Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG04-187961
McGuiness, P. J.
This appeal arises from litigation between the parties to resolve their rights and obligations under certain settlement agreements and easement grant deeds governing their access to each others’ properties and the repair and maintenance of an easement. After a jury and bench trial of legal and equitable claims, the Marchands appeal from (1) an amended judgment entered on November 10, 2008, in which, among other things, (a) the Pisanis were awarded the principal sum of $674,826 (compensatory damages of $143,372, punitive damages of $300,000, and attorney fee on a quiet title cause of action pursuant to Civil Code section 3306a of $231,454) against Daniel Marchand, (b) the Pisanis were awarded the principal sum of $4,300 against Linda Marchand, and (c) the Marchands were awarded the sum of $1,200 against the Pisanis; and (2) an order entered on March 9, 2009, in which the Pisanis were awarded costs of $56,285.92. We affirm.
The Marchands also appeal from a judgment entered on September 10, 2008. We dismiss the appeal from the September 10, 2008, judgment as that judgment was superseded by the amended judgment entered on November 10, 2008.
FACTS
A. Background
The Pisanis own two properties, one parcel of six acres purchased in 1998 and a second parcel of 50 acres purchased in 2003. Separating the Pisanis’ two properties is a portion of the Marchands’ 11-acre parcel, which was purchased by Daniel Marchand in 1981 and where he currently resides with his wife Linda Marchand. The water source for the Marchand residence comes from a spring on a portion of their property referred to as “the dog leg area.” The water system operates by the spring water flowing directly through water pipes that lay on the dog leg area. Before this dispute, the water pipes connected to the spring ran across the Pisanis’ 50-acre parcel to a water tank and then continued on the 50 acres and ultimately to the Marchand residence. Because of the configuration of the parties’ properties, the Marchands needed an easement over the Pisanis’ 50 acre parcel to access the portion of their water system (the water tank and water pipes) that lay on the Pisanis’ 50-acre parcel and the Pisanis needed an easement over the Marchand property to access their 50-acre parcel.
A. Prior Litigation
In prior litigation, an attempt was made to determine the parties’ rights and obligations regarding their access to each others’ properties. As part of a 1990 settlement agreement, Bonnie Marie Hudson as Executor of the Estate of Delmar Mullens, Deceased (the Pisanis’ predecessor in interest) executed in favor of Daniel Marchand a grant deed of “a non-exclusive perpetual easement” over the 50-acre parcel for that part of the Marchand “water system (a water tank and pipes) presently located on the” 50 acres (hereinafter referred as the Marchand water system easement). In addition, Daniel Marchand executed in favor of Bonnie Marie Hudson, as Executor of the Estate of Delmar Mullens, Deceased, a grant deed of a “non-exclusive easement” over and under the Marchand property (hereinafter referred to as the Pisani candy stripe easement). As part of a 2000 settlement agreement entered into by Daniel and Linda Marchand and Linda Mullens, Judith R. Mullens, Bonnie M. Hudson (the Pisanis’ predecessors in interest), the Pisani candy stripe easement was modified regarding the use of the easement and the parties’ obligations of repair and maintenance of the easement.
The parties referred to this easement as the candy stripe easement because the easement was delineated by red and white stripes on the maps submitted at trial.
1. The Marchand Water System Easement
The Marchand water system easement, memorialized in a grant deed, allowed the Marchands to use “a strip of land upon the northern portion of [the Pisanis’ 50-acre parcel], ... having a width of 1 foot on either side of the existing water pipes, and a width of 5 feet on either side of the existing water tank, ... the centerline of which is the centerline of said existing water storage and transportation facilities (a water tank and water pipes), ... for purposes of transporting, carrying, storing and delivering water by and through such facilities, [and]... for reasonable access for purposes of maintaining, altering, replacing, expanding, supplementing and repairing such facilities.” The easement was limited to the water tank and water pipes then existing on the Pisanis’ 50 acres. At trial, Daniel Marchand conceded that despite the difficult terrain of the dog leg area, he agreed the terms of the grant deed did not allow him to use the Pisanis’ 50 acres to reach the dog leg spring on his property.
The Marchand water system easement grant deed allows the Pisanis, as owners of the 50 acre parcel, to extinguish the easement and reacquire the full use of their acreage by relocating the Marchands’ water tank and pipes or installing a new water system entirely on the Marchand property. In pertinent part, the deed read as follows: “[A]t their sole cost and expense and without interruption of water service to [the Marchand] residence for more than eight (8) hours, [the Pisanis] shall have the right to relocate all such water storage and delivery facilities or to locate new water storage and delivery facilities onto a portion of [the Marchand property], exclusive of the dog leg area, designated by [the Marchands], which [the Marchands] shall designate within 30 days after notice from [the Pisanis] of intent to relocate, provided that (i) the relocated or new storage and delivery facilities shall be fully operational and of equal or greater capacity and quality as the now existing facilities; (ii) the water delivered thereby shall be of equal or greater pressure, volume, and purity as the water delivered by the now existing facilities; (iii) [the Pisanis] shall cause the water pipes to be buried between the water tank and [the Marchand] residence, and (iv) [the Pisanis] shall provide [the Marchands] with reasonable notice of any relocation plans.” In the event the Pisanis “so relocate[d] existing or new facilities entirely onto [the Marchand property] and all such facilities [were] granted and delivered... free of liens or encumbrances, ... [then the Marchands] shall quitclaim [their] interest in this easement to the [Pisanis as the] record owner of [the 50 acre parcel].”
2. The Pisani Candy Stripe Easement
The Pisani candy stripe easement, which was memorialized in a grant deed, allowed the Pisanis to use a portion of the Marchand property “for ingress and egress of vehicles of all kinds, pedestrians, animals and for public utility purposes....” The grant deed also provided that the owners of the easement “shall maintain and repair any road improvements made in connection with this easement, ” but said nothing about the repair and maintenance of the easement itself.
The 1990 settlement agreement contained specific provisions regarding the procedures, protocols and requirements to be met if the owners of the easement installed a road on the easement.
As a matter of statutory law, “[t]the owner of any easement in the nature of a private right-of-way, or of any land to which any such easement is attached, shall maintain it in repair.” (Civ. Code, § 845, subd. (a).) “In the absence of an agreement, the cost [of maintaining the easement in repair] shall be shared proportionately to the use made of the easement by each owner, ” which statutory right is enforceable by a legal action by either the owner of the easement or the owner of the land to which the easement is attached. (Id., subd. (c).)
As part of the 2000 settlement agreement, the parties’ use of the candy stripe easement was modified to provide: “Until such time as [the Pisanis] elect to install a road on [the] Easement, ... [they] shall have use of [the] Easement for ingress and egress of pedestrians, bicycles, animals, and for public and private utility purposes, including, without limitation, water lines. [The Marchands] shall have use of [the] Easement solely for the purpose of repairing [the] Easement.” Additionally, the 2000 settlement agreement modified the parties’ obligations concerning the repair and maintenance of the easement to provide: (1) “In consideration of the payments set forth in Section 3 [periodic payments to the Marchands of $10,000 every year for 10 years commencing June 1, 2001]... [the Pisanis, as owners of the easement, ] shall have no duty, whatsoever, to maintain, improve, restore or repair [the] Easement or to grade, pave or install a road on [the] Easement, and...shall not be liable to [the Marchands] for failure to maintain, improve, restore or repair the Easement or for any other related act or omission;” (2) the Marchands “hereby waive any and all rights based upon the provisions of California Civil Code Section 845(a) which read in pertinent part as follows: [¶] ‘The owner of any easement in the nature of a private right-of-way, or of any land to which any such easement is attached, shall maintain it in repair....’; and (3) “[i]f, in the future, [the Pisanis as owners of the easement] elect to install a road upon [the] Easement, the road to be installed on the Easement shall be designed and constructed in accordance with [certain provisions of the 1990 settlement agreement].”
B. Current Litigation
This litigation concerns the parties’ rights and obligations under the 1990 and 2000 settlement agreements and the easement grant deeds governing access to the parties’ land parcels. The Pisanis and the Marchands sought both legal and equitable relief against each other. During the month-long proceedings before a jury, the parties proffered extensive testimony from 16 witnesses. The court also admitted into evidence over 150 exhibits.
The Pisanis filed a complaint against the Marchands, who filed a cross-complaint. In addition to naming the Pisanis as cross-defendants, the Marchands also named as cross-defendants East Bay Pump & Equipment Company, Inc. and its corporate president Mark A. Ratto. The Pisanis had hired East Bay to install the new water tanks for the Marchands. East Bay and Ratto are not parties to this appeal.
The jury considered the testimony of the following witnesses: Cynthia Pisani, Susan Pisani, Daniel Marchand, Linda Marchand, Mark Ratto, Stephen Vonder Haar (expert in water purity), Ronald Alan Foster, Sr. (expert in well spring design), Clarence Bush (Marchands’ predecessor in interest), John B. Giacoma (expert in plumbing), John DeLucchi (expert in water systems design), Jon Lamb (licensed land surveyor), Geoffrey John Van Lienden (geotechnical engineer), Raymond K. Will (hydrologist), Patrick Shires (expert in civil engineering and geotechnical engineering), Richard Holsinger (expert in civil and mechanical engineering), and Bonnie Hudson.
Specifically, the Pisanis sought to quiet title of their ownership of the 50-acre parcel by extinguishing the Marchand water system easement. The Pisanis contended they had installed a new water system (two water tanks and water pipes) entirely on the Marchand property, which satisfied all of the conditions “lawfully imposed” on them by the easement grant deed. It was undisputed that the new water tanks were not on the dog leg area, but some of the new water pipes were on a portion of the dog leg area. It was the Pisanis’ position that although the water tank could not be on the dog leg area, some of the water pipes had to be on the dog leg area in order to get the water from the dog leg spring to the Marchand residence. Consequently, the Pisanis argued the condition requiring the location of new water pipes to be on the Marchand property exclusive of the dog leg area should be disregarded and not given effect because it did not reflect the true intent of the parties, and rendered illusory their right to install a new water system and extinguish the easement, as allowed under the grant deed.
The Marchands opposed extinguishment of their water system easement, contending the Pisanis had not complied with all the conditions of the easement grant deed, including placing all new water pipes on a portion of the Marchand property exclusive of the dog leg area. At trial Daniel Marchand testified that at the time he entered into the 1990 settlement agreement he knew the condition—that the new water pipes not be physically located in the dog leg area—could never be met because any water pipes connecting to the dog leg spring had to be on the dog leg area. He contended the location condition in the easement grant deed could be met if the Pisanis complied with another provision of the 1990 settlement that allowed the Pisanis to provide the Marchands with a new water source on the Marchand property. However, he conceded (1) the Marchand water system easement grant deed did not require the Pisanis to provide a new water source as a condition of their right to install a new water system and extinguish the easement; and (2) the 1990 settlement agreement dealt separately with the Pisanis’ right to install a new water system to extinguish the easement and their alternative right to supply a new water source for the Marchand property.
Both the Pisanis and the Marchands also sought to recover damages relating to the repair and maintenance of the Pisani candy stripe easement. The Pisanis’ causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence were based on allegations that, by entering into the 2000 settlement agreement, Daniel Marchand promised to repair and maintain the easement even though he never intended to do so, and the Marchands negligently failed to repair or maintain the easement. The Marchands’ cause of action for negligence was based on allegations that the 2000 settlement agreement allowed them to repair the easement but did not impose an obligation to do so that was enforceable by the Pisanis. It was the Marchands’ position that “[w]hoever benefited or used the easement would have to maintain and repair it, ” and the Pisanis were responsible for negligently installing a road on the easement that damaged the Marchand property. Additionally, the Marchands sought to hold the Pisanis responsible, on a negligence theory, for the destruction of the old water pipes after the installation of the new water system.
The jury’s responses to questions in special verdict forms were included as findings in the amended judgment, which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) The Pisanis had satisfied all of the conditions specified in the Marchand water system easement grant deed.
(2) Daniel Marchand made a false promise that he—and not the Pisanis—would be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the candy stripe easement, and the Pisanis reasonably relied on such false promise that was a substantial factor in causing them harm; and the Pisanis should recover from Daniel Marchand the sums of (a) $48,272 for “[p]ast economic loss including amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and (b) $90,000 for “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property.”
(3) Daniel Marchand engaged in conduct “with malice, oppression, or fraud” for which the Pisanis should recover $300,000 in punitive damages.
(4) Daniel Marchand’s negligence caused harm to the Pisanis for which the Pisanis should recover $4,000 ($2,000 for “[p]ast economic loss including amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and $2,000 for “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property”), and the percentage of responsibility for the Pisanis’ harm was allocated as: 40 percent Daniel Marchand, 40 percent Linda Marchand, and 20 percent the Pisanis.
(5) Linda Marchand’s negligence caused harm to the Pisanis for which the Pisanis should recover $2,000 ($1,000 for “past economic loss including amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and $1,000 for “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property”), and the percentage of responsibility for the Pisanis’ harm was allocated as: 40 percent Daniel Marchand, 40 percent Linda Marchand, and 20 percent the Pisanis.
(6) Daniel Marchand’s breach of the 2000 settlement agreement caused harm to the Pisanis for which the Pisanis should recover $2,000 ($1,000 for “[p]ast economic loss including... amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to maintain the easement and to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and $1,000 for “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property”).
(7) Linda Marchand’s breach of the 2000 settlement agreement caused harm to the Pisanis for which the Pisanis should recover $2,000 ($1,000 for “[p]ast economic loss including... amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to maintain the easement and to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and $1,000 for “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property”).
(8) The Pisanis’ negligence caused harm to the Marchands for which the Marchands should recover $2,000, and the percentage responsibility was allocated: 40 percent the Marchands and 60 percent the Pisanis.
Additionally, as part of the amended judgment, the court resolved the parties’ equitable claims by, among other things, (1) granting the Pisanis’ cause of action to quiet title by extinguishing the Marchands’ water system easement and declaring the Pisanis the owners in fee simple absolute of their 50 acre parcel; and (2) declaring that the 2000 settlement agreement requires the Marchands to maintain the candy stripe easement, and permanently enjoins the Marchands from interfering with the Pisanis’ use of the candy stripe easement, except that the Marchands may use the easement as is necessary to permit them to maintain the easement in repair.
In an order entered on March 9, 2009, the court awarded the Pisanis their costs of $56,285.92, after granting in part and denying in part the Marchands’ motion to tax costs claimed by the Pisanis. The Marchands timely appeal from the amended judgment and the order of costs.
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Verdicts Regarding the Marchand Water System Easement
To resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the Pisanis’ right to extinguish the Marchand water system easement, the jury was asked to respond to the following questions: “[Question] 1. Did Cynthia Pisani and Susan Pisani... satisfy all of the conditions specified by the [1990] Easement Grant Deed, Exhibit 48? [¶] __ Yes __ No. [¶] If your answer to question 1 is yes, then skip questions 2-4.... If you answered no, answer question 2. [¶] [Question] 2. Were Cynthia Pisani and Susan Pisani excused, due to impossibility, from having to perform one or more of the conditions specified by the Easement Grant Deed? [¶] __ Yes __ No. [¶] Please answer question 3. [¶] [Question] 3. Did Dan Marchand and Linda Marchand waive one or more conditions specified by the Easement Grant Deed? [¶] __ Yes __ No. [¶] If your answer to question 2 or 3 is yes, then answer question 4. If you answered no as to both 2 and 3, stop here [and] answer no further questions.... [¶] [Question] 4. Did Cynthia Pisani and Susan Pisani satisfy all of the conditions specified by the Easement Grant Deed that were not excused or waived? [¶] __ Yes __ No. The jury answered Yes to Question 1 and did not respond to the remaining questions.
The Marchands argue there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the Pisanis satisfied all the conditions specified in the Marchand water system easement grant deed because it was undisputed that the Pisanis had failed to comply with the condition that new water pipes not be placed on the dog leg area of the Marchand property. The Pisanis respond by arguing that the jury could have found the challenged relocation condition impossible to perform and therefore void, and then the jury followed the court’s instructions to disregard the void condition, finding the conditions to be given effect had been satisfied by the Pisanis. The Marchands reply that the jury did not make an impossibility finding as the Pisanis suggest because after answering Yes to Question 1, the jury did not answer Question 2, which concerned the concept of impossibility. We conclude the challenged jury finding is sustainable.
Before answering the verdict form questions as to whether a condition was satisfied, excused, or waived, the jury would necessarily have to first determine which conditions were to be given effect or disregarded. The jury was given instructions to aid them in making that latter determination: “When through fraud, mistake or accident a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded and the erroneous part of the writing disregarded, ” and “A condition in a contract, the fulfillment of which is impossible or which is repugnant to the nature of the interest created by the contract, is void.” (Emphasis added.) Concededly, the jury was not asked to make a specific finding as to whether a condition was disregarded or void. Nevertheless, if the jury found a condition was to be disregarded or void, it would necessarily follow that the jury would not consider that condition in its response to the verdict form questions as to whether a condition was satisfied, excused, or waived. Contrary to the Marchands’ argument, neither the court’s instructions nor the verdict form questions required the jury to find that a condition was impossible to perform before disregarding that condition. The instructions allowed the jury to disregard any condition as contrary to the intention of the parties or repugnant to the nature of the interest created by the easement grant deed, even if the condition was capable of being performed. As noted, if a condition was disregarded or void, the jury could appropriately ignore it before answering the verdict form questions as to whether a condition was satisfied, excused, or waived. Consequently, the jury’s finding is properly construed as a determination that the Pisanis satisfied all of the conditions that were to be given effect. Because the jury’s finding may be so construed in a manner that supports it, we will not disturb it. (See Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 457 [“an appellate court will interpret the verdict if it is possible to give a correct interpretation, ” and reverse only if the verdict is “hopelessly ambiguous”].)
In light of our determination, we do not address the Marchands’ related arguments regarding the proper remedy for the alleged error in the jury’s finding.
II. Jury Verdicts Regarding the Pisani Candy Stripe Easement
The Marchands seek a new trial on all causes of action relating to the Pisani candy stripe easement on the ground that the jury made inconsistent findings regarding who was obligated to repair and maintain the easement. Alternatively, the Marchands seek a new trial on damages because the jury awarded multiple damages for a single harm. Finally, the Marchands argue that, as a matter of law, the Pisanis are not entitled to damages based on their negligence claims or punitive damages. We conclude the Marchands’ arguments are unavailing.
A. Jury Verdicts on the Parties’ Negligence Claims Are Not Inconsistent
The Marchands argue the jury verdicts on both parties’ negligence claims are inconsistent based on the following premise: The Marchands pleaded a negligence cause of action articulating “several” theories. One theory was that the Pisanis negligently installed a road on the candy stripe easement resulting in damage to the Marchand property. The Pisanis contended they did not install a road on the easement, and that the Marchands alone were responsible for repairing and maintaining the easement under the 2000 settlement agreement. The jury verdicts in favor of the Pisanis on their separate causes of action for breach of the 2000 settlement agreement and negligence indicate the jury believed the Marchands were responsible for repairing and maintaining the easement, and imply that the jury did not believe the Pisanis had installed a road on the easement. Nevertheless, the jury also returned a verdict in favor of the Marchands on their negligence claim, which purportedly shows the jury irreconcilably believed the Marchands were entitled to recover damages based on the Pisanis’ supposed installation of a road on the easement and responsibility for damaging the Marchand property. We conclude the Marchands’ argument that the verdicts are inconsistent fails.
The Marchands’ inconsistent verdicts claim is based on the premise that we must accept their argument that the negligence verdict in their favor rests on the theory the Pisanis negligently installed a road on the candy stripe easement, causing damage to the Marchand property. However, in closing argument the Marchands asked the jury to find in their favor on their negligence cause of action and award them moneys (1) to repair their property damaged by a 2006 landslide allegedly caused by the Pisanis’ work on the easement, at an estimated repair cost of $80,000 to $100,000, or $131,250, and (2) to replace the old water pipes destroyed by the Pisanis, at an estimated replacement cost of $2,000 to $10,000. Given the Marchands’ damages requests on their negligence claim, we can be reasonably certain the jury’s finding that the Marchands should recover $2,000 on their negligence claim, without adjustment for fault, was for the destruction of their old water pipes, and not for property damage caused by the Pisanis’ purportedly negligent installation of a road on the candy stripe easement.
We reject the Marchands’ argument that we cannot assume the negligence verdict in their favor relied solely on their claim for the destruction of their old water pipes because there is no evidentiary support for the jury’s finding that the Marchands were 40 percent at fault for their loss resulting from the Pisanis’ negligence. The Marchands’ request for reimbursement of the cost of their destroyed water pipes was based on (1) a provision in the Marchand water system easement grant deed that “all existing or replacement” parts of the water system “shall remain the property of” Daniel Marchand; and (2) Daniel Marchand’s testimony that the old water pipes had not been returned to him, and the Pisanis never said, “we have your pipes, and we’ll give them back to you.” However, Susan Pisani testified she was not aware Daniel Marchand wanted his old water pipes, “he had brand new pipes, ” and she had disposed of the old water pipes, not by selling them, but by cutting them into shorter lengths and taking them to the “dump” because she did not “imagine anyone to want those pipes in the condition they were in.” In allocating 40 percent of the fault for the loss of the old water pipes to the Marchands, the jury may well have reasoned the Marchands were responsible in part for the loss because they knew about the installation of the new water system but did not ask the Pisanis to return the old water pipes, and the Pisanis should not be held liable for the entire loss because they proffered a reasonable explanation for their destruction of the water pipes from which they gained no monetary benefit.
We therefore conclude there is no basis to set aside the jury’s findings on the parties’ negligence claims on the ground of inconsistent verdicts.
B. No Showing That Jury Awarded Multiple Damages for Single Harm
The Marchands argue they are entitled to a new trial on damages because the verdict forms permitted the jury to award the same types of damages (“[p]ast economic loss including amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to maintain the easement and to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and “[f]uture economic loss including the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property”), under multiple theories of fraud, breach of contract, and negligence. According to the Marchands, because the verdict form questions used identical language, the trial court effectively allowed the jury several chances to award damages for a single harm. We conclude the Marchands’ argument is unavailing.
The jury found the Pisanis should recover the aggregate principal sum of $148,272.74 (before reduction for any fault on their part) for their past and future costs to repair the existing damage on the candy stripe easement. This sum is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, by the time of trial the Pisanis had paid $48,272.74 to repair the existing damage on the candy stripe easement. The Pisanis’ expert, Patrick Shires, estimated the cost of the future repair of the existing damage, which was limited to a portion of the easement, was between $80,000 and $100,000. The Marchands’ expert, Richard Holsinger, estimated the cost of the future repair of the existing damage to be about $125,000, plus five percent for inflation. Thus, the aggregate principal sum of $148,272.74, was not only between the lowest and highest estimates, but, the exact maximum amount to the penny that was requested by the Pisanis.
The Marchands contend their request for relief based on duplicative damages is supported by a portion of the decision in Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150 (Tavaglione), in which our Supreme Court explained that “[r]egardless of the nature and number of legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, he is not entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. [Citation.] Double or duplicative recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is therefore prohibited.” (Id. at pp. 1158-1159.) However, in explaining the application of the rule, our Supreme Court went on to state: “Thus, for example, in a case in which the plaintiff’s only item of damage was loss of commissions, two awards of damages identical in amount—one for breach of contract and the other for bad faith denial of the same contract—could not be added together in computing the judgment. Plaintiff was entitled to only one of the awards. [Citations.] [¶] In contrast, where separate items of compensable damage are shown by distinct and independent evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire amount of his damages, whether that amount is expressed by the jury in a single verdict or multiple verdicts referring to different claims or legal theories. (See Pat Rose Associates v. Coombe (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 9, 20 [(Pat Rose Associates)], disapproved on other grounds in Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 116 [recovery of sum of (1) out-of-pocket loss recovered under fraud theory and (2) lost profits damages recovered under contract theory permissible where damage items were distinct and entire amount of injury was compensable under fraud theory in any event].)” (Tavaglione, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) As we now discuss, it is the latter rule—that a plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his damages, whether that amount is expressed by the jury in a single verdict or multiple verdicts referring to different claims or legal theories—which is applicable in this case.
The court’s instructions to the jurors did not limit their consideration of damages to specific items. Rather, the jury was told, among other things, that the Pisanis did “not have to prove the exact amount of damages that will provide reasonable compensation for the harm, ” and the jury “must award only the damages that fairly compensate the plaintiffs... for their loss if any, ” and the award of damages “must be based on [the jury’s] reasoned judgment applied to testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence that has been admitted during the trial.” The verdict form advised the jury that the Pisanis could recover damages for past economic loss that included “amounts paid to Ned Clyde and others to maintain the easement and to repair the landslide damage from 2003 to the present, ” and future economic loss that included “the cost to repair the landslides on the easement on the Marchand property.” The jury was expressly told that the Pisanis had made claims against the Marchands “for breach of contract, negligence, ... and fraud. If you decide the plaintiffs... have proved their claims, the same damages that resulted from any and all claims can be awarded only once.” Because the jury did not find the Pisanis should recover the same amount of damages for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence, we can be reasonably certain the jury followed the court’s instructions and awarded sums for the same damages only once. The total aggregate amount of damages for which the jury found the Pisanis should recover for their past and future economic losses as a result of the existing physical damage to the candy stripe easement was compensable under their fraud (false promise) theory. The fact that the Pisanis “recovered a portion of [their] loss[es] under a contract theory [and a negligence theory] does not mean that the damages were duplicated.” (Pat Rose Associates, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 20.) Consequently, we see no merit to the Marchands’ argument that the court erred in entering judgment in favor of the Pisanis by aggregating the damages the jury found to be recoverable for their past and future economic losses relating to the existing damage on the candy stripe easement.
The Marchands’ reliance on Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, is misplaced. In that employment case, the trial court told the jury to assess the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages individually for each of three termination-related causes of action. (Id. at p. 703.) The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s procedure of calculating the total award by adding together the several individual awards of noneconomic damages “could only be justified if the awards of noneconomic damages for each of the three termination-related causes of action were all mutually exclusive. If they overlapped in part, then, to the extent of the overlap, adding the awards together had the effect of compensating [the plaintiff] multiple times for the same injury.” (Ibid.) Although the Supreme Court found that no explanation of the verdict was satisfactory, it did not remand for a new trial because the plaintiff withdrew her challenge to that part of the Court of Appeal’s decision that the three termination-related noneconomic damages awards fully overlapped one another, and therefore, it would affirm only the largest of the three awards, while treating the other two awards as duplicative. (Id. at p. 705.) Here, as we note in the text of this opinion, the jury’s intent in making the awards can be “determined to a reasonable certainty” (id. at p. 705), and therefore, a remand for a new trial on damages is not required. (See Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 457 [“an appellate court will interpret the verdict if it is possible to give a correct interpretation, ” and reverse only if the verdict is “hopelessly ambiguous”].)
C. The Pisanis’ Negligence Claims Are Not Duplicative of Breach of Contract Claims
The Marchands also argue that the award of damages on the Pisanis’ negligence claims for damage to the candy stripe easement should be reversed as a matter of law because those claims were duplicative of their breach of contract claims based on Daniel Marchand’s breach of the 2000 settlement agreement regarding the parties’ obligations to repair and maintain the easement. However, when questioned by the trial court about the apparent duplicative nature of the claims, the Pisanis’ counsel explained the breach of contract claims were based on the Marchands’ breach of their contractual duty to repair and maintain the easement, while the negligence claims were premised on the allegation that Marchands’ conduct “fell below the standard of care” as it related to their efforts to take care of the easement. The court instructed the jury on the elements necessary to find the Pisanis had suffered damages for their separate breach of contract and negligence claims relating to the parties’ obligations to repair and maintain the easement. Consequently, we reject the Marchands’ argument that the Pisanis’ negligence claims should be dismissed as duplicative of their breach of contract claims.
D. Substantial Evidence Supports Punitive Damages Awarded to Pisanis
The Marchands argue the award of punitive damages should be reversed as a matter of law because the evidence was insufficient to establish Daniel Marchand acted with the requisite oppression, fraud, or malice, to support such an award. We disagree.
Civil Code section 3294, which governs an award of punitive damages, provides, in pertinent part, that “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The words ‘oppression, fraud, or malice’ in Civil Code section 3294 being in the disjunctive, fraud alone is an adequate basis for awarding punitive damages. [Citations.]” (Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 101, 135 [punitive damages “may be awarded where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract”]; see Pat Rose Associates, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 21 [“jury finding of fraud [is] a sufficient basis for awarding punitive damages”].)
In this case, the Marchands do not expressly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Daniel Marchand made a false promise to be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the candy stripe easement when he entered into the 2000 settlement agreement. They only challenge the jury’s finding that Daniel Marchand’s alleged fraudulent conduct was insufficient to demonstrate the requisite oppression, fraud, or malice, to support an award of punitive damages. Relying on isolated portions of Daniel Marchand’s testimony, the Marchands contend the issue of who was responsible for repairing and maintaining the candy stripe easement was hotly contested, and all of the evidence remains consistent with “mistakes of law, errors in judgment, and negligence, ” which cannot support an award of punitive damages.
However, the jury was free to reject and give no weight to Daniel Marchand’s testimony regarding his “honestly held” belief that “under the 2000 settlement agreement, those who used the easement had a duty to repair it.” The jury’s finding that Daniel Marchand engaged in the requisite fraudulent conduct to warrant imposition of punitive damages is not vulnerable to attack because he “consistently hewed to his understanding” of the 2000 settlement agreement. As we have previously concluded, we also see no merit to the Marchands’ argument that the jury’s negligence finding against the Pisanis establishes that the jury must have found the Pisanis bore some responsibility for maintaining the easement. The Marchands’ reliance on the fact that the Pisanis never asked Daniel Marchand to pay for the repair or maintenance of the easement on the Marchand property is similarly misplaced. The jury was free to accept Cynthia Pisani’s explanation as to why the Pisanis never asked Daniel Marchand to pay for any repair and maintenance prior to this litigation. Accordingly, we see no basis to disturb the jury’s findings on the Pisanis’ entitlement to punitive damages on the grounds argued by the Marchands.
III. Order Awarding Costs to Pisanis
The Marchands argue that if we reverse the amended judgment in favor of the Pisanis, we must also reverse the order awarding them costs. Because we have determined that there is no basis to reverse the amended judgment in favor of the Pisanis, we affirm the order granting them costs.
In their responsive brief, the Pisanis request that if they are the prevailing parties on this appeal, we should determine they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Civil Code section 3306a (as an expense incurred in quieting title to their property) and remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount of such fees. In their reply brief, the Marchands oppose the request, arguing that the attorney fees already awarded to the Pisanis are more than 1.5 times the compensatory damages awarded to them, and none of the issues on the Marchands’ appeal specifically targets the Pisanis’ quiet title cause of action. However, the Marchands make no substantive challenge to the sum already awarded to the Pisanis as attorney fees. Consequently, we decline to now rule on the Pisanis’ entitlement to appellate counsel fees. The Pisanis may pursue their request for such fees with the trial court, which shall determine, in the first instance, the Pisanis’ entitlement to such fees and the amount of such fees, if appropriate. (People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 378, 387-388.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the judgment entered on September 10, 2008, is dismissed. The amended judgment entered on November 10, 2008, and the order entered on March 9, 2009, are affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded costs on appeal.
We concur: Pollak, J., Jenkins, J.