction of a plain and definite contract, if needed, is a matter of law for the court; a contract is not ambiguous even though difficult to construe, unless and until an application of the pertinent rules of interpretation leaves it uncertain as to which of two or more possible meanings represents the true intention of the parties. [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). "The construction which will uphold a contract in whole and in every part is to be preferred, and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part."

  7. Ricketson v. Metts

    327 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 5 times

    [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). After the rules of construction are applied to the instant agreement, no ambiguity as to the parties' intent remains.

  8. Cowen v. Snellgrove

    169 Ga. App. 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 5 times

    [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). 3.

  9. Saf-T-Green of Atlanta v. Lazenby c. Co.

    169 Ga. App. 249 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    See also H. R. Kaminsky Sons, v. Smithwick Constr. Co., 147 Ga. App. 147 ( 248 S.E.2d 211) (1978). Interpretation of a contract becomes a question for the jury only if the contract is ambiguous and if the ambiguity remains after the application of the rules of construction. Pisano v. Security Mgt. Co., 148 Ga. App. 567 ( 251 S.E.2d 798) (1978). In construing a contract, the intention of the parties must be ascertained. "If that intention is clear, and it contravenes no rule of law, and sufficient words are used to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of construction."

  10. Johns v. Leaseway of Georgia, Inc.

    304 S.E.2d 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 6 times
    In Johns, the court limited a surety's contractual obligation to the one specific weekly lease agreement listed in the contract even though the principal parties had done business under a series of similar weekly lease agreements for a number of months and despite the lessor's contention that it would not have leased its trucks without a guaranty or surety agreement.

    [Cit.]" Pisano v. Security Management Co., 148 Ga. App. 567, 568 ( 251 S.E.2d 798). The contract of suretyship is clear and unambiguous.