During the pendency of the action, the Pirkles deeded the disputed property to appellant Cox, and Cox was joined as a plaintiff in the action. In Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308 ( 588 SE2d 733) (2003), this Court affirmed the trial court's issuance of an interlocutory injunction against Cox as well as its finding that two deeds in the Pirkles' chain of title, upon which appellants relied to establish their claims, were void as a matter of law because the property descriptions therein were too indefinite. A jury trial was subsequently held, and the jury returned special verdicts rejecting appellants' claims of title by perfect equity or by actual adverse possession and affirming Turner's title to a designated portion of the disputed property by constructive adverse possession.

The sufficiency of the description of property in a deed is a question of law for the court. Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308 (1) ( 588 SE2d 733) (2003). In fact, "[a] deed wherein the description of the property sought to be conveyed is so vague and indefinite as to afford no means of identifying any particular tract of land is inoperative either as a conveyance of title or as color of title."

         A description of property contained in a deed must be sufficient to identify the land being sold. See generally Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308(1), 588 S.E.2d 733 (2003); Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 198(2)(b), 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947); Mull v. Mickey's Lumber & Supply Co., Inc., 218 Ga.App. 343, 344(2), 461 S.E.2d 270 (1995). "This court has often held that the description in an entry of levy on land and in a deed is sufficient where it furnishes a key whereby the identity of the land may be made certain by extrinsic evidence."

Here, the description of the easement in the 1941 warranty deed and subsequent references to that description in later deeds provides no means to identify the quantity or location of the easement intended to be conveyed. The description does not clearly identify the dimensions of the easement or where it begins, leads, or ends. There is nothing in the record to support the Tolars' contention that the 1964 survey of a portion of Smith's land shows the location of the intended easement. It follows that the express easement sought to be conveyed is void for vagueness and unenforceable. Hedden, 236 Ga. at 642-643; Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308 ( 588 SE2d 733) (2003). The trial court erred by granting the Tolars' motion for summary judgment and by denying Smith's motion for summary judgment.

Id. The sufficiency of the description of property in a deed is a question of law. Strickland v. CMCR Investments, LLC, 279 Ga. 112, 115, 610 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2005) (citing Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308, 588 S.E.2d 733 (2003)). The Georgia Supreme Court has clarified when a deed's description is adequate.

Here, the trial court erred when it used extrinsic evidence to identify a location and width for the easement because the general and unspecific language in the deed provides no key from which the location of the easement can be determined. See Pirkle v. Turner , 277 Ga. 308, 588 S.E.2d 733 (2003) ; Smith v. Tolar , 281 Ga.App. 406, 408, 636 S.E.2d 112 (2006). We must therefore reverse the trial court's order granting an express easement to Byrd.

The sufficiency of the description in a deed is a question of law for the court. See Pirkle v. Turner, 277 Ga. 308, 588 S.E.2d 733 (2003). If the description in a deed identifies, or furnishes the means of identifying, the property conveyed, it performs its function. Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55, 60, 308 P.2d 216, 219 (1957); see also Derham v. Hill, 57 Colo. 345, 142 P. 181 (1914) (a description is sufficient when from it the property can be identified).