Opinion
Case No. 1:23-cv-1088
2023-12-11
Mary A. PIPER and Thomas W. Loveless, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR CO., et al., Defendants.
James Ben Feinman, James B. Feinman Attorney at Law, Lynchburg, VA, for Plaintiffs. Brian Vincent Johnson, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant Ford Motor Company. Soroush Nasser Moghaddassi, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, P.C., Glen Allen, VA, Nadeem B. Bohsali, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, Richmond, VA, for Defendant Thor Industries, Inc. Soroush Nasser Moghaddassi, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, P.C., Glen Allen, VA, for Defendants Camping World RV Sales, LLC, Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
James Ben Feinman, James B. Feinman Attorney at Law, Lynchburg, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Brian Vincent Johnson, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant Ford Motor Company.
Soroush Nasser Moghaddassi, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, P.C., Glen Allen, VA, Nadeem B. Bohsali, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, Richmond, VA, for Defendant Thor Industries, Inc.
Soroush Nasser Moghaddassi, Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman, P.C., Glen Allen, VA, for Defendants Camping World RV Sales, LLC, Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
ORDER
T. S. Ellis, III, United States District Judge.
At issue in this breach-of-warranty dispute is Defendant Camping World RV Sales, LLC's ("Camping World's") motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Mary A. Piper and Thomas W. Loveless's complaint as against Camping World. (Dkt. 8). The motion has been fully briefed, and it is therefore ripe for disposition.
I.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint (Dkt. 27) reflects the following relevant facts, which must be taken as true for purposes of this motion. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Plaintiffs Mary A. Piper and Thomas W. Loveless reside in Loudoun County, Virginia. On February 18, 2022, Plaintiffs purchased a 2022 Thor Hurricane 29M (the "Thor"), a Class A luxury recreational vehicle, from Defendant Camping World RV Sales. The Thor was manufactured by Defendant Thor Motor Coach, Inc., and it came equipped with an F-53 chassis manufactured by Defendant Ford Motor Co. The Thor cost nearly $170,000.
To Plaintiffs' dismay, the Thor turned out to be a lemon. Between the date of Plaintiffs' purchase and the filing of this action, the Thor has been taken in for repairs four times; nor were those repairs minor or trivial, as they consumed a total of 227 days. Notwithstanding these extensive attempts to repair the Thor, Plaintiffs nevertheless discovered on or around June 2023 that the Thor had a soft brake pedal—a "serious safety defect." Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
On August 16, 2023, Plaintiffs sued Ford, Thor Industries, and Camping World and asserted the following three claims. Count One arises under the Virginia Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (the "Lemon Law"), Va. Code § 59.1-207.9 et seq., and is brought against Ford and Thor Motor Coach. Count Two arises under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and is brought against all three defendants. Count Three arises under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (the "VCPA"), Va. Code § 59.1-196 et seq., and is also brought against all three defendants.
On September 12, 2023, Camping World moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against it as time barred pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. Camping World argues
On November 28, 2023, because Plaintiffs' original complaint improperly named Thor Industries, Inc. as a defendant, Plaintiffs were given leave to amend their complaint to state a claim against Defendant Thor Motor Coach, Inc. Order, Piper v. Ford Motor Co. (Nov. 28, 2023) (Dkt. 26).
that the relevant statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' claims. In the alternative, Camping World argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act because Camping World expressly disclaimed all warranties on which Plaintiffs could sue.
II.
Camping World argues that Plaintiffs' claims against it are time barred. Specifically, Camping World relies on the Virginia Commercial Code (the "VCC")'s general-purpose statute of limitations, which states that "[a]n action for breach of any contract of sale," including any action for breach of warranty, "must be commenced within four years" after the claim accrues unless the parties "reduce the period of limitations to not less than one year" "[b]y the original agreement." Va. Code § 8.2-725(1). Plaintiffs purchased the Thor in February 2022, but sued only in August 2023. Camping World notes that its contract with Plaintiffs reduced the limitations period to one year, and thus Camping World argues that Plaintiffs' warranty claims are time barred and must be dismissed.
A.
Camping World's motion must be denied with respect to Counts One and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint. To begin with, Camping World's motion to dismiss Count One fails because Count One is not brought against Camping World in the first place. Indeed, Plaintiffs' Lemon Law allegations do not mention Camping World at all. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19.
Next, Camping World's motion to dismiss Count Three—Plaintiffs' VCPA claim—fails, as the VCC's statute of limitations does not apply to claims brought under the VCPA. Camping World's contract of sale with Plaintiffs purported to reduce the limitations period for "any claim arising out of ... the purchase of the [Thor]" to one year from the date of sale. Camping Sales Purchase Contract at 1 (Dkt. 9-1). But Va. Code § 8.2-725—the only statute Camping World relies on for dismissal of Count Three—applies exclusively to actions "for breach of any contract" or for "breach of warranty." Importantly, Section 8.2-725 gives Camping World no authority to shorten the limitations period for any other cause of action. See Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 256 Va. 161, 500 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1998); In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Litig., 94 Va. Cir. 189, 209-10 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2016). The statute does not apply to anything except an action for breach of a contract for the sale of goods. See Herren Farms, LLC v. Martin, 615 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432 (W.D. Va. 2022). Accordingly, Section 8.2-725 is inapplicable to Plaintiffs' VCPA claim; instead, that claim is governed by the VCPA itself, which specifically provides that enforcement actions "shall be commenced within two years after ... accrual." Va. Code § 59.1-204.1(A). The earliest Plaintiffs' VCPA claim could have possibly accrued was February 18, 2022—the date Plaintiffs purchased the Thor from Camping World. Two years have not passed since that date. Thus, Camping World's motion must be denied with respect to Counts One and Three of Plaintiffs' complaint, as the VCC's statute of limitations does not apply to these claims.
B.
A different analysis applies, however, to Camping World's motion to dismiss as time barred Count Two, Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim. The Magnuson-Moss
Act does not provide its own statute of limitations. When a federal cause of action lacks an express statute of limitations, district courts have two options. The cause of action may be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658's default four-year statute of limitations. Alternatively, the "state-borrowing doctrine," which requires district courts to apply "the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand," may instead govern the cause of action. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355-56, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991).
It is clear that the state-borrowing doctrine applies to Plaintiffs' cause of action because Section 1658 abrogated the state-borrowing doctrine only prospectively and not, as here, with respect to a statute enacted before Section 1658 went into effect. Specifically, Section 1658 was passed by Congress in 1990 to abrogate the state-borrowing doctrine, but that abrogation applied to causes of action created after that section's enaction. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; see Lampf. Pleva, 501 U.S. at 364 n.10, 111 S.Ct. 2773. Thus, the terms of the statute provide that Section 1658's "catchall 4-year statute of limitations" applies only to "actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990." Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004); see 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). As the Supreme Court held in Jones, Section 1658's default rule governs only if the claim at issue was "made possible" by a post-1990 enactment. Jones, 541 U.S. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 1836; Chambers v. N.C. Dep't of Justice, 66 F.4th 139, 142 (4th Cir. 2023). Because Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim was made possible by 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d), which was enacted in 1975 alongside the rest of the Magnuson-Moss Act, the state-borrowing doctrine applies notwithstanding Section 1658. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 110, 88 Stat. 2183, 2189-92 (1975).
See, e.g., Rutherford v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 737, 746 (D. Md. 2022) (applying the state borrowing doctrine and holding that the forum state's UCC determines the statute of limitations for a Magnuson-Moss claim); Withers v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 560 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1021 (W.D.N.C. 2021) (same); Wheeler v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 534 F. Supp. 3d 527, 535 (W.D.N.C. 2021) (same); Harrell v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 517 F. Supp. 3d 527, 533-34 (D.S.C. 2021) (same); Thomas v. FireRock Prods., LLC, 40 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 n.3 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (same); Murungi v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 71, 78-79 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
Because the state-borrowing doctrine applies to actions brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the next step requires identifying "the local time limitation most analogous" to the cause of action. Lampf, Pleva, 501 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. 2773. The Magnuson-Moss Act regulates express and implied warranties and provides a federal cause of action for breach of warranty. Because the Magnuson-Moss Act "applies to all 'consumer goods,'" not just cars, courts have overwhelmingly held that "[t]he state law cause of action most analogous to a Magnuson-Moss breach of warranty claim is an action for a breach of warranty in a contract of sale", brought pursuant to the UCC. Hillery v. Georgie Boy Mfg., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114-15 (D. Ariz. 2004). Although the Fourth Circuit has never reached the issue, the Fourth Circuit has previously accepted parties' agreement that it is appropriate to apply the forum state's limitations period on "claims for breach of warranty for the sale of goods" to actions arising under the Magnuson-Moss Act. Ferro v. Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, 731 F. App'x 208, 210 (4th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Section 8.2-725, the VCC's statute of limitations on
warranty actions, therefore provides the relevant limitations period for Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim. That statute provides for a four-year statute of limitations but also provides that this period may be reduced by contract to a period no less than one year. Camping World's "original agreement" with Plaintiffs—the contract of sale pursuant to which Plaintiffs bought the Thor—reduced the limitations period to one year from the date of sale, as Section 8.2-725(1) expressly allows. Camping Sales Purchase Contract at 1. By operation of the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim is time barred.
Seeking to avoid this straightforward conclusion, Plaintiffs argue that Camping World promised Plaintiffs a five-year warranty and that the Magnuson-Moss Act prohibits enforcement of statutes of limitation which would bar claims for breach of a longer warranty. Pltfs' Mem. at 6-7 (Dkt. 13). Specifically, Plaintiffs rely on 15 U.S.C. § 2308, a provision of the Magnuson-Moss Act that limits the circumstances in which a seller may disclaim, modify, or limit an implied warranty. Pltfs' Mem. at 6. Plaintiffs do not argue that Camping World cites the wrong statute of limitations. Nor do Plaintiffs argue that the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts Va. Code § 8.2-725. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that 15 U.S.C. § 2308, of its own force, invalidates a contracted-for limitations period that Virginia law expressly permits.
Camping World disputes that it promised Plaintiffs a five-year warranty. Camping World's dispute in this regard need not be resolved here, since Camping World, for reasons stated infra, still prevails even if a five-year warranty is assumed arguendo. This is so because a one-year limitations period does not disclaim or modify a five-year warranty.
Plaintiffs' argument fails because Section 2308 regulates warranties substantively, but does not address affirmative defenses to warranties, including statutes of limitation. This is so because a statute of limitations is not a substantive limitation on the implied warranty itself; rather, it is a procedural bar to relief that is invoked as an affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (listing "statute of limitations" as an example of an affirmative defense); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945) ("statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy" rather than to underlying substantive rights) (discussing Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885)). Put another way, the Magnuson-Moss Act does not affect state statutes of limitation because "[a] statute of limitations neither excludes nor modifies warranties, but only limits the period of time in which an action may be brought." Martin v. Thor Motor Coach Inc., 474 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983 (N.D. Ind. 2020) (quoting Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 273 (S.D. 1982)).
Although the decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia do not govern this case, which arises under federal law, those decisions are nonetheless instructive because Virginia courts, like federal courts, have long held that statutes of limitation are remedial in nature and do not affect substantive rights. See Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1989) (statutes of limitation "serve merely to time-restrict the assertion of a remedy."); Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 875, 170 S.E. 412, 416 (1933) (statutes of limitation "neither create nor destroy rights, but pertain to the remedy solely.") (quoting In re Hogan, 75 Ind.App. 53, 129 N.E. 633, 634 (1921)); Smith & Marsh v. N. Neck Mut. Fire Ass'n of Va., 112 Va. 192, 70 S.E. 482, 484 (1911) ("to shorten the period of limitation" does not "impair the [underlying] obligation").
In Martin, the plaintiffs there argued, as Plaintiffs do here, that a "reduced period of limitations [was] a modification of the implied warranty" and thus prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Act. 474 F. Supp. 3d at 983. The Martin Court rejected this argument, and although Martin is not binding in this District, Martin is thorough and persuasive in its analysis.
Because a statute of limitations is not "[a] disclaimer, modification, or limitation" of an implied warranty, the Magnuson-Moss Act is no bar to the application of a state statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c). In sum, Section 2308 does not apply, as Plaintiffs argue here, to preclude application of Virginia's statute of limitations and its provision that the four-year limitations period may be shortened.
Plaintiffs resist this conclusion, asserting that "[n]o statute of limitations clause can be used as a device to defeat the existence and duration of an implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act." Pltfs' Mem. at 7 (emphasis removed). Although Plaintiffs place this claim in quotation marks, Plaintiffs cite no case in which this quotation appears, nor has any been found.
Plaintiffs also rely on cases stating the general proposition that remedial statutes should be construed broadly. Id. (citing and quoting Genetics & IVF Inst. v. Kappos, 801 F. Supp. 2d 497, 508 (E.D. Va. 2011)). This, too, does not save Plaintiffs' argument, inasmuch Plaintiffs cannot avoid well-established doctrine holding that the Magnuson-Moss Act "supplements, rather than supplants state law." Doll v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F. Supp. 2d 526, 545 (D. Md. 2011); accord, e.g., Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1986); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008). As Plaintiffs' own authority recognizes, "a liberal construction is not a license to re-write the statute." Genetics & IVF Inst., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 508. In sum, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Magnuson-Moss Act supplants state statutes of limitation when the state-borrowing doctrine in fact requires the opposite result.
Plaintiffs also argue that borrowing and applying the VCC's statute of limitations here would leave Plaintiffs without a remedy and that "[a] warranty without a remedy is no warranty at all." Pltfs' Mem. at 7 (emphasis removed). This is false. The Magnuson-Moss Act guaranteed Plaintiffs a remedy; Plaintiffs merely failed to assert it timely.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Camping World's one-year contractual limitations period is void because it is unconscionable. Pltfs' Mem. at 7-8. A contractual term is unconscionable under Virginia law if it is so shockingly inequitable that no reasonable person would offer or accept it. Flint Hill Sch. v. McIntosh, No. 181678, 2020 WL 33258, at *5 (Va. Jan. 2, 2020). That high bar is not met on the facts of this case. The one-year statute of limitations clause in Camping World's purchase contract, although printed in small type, is bolded, located on the first page of the contract, and placed just above the field on which Plaintiffs signed their names. Camping Sales Purchase Contract at 1. Although the purchase contract is arguably a contract of adhesion, see Flint Hill, at *5, that alone does not make the one-year limitations clause procedurally unfair or unconscionable. Neither is the content of the purchase contract substantively shocking. Indeed, the parties here contracted for a result expressly contemplated by the Virginia Commercial Code. To adopt Plaintiffs' unconscionability argument would effectively use the unconscionability doctrine to end-run the Virginia's General Assembly's judgment, as reflected in Va. Code § 8.2-725. That result is not tenable. The Fourth Circuit said as much in Buettner v. R. W. Martin & Sons, Inc., 47 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1995), where the Fourth Circuit refused to "create via unconscionability doctrine" an independent warranty that
"does not exist under Virginia [statutory] law." 47 F.3d at 119-20. In sum, Plaintiffs' attempts to evade the applicable one-year limitations period are unavailing. As a result, Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Act claim against Camping World must be dismissed. Because Camping World's statute of limitations argument is sufficient to dispose of Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim, there is no need to address Camping World's disclaimer of warranties argument.
* * *
In conclusion, Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss claim against Camping World must be dismissed as time barred, but Plaintiffs' VCPA claim against Camping World is not time barred and survives.
Accordingly,
It is hereby ORDERED that Camping World RV Sales, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 8) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Count Two of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Dkt. 27), which alleges a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act, is DISMISSED as against Camping World. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
It is further ORDERED that Camping World's Motion for Leave to Respond to Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Submission (Dkt. 30) is DENIED AS MOOT because Plaintiffs' proffered supplemental authority (Dkt. 29) does not affect the analysis or alter the result reached here.