Pursuant to Part II, Article 74, the justices of the supreme court may render advisory opinions only "upon important questions of law and upon solemn occasions," and only to "[e]ach branch of the legislature as well as the governor and council." N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74 ; see In re School–Law Manual, 63 N.H. at 576–77, 4 A. 878 ; Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330, 251 A.2d 328 (1969) ("The bodies authorized to ... obtain [advisory] opinions are limited by [Part II,] Article 74 [ ] to the branches of the Legislature and the Governor and Council."). Thus, Part II, Article 74 does not authorize this court to render advisory opinions to private individuals.
When we issue such opinions, we act not as a court, but as individual constitutional advisors to the legislative or executive branches. Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330 (1969). With respect to issuing advisory opinions about existing statutes, as we are asked to do here, our constitutional authority is especially limited.
This ruling was vacated by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on the grounds that it was advisory and the superior court lacked jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 251 A.2d 328 (1969). Subsequently, Nelson B. Piper, Jr. and the two appellants herein joined as plaintiffs in a state declaratory judgment suit against the town.
Thus, while the respective branches of the legislature, the governor, and the executive council may request our advisory opinion on important questions of law, other parties may not. See Duncan, 166 N.H. at 640, 102 A.3d 913 ; Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330, 251 A.2d 328 (1969). Rather, we have held that those other parties must present claims for judicial resolution through an adversarial process in which their actual interests are at stake.
"The bodies authorized to ... obtain [advisory] opinions are limited by [ Part II, Article 74 ] to the branches of the Legislature and the Governor and Council." Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330, 251 A.2d 328 (1969). Part II, Article 74 does not authorize the justices to render advisory opinions to private individuals.
It appears that the trial court may have rendered an advisory opinion as to actions the town could take in the future. See Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330 (1969) (superior court has no jurisdiction to give advisory opinions). We vacate and remand for a determination as to whether the town's existing site plan regulations are applicable, lawful and consistent with RSA chapter 149-M.
The action cannot be based on a hypothetical set of facts, id., 298 A.2d at 749; Villars v. Portsmouth, 100 N.H. 453, 455, 129 A.2d 914, 916 (1957), and it cannot constitute a request for advice as to future cases. Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 330, 251 A.2d 328, 329 (1969). "Furthermore the controversy must be of a nature which will permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made through a decree of a conclusive character."
However, we hold that this record constitutes an insufficient basis on which we can properly render an opinion on the second issue and decline to do so. See Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 251 A.2d 328 (1969); Bedford v. Lynch, 113 N.H. 364, 308 A.2d 522 (1973). Remanded.
While we are of the opinion it would be questionable whether a defendant could raise the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment in advance of trial, in the present case he is not subject to capital punishment and clearly may not require an advisory opinion on the issue from this court. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74; Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 251 A.2d 328 (1969); State v. Harvey, 106 N.H. 446, 213 A.2d 428 (1965). Remanded.
Initially the defendants argue that the issues in dispute are not properly determined in a declaratory judgment action. Their reliance on Piper v. Meredith, 109 N.H. 328, 251 A.2d 328 (1969) is misplaced. Unlike Piper v. Meredith, the case before us concerns a dispute between the parties over their rights under an existing binding contract and does not constitute a demand for advice as to future cases.