Although a sale conducted in a manner provided for in Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 810 5/9–627(b) will be considered “commercially reasonable,” the statute does not establish the exclusive means for conducting a commercially reasonable sale. See UCC Comment 3 to Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 810 5/9–627 (“[N]one of the specific methods of disposition specified in subsection [b] is required or exclusive.”); Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 126 Ill.App.3d 870, 873–74, 467 N.E.2d 1011 (1984) (construing earlier version of statute and reaching same conclusion). Further guidance for what constitutes a commercially reasonable sale is provided in Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 810 5/9–610(b) (2004), which states:

Id.Id.; accord Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 126 Ill.App.3d 870, 81 Ill.Dec. 889, 467 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (1984) (concluding that to determine if a sale was commercially reasonable, the court must look to the practices among dealers of that type of property).Unlike the three-week sales process run by the secured lender in Vornado, HIG consented to a 55–day process run by the company's officers and directors and the company's investment banker who had access to confidential information.

Id.Id.; accord Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 467 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (concluding that to determine if a sale was commercially reasonable, the court must look to the practices among dealers of that type of property). Unlike the three-week sales process run by the secured lender in Vornado, HIG consented to a 55-day process run by the company's officers and directors and the company's investment banker who had access to confidential information.

) In Illinois, the secured creditor, here Boender, has the burden of proving commercial reasonableness. ( Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 295, 301, 372 N.E.2d 926; General Foods Corp. v. Hall (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 147, 153, 349 N.E.2d 573.) Commercial reasonableness is normally an issue of fact ( Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 870, 873-74, 467 N.E.2d 1011), ill-suited to disposition by dismissal. Willard v. Northwest National Bank (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 255, 263, 484 N.E.2d 823.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on both the Structural Work Act count and the negligence count on May 21, 1985. • 1, 2 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ( Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 870, 873, 467 N.E.2d 1011, 1014.) Summary judgment is proper only where the evidence, when construed most strongly against the moving party, establishes clearly and without doubt his right thereto.

Accordingly, although we express no opinion as to whether Gorov breached a duty owing to the plaintiffs, we believe that summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue because it cannot be said as a matter of law that the movant was entitled to judgment. See Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 870, 876, 467 N.E.2d 1011. • 9, 10 The trial court also granted summary judgment on the basis that there was no material issue of fact as to the issue of proximate cause.

Plaintiff argues that the intent of the parties to be bound was ambiguous and, consequently, present a disputed issue of fact precluding summary judgment. An order granting summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, filed admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuinely disputed issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 870, 873, 467 N.E.2d 1011.) A disputed issue of fact exists when a material writing contains an ambiguity requiring the admission of extrinsic evidence.

• 12, 13 We also reject defendant's argument that plaintiff cannot recover because the sale was commercially reasonable. We observe that commercial reasonableness is normally an issue of fact (see Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 870, 873-74, 467 N.E.2d 1011), ill-suited to disposition by dismissal. More important, the Code provides a right to recover any loss caused by the failure of the secured party to comply with procedures for the disposition of collateral, including violation of the notice provisions. ( First Galesburg National Bank Trust Co. v. Joannides (1984), 103 Ill.2d 294, 300, 469 N.E.2d 180; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 26, par. 9-507(1).)