Judgment in the case was rendered in favor of the successor receiver. It is the general rule that where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, failure to revive after death of a party does not render void a judgment subsequently entered in the case. Pioneer Tel. Tel. Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783. 116 P. 432; Town of Jefferson v. Hicks. 33 Okla. 407. 126 P. 739, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1053. The defendants' objection to the sufficiency of the cross-petition is without merit.

This was a quotation from Jantzen v. Emanuel German Baptist Church, 27 Okla. 473, 112 P. 1127, Ann.Cas. 1912C, 659, and other cases to the same effect are therein cited. See also Pioneer Telegraph Telephone Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432, which holds when no objection as to the mode of revival is made until after pleading to the merits and trial of the case such defect is waived. Defendant next contends that this action was instituted originally by plaintiff as guardian of Joanna Foster; that notice was not served in the proper manner by the proper person upon the incompetent; therefore the appointment of the guardian was void and plaintiff was without authority to institute the suit.

It is also the well settled law of this state that, where the instructions given by the court fully and fairly cover the questions suggested in the requested instructions, it is not error for the court to refuse to give specific instructions where the same subject-matter is fairly covered by the general instructions. Chase v. Cable Co., 67 Okla. 322, 170 P. 1172; Pioneer Telegraph Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed and judgment here rendered on the supersedeas.

Defendant next complains of error committed by the court in giving the instructions that were given and refusing to give certain instructions requested by the defendant, but we have carefully examined both the instructions given and those requested by defendant and which the court refused to give, and conclude, taking all of the instructions together, that the cause was fairly presented to the jury by the instructions given, and under the well-settled rule in this state, if the instructions that were given reasonably and fairly present all issues involved in the case to the jury, the cause will not be reversed upon the court's refusal to give other instructions, although they may correctly state the law, providing the same subject-matter be fairly covered in the general instructions. Chase v. Gable Co., 67 Okla. 322, 170 P. 1172; Pioneer Telegraph Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432. Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

An examination of the requested instructions discloses that they, in the main, state the law applicable to the case, but the record further discloses that the instructions given by the court fully and fairly covered the questions suggested in the requested instructions, and it was, therefore, not error for the court to refuse to give specific instructions where the same subject-matter was fairly covered by the general instructions. Chase v. Cable Co., 67 Okla. 322, 170 P. 1172; Pioneer Telegraph Telephone Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 166 P. 432. Finding no prejudicial error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. NICHOLSON, C. J., and HARRISON, MASON, HUNT, CLARK, and RILEY, JJ., concur.

The amount of damages recoverable in a death case is always a question of fact for the jury, and the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed unless it appears from the record that the jury was swayed by passion or prejudice against the losing party, and unless the recovery is so large as to shock the sense of justice. Pioneer Tel. T. Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432; Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Rye, 38 Okla. 93, 132 P. 336; St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Davis, 37 Okla. 340, 132 P. 337; Missouri, K. T. Co. v. West, 38 Okla. 581, 134 P. 655; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Pitchford, 44 Okla. 197, 143 P. 1146; Missouri, O. G. R. Co. v. Collins, 47 Okla. 761, 150 P. 142; Bellevue Gas Oil Co. v. Carr, 61 Okla. 290, 161 P. 203; St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. McClain, 63 Okla. 75, 162 P. 751. Under the facts and circumstances in this case we cannot say that the verdict is excessive.

"But appearance without questioning the want of notice is a waiver of such notice." The appearance without notice, although not under the same facts, but under circumstances that may be considered analogous, is discussed by this court in the case of Pioneer Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432, and it is likewise discussed by the Supreme Courts of Nebraska and Missouri in the following cases: Schaberg's Estate v. McDonald (Neb.) 83 N.W. 737; Crawford v. Chicago, R.I. P. R. Co. (Mo.) 66 S.W. 350. We are, therefore, of the opinion that when the city attorney appeared at the time of hearing the motion to revive, filed no objection to the revivor, and asked for no time to file objections nor objected to the court hearing the motion at that time, the notice provided by statute was waived, and that failing to except to the order of revivor waived any irregularities therein, and that the court erred in vacating the order of revivor.

So in the instant case the defendants, by their general appearance in answering the pleadings, and by their entering into the the stipulation as to the evidence, appeared generally in the action and thereby waived any objection to the regularity of the order of revivor, and therefore could not urge such irregularities by objection to the introduction of evidence. To the same effect is the decision of this court in Pioneer Tel. Tel. Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. at page 783, 116 P. 432. We therefore hold that the irregularity in the procedure in entering the order of revivor in this action was waived by the general appearance of the defendants after the order was made.

In at least two of the requested instructions correct rules of law arising upon the issues of the case were set out, but it seems to us that these rules were unduly shaded in favor of the railway company, and inasmuch as these rules were embraced in and fairly stated by the court in the instructions given, it was not error to deny the requested instructions. Finch v. Brown, 27 Okla. 217, 111 P. 391; Ellet-Kendall Shoe Co. v. Ross, 28 Okla. 697, 115 P. 892; Pioneer T. T. Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432; Standifer v. Sullivan, 30 Okla. 365, 120 P. 624. Exception was saved and is urged to instruction No. 9 in the court's charge to the jury.

These instructions, however, in so far as they correctly state the law, were substantially given by the court. Hence there was no reversible error in refusing to give them. Pioneer Tel. Tel. Co. v. Davis, Adm'r, 28 Okla. 783, 116 P. 432; Gulf, Colorado Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 37 Okla. 99, 130 P. 574; Enid City Ry. Co. v. Addie Reynolds, 34 Okla. 405, 126 P. 193. The next assignment is that the court erred in giving paragraph No. 2 of its instructions, which is as follows: