Opinion
No. 1078 C.D. 2011
03-15-2012
Raymond Pinson, Appellant v. PA Department of Corrections, et al., C.O. B.C. Schultz and C.O. Gribble
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 7, 2012, when Judge Pellegrini became President Judge.
Raymond Pinson, pro se, appeals the March 23, 2010, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) and dismissing Pinson's "petition for review." For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
By order dated June 10, 2011, the case was transferred from Superior Court to this Court.
The facts as alleged by Pinson are as follows: Pinson is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Greene. On October 3, 2008, Pinson was moved from his housing unit to a cell in the restricted housing unit, where he was held in administrative custody until a bed in general population became available. (Petition for Review, ¶4.) Pinson was moved to general population on October 8, 2008. (Petition for Review, ¶5.) On that day, Pinson's personal property was inventoried by Officers Schultz and Gribble and placed into two record center boxes and a footlocker. (Id.) Not all of the property fit, so the remaining items were listed on confiscated items receipts and confiscated and/or thrown away. (Id.) Pinson signed the confiscation receipts, noting that he chose to have the property destroyed rather than shipped somewhere at his own expense. (C.R., Confiscated Items Receipts.)
On October 17, 2008, Pinson filed an institutional grievance, seeking "return of his property." (Petition for Review, ¶7.) In the grievance, Pinson asserted that the confiscation of his property was unfair because all confiscated items were permitted by DC ADM 815 and had been purchased in good faith. (C.R., Appeal of Initial Review Response.)
DC ADM 815 is the Department's policy statement on what property inmates may and may not have. Section 3B(1) provides:
An inmate in general population is permitted storage space equal to four records center boxes. This space may consist of four records center boxes or one footlocker and two record center boxes. In a cell with a built-in, or free standing storage cabinet, the inmate is permitted to use that space and either two records center boxes or one footlocker.According to Pinson, he was being moved to a cell with a storage cabinet, and all of his belongings would have fit in one footlocker and the cabinet because the cabinets hold more than two records center boxes. (C.R., Appeal of Initial Review Response.) Moreover, Pinson felt it was unfair for him to go through the inventory process and have his belongings confiscated because the move into and back out of the restricted housing unit was for administrative, not disciplinary reasons. (Petition for Review, ¶18.)
On October 13, 2008, Pinson received notice that his grievance was denied. (Petition for Review, ¶6.) He immediately filed a first-level appeal. (Id.) The grievance coordinator denied the grievance on the same day, but Pinson did not receive the notice because his cell was moved again that day. (Petition for Review, ¶¶8, 9.) Pinson did not receive a copy of the grievance coordinator's response until December 5, 2008, after he had inquired about it. (Petition for Review, ¶10.) On December 9, 2008, Pinson filed a final review appeal with the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), but it was dismissed as untimely. (Petition for Review, ¶11.)
Pinson filed a petition with this Court in its original jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. §761, seeking review of SOIGA's final review decision. The petition names the Department, along with Officers Schultz and Gribble, as respondents. The petition alleges that Pinson was deprived of his property without due process and by coercion and asserts that he should be permitted to pursue his final appeal as if filed on time. The petition requests that this Court grant any other relief it deems just and proper. (Petition for Review, ¶19.)
Pinson alleges that another officer, Sergeant Irey, told Pinson that if he had any problems or argued with the officers during the inventory process, he would be returned to the restricted housing unit and placed on disciplinary custody status. (Petition for Review ¶5.)
On February 3, 2009, this Court ordered that the matter "shall be treated as a petition for review addressed to this Court's original jurisdiction." The Department filed preliminary objections, alleging that this Court: (1) lacked personal jurisdiction over the respondents because service was improper, and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the action was "in the nature of trespass and includes claims raised against Officers Schultz and Gribble, neither of whom are state-wide officers." (Department's Preliminary Objections, ¶10.)
On April 8, 2009, this Court ordered that :
upon consideration of respondents' preliminary objection alleging lack of original jurisdiction, and it appearing that this action is in the nature of trespass and includes claims against two corrections officers employed at SCI Greene, the objection is sustained, and this matter is transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County.(C.R., Item 23.)
After the matter was transferred to the trial court, the Department once again filed preliminary objections alleging that Pinson's claim failed to state a claim for due process violations because Pinson did not have a protected interest in the property that was confiscated. The trial court heard arguments on the Department's preliminary objections via telephone, after which the trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the case. The order states:
this Court finds [Pinson] was provided with adequate post-deprivation remedies through the administrative grievance process and THEREFORE no due process rights of [Pinson] were violated and his claim is legally insufficient.
On appeal to this court, Pinson first argues that this Court, not the trial court, had subject matter jurisdiction over his case because, pursuant to section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §761(a), this Court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions "against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, with certain enumerated exceptions not relevant here." (Pinson's brief at 8.) However, contrary to Pinson's assertion, one of the "enumerated exceptions" is relevant here. Section 761(a) provides:
In reviewing a trial court's grant of preliminary objections, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Keller v. Scranton City Treasurer, 29 A.3d 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). --------
(a) General Rule.—The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:
(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:
42 Pa. C.S. §761(a) (emphasis added) .
* * *
(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.
In Balshy v. Rank, 507 Pa. 384, 490 A.2d 415 (1985), our Supreme Court explained the nature of actions "in the nature of trespass" and concluded that all actions against the Commonwealth "for money damages based on tort liability are outside the original jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court and are properly commenced in the Courts of Common Pleas." Id. at 396, 490 A.2d at 420-21. Here, Pinson seeks either return of his property (which he opted to have destroyed) or compensation for its value. Thus, his claim is in the nature of trespass and was properly transferred to and heard by the court of common pleas.
In the alternative, Pinson argues that the trial court erred in determining that Pinson "was provided with adequate post-deprivation remedies through the administrative grievance process, where notice was not timely given to [Pinson] and final appeal rights were denied due to this error." (Pinson's brief at 13.) This argument is based on Pinson's mistaken belief that his action before the trial court was an appeal of SOIGA's decision rather than a separate complaint against the named respondents. Decisions made by intra-prison grievance tribunals are not appealable to any court. Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 554 Pa. 317, 721 A.2d 357 (1998). Rather, an aggrieved inmate who has been unsuccessful in the Department's grievance procedures must bring a new claim in the original jurisdiction of the appropriate tribunal. Id.
The trial court properly treated Pinson's action as a due process claim and concluded that Pinson did not have a protected interest in the property, and, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In determining whether an alleged deprivation amounts to a violation of a plaintiff's due process rights, courts must make a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest; and (2) if so, what process was due. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
Here, Pinson cannot prevail because he did not have a protected interest in the confiscated property. Inmates do not have an absolute right to acquire and keep any type or quantity of property they wish. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 554 (1979) (holding, among other things, that a rule prohibiting inmates from receiving packages of food and personal items from outside the institution did not deny due process because "due process rights of prisoners and pretrial detainees are not absolute; they are subject to reasonable limitation or retraction in light of the legitimate security concerns of the institution"); Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (holding that restricting inmates from receiving newspapers and publications and limiting the amount of legal materials to be kept in an inmate's cell at one time was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and was constitutionally acceptable). "Reasonable prison regulations regarding the quantity and type of property that inmates may possess do not violate due process guarantees." Small v. Horn, 554 Pa. 600, 614, 722 A.2d 664, 671 (1998) (holding that prohibiting inmates from possessing civilian clothing did not violate due process). As noted above, DC-ADM Section 3(B)(1) limits the amount of property that an inmate may keep to whatever can fit into four records center boxes or one footlocker and two record center boxes. Further, DC-ADM Section 3(B)(9) provides that inmates may not exceed the property limits established by the Department and that excess property, as determined by the Facility Manager/designee, may be shipped out at the inmate's expense or destroyed. Here, Pinson concedes that he had more property than would fit into one footlocker and two record boxes. Because he had no right to maintain more property than what was allowed by DC-ADM 815, Pinson was not deprived of any protected interest, and his due process claim must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of March, 2012, the March 23, 2010, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County is hereby affirmed.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge