Opinion
Case No.: 22-cv-00419-AJB-BGS
2023-02-21
Salvador Anselmo PINONES, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Matthew Dean BALDRIDGE and Donna Baldridge, Defendants. Matthew Dean Baldridge and Donna Baldridge, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. The United States of America, Third-Party Defendant.
William J. Light, Law Office of Todd Rash, Riverside, CA, for Plaintiff. Christopher Lyon, Gilsleider, McMahon, Molinelli & Phan, Irvine, CA, for Defendants.
William J. Light, Law Office of Todd Rash, Riverside, CA, for Plaintiff. Christopher Lyon, Gilsleider, McMahon, Molinelli & Phan, Irvine, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS' THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Third-Party Defendant the United States of America's ("United States") motion to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint filed by Third-Party Plaintiffs Matthew and Donna Baldridge ("Baldridges"). (Doc. No. 6.) The motion is fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a traffic collision between a government-owned Chevrolet Tahoe and a privately-owned Nissan Altima on November 12, 2019, in Escondido, California. On-duty border patrol agents, Elias Perez ("Agent Perez") and Salvador Anselmo Pinones, Jr. ("Agent Pinones") (collectively, "Agents") were in the government-owned vehicle. The Baldridges were in the Nissan Altima.
After the collision, Agent Pinones, the passenger in the government car, filed an administrative claim under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA") with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs for his employment-related injuries and received compensation. Agent Pinones also later filed a negligence action for damages against the Baldridges in San Diego County Superior Court. In response, the Baldridges filed an Answer and the California equivalent of a Third-Party Complaint against Agent Perez, the federal agent driving the government car, for indemnification, declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault, asserting that he must indemnify or pay a share of the damages in the underlying negligence action. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3, 9.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
By operation of law, the United States substituted itself as the defendant with respect to the third-party claims alleged against Agent Perez, and thereafter removed the case to this Court. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 5.) Upon removal, the United States filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Baldridges' Third-Party Complaint. (Doc. No. 6.) This Order follows.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Accordingly, "[a] federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears." Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). In civil cases, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over only those cases where either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction exist. See Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2005). Diversity jurisdiction exists in cases between citizens of different states and involving an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal question jurisdiction exists in cases that arise under federal law. Id. § 1331.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence." Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). Where the party asserts a facial challenge, the court limits its inquiry to the allegations set forth in the complaint. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the party asserts a factual challenge, the court may consider extrinsic evidence demonstrating or refuting the existence of jurisdiction without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. The party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden of persuasion for establishing it. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
III. DISCUSSION
The United States argues the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because it is immune from the Baldridges' third-party claims for indemnity or contribution. (Doc. No. 6 at 7.) The Baldridges contend the United States should be estopped from asserting immunity, and that special duties exist to trigger liability. (Doc. No. 9 at 3-7.) The Court discusses these arguments in turn.
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Federal Torts Claim Act
The United States has sovereign immunity "except to the extent that it has unequivocally consented to litigation against itself." LaBarge v. Cnty. of Mariposa, 798 F.2d 364, 366 (9th Cir. 1986). The Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") provides a limited waiver of that immunity. Id. Pertinent here are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2674. They state, in relevant part:
the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.]28 U.S.C. § 2674. Taken together, these "provisions direct the courts to analogize the government to a private actor in a similar situation and apply state law to determine amenability to suit and substantive liability." LaBarge, 798 F.2d at 366.
Here, the Baldridges, through their Third-Party Complaint, seek to hold the United States liable for indemnification or contribution. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3.) The parties do not dispute that California law is relevant in determining whether the Baldridges may pursue their third-party claims against the United States. Thus, given the allegations in this case, the Court finds, pursuant to the FTCA, that "a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674, to that of the United States would be a private employer in California facing a third-party lawsuit for indemnification or contribution for the alleged tortious misconduct of an employee. Accordingly, if a private employer in California can be held liable under such circumstances, then so too can the United States.
In LaBarge v. Cnty. of Mariposa, the Ninth Circuit considered a factually and legally analogous case. See 798 F.2d at 365. There, three federal secret service agents were killed when their vehicle collided with a county sheriff's patrol car on a California highway. Id. The decedents' estates sued the county for negligence, and the parties settled their claims. Id. The county thereafter initiated a third-party action against the United States for contribution, asserting that the secret service agents were at least partly responsible for the accident. Id. Applying the relevant FTCA sections and considering the facts of the case, the court found the "most reasonable analogy" for the United States is a California employer covered by California's workmen compensations law with employees in California. See LaBarge, 798 F.2d at 367, 369 ("FECA is comparable to state workmen's compensation law[.]") The court then observed that while California law allows a tortfeasor to sue for contribution from a joint tortfeasor (as the county did in that case), California Labor Code § 3864 "bars such suits when the third-party defendant is an employer subject to the workmen's compensation laws." Id. at 369. Accordingly, because the county could not sue a California employer for contribution under like circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that the United States is immune from suit, and the district court lacked jurisdiction over the county's third-party contribution claim. See id.
The same is true in this case. The Baldridges, like the county in La Barge, seek to hold the United States liable for indemnification or contribution for its employee's alleged negligence. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 3.) And as explained in La Barge, because the United States in this case is most analogous to a California employer with California employees covered by California' workers' compensation law, California Labor Code § 3864 bars the Baldridges' third-party suit. See LaBarge, 798 F.2d at 367 ("In view of the fact that the FECA is comparable to state workmen's compensation laws . . . the United States should be entitled to the same immunity from suit enjoyed by a private employer covered by state workmen's compensation laws."). In other words, because the exclusive remedy provision of the California workers' compensation statute protects analogous private employers from third-party liability, a private person in like circumstances would be immune from the Baldridges' suit, and thus, so too is the United States.
The statute states in full:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or both jointly against the third person results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior to the injury.Cal. Lab. Code § 3864.
Despite having notice of the United States' reliance on La Barge, the Baldridges made no effort to distinguish the case or offer a more analogous situation supported by binding authority. As previously mentioned, it is "presumed that a cause lies outside this limited [federal] jurisdiction" and the Baldridges bear "the burden of establishing the contrary." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673. They have failed to do so. Moreover, as explained below, their arguments concerning judicial estoppel and special duties fail to persuade.
B. Judicial Estoppel and Special Public Duties
The Baldridges argue that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over their third-party claims based on (1) judicial estoppel and (2) special duties that trigger the United States' liability. (Doc. No. 9 at 3-7.) Neither argument is availing.
The longstanding doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that "where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position[.]" Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 15 S.Ct. 555, 39 L.Ed. 578 (1895). The Baldridges argue that the United States should be estopped from challenging the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction because it successfully removed this state court action based on the representation that the FTCA applies. (Doc. No. 9 at 4.) The Court disagrees. The United States has not taken an inconsistent position in this case.
As previously explained, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of civil claims against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); supra § III.A. The United States was thus required to remove the case to this Court. And as the United States correctly points out, the Supreme Court in United States v. Smith explained that the FTCA is "the exclusive mode of recovery for the tort of a Government employee even when the FTCA itself precludes Government liability." 499 U.S. 160, 166, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court thus finds nothing inconsistent about the United States removing this action under the FTCA and then moving to dismiss it based on sovereign immunity and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing a case removed from state court and subsequently instructing the district court to substitute United States as defendant in place of federal employee in FTCA action and then to dismiss claim as barred by FTCA).
Moreover, the Baldridges cite no authority for their position that judicial estoppel can prevent this Court from dismissing an action over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (emphasis added). See also Washington Env't Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[A] jurisdictional defect is a non-waivable challenge that may be raised at any time during the proceedings, including on appeal."). Accordingly, the Court declines to find that judicial estoppel applies here.
Lastly, the Baldridges assert that the United States can be held liable based on state law duties arising from special duties owed by public officers, as well as under California Government Code § 815.6, which permits a tort suit against a public entity. (Doc. No. 9 at 4-5.) They are mistaken. Again, the relevant analysis in determining whether the United States can be sued is "to analogize the government to a private actor in a similar situation and apply state law to determine amenability to suit and substantive liability." LaBarge, 798 F.2d at 366. As such, the Court finds misguided the Baldridges' attempt to demonstrate liability with cases involving liability against public actors or public entities. See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005) (The FTCA "waives sovereign immunity under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, not the United States, if a state or municipal entity, would be liable") (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In sum, having failed to distinguish La Barge or persuasively support their assertions of third-party liability against the United States, the Court finds the Baldridges have failed to establish the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction over their Third-Party Complaint. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96, 130 S.Ct. 1181; Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the United States is immune from this suit, and thus, GRANTS the United States' motion to dismiss the Baldridges' Third-Party Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) Because this jurisdictional defect cannot be cured, the Third-Party Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Finally, as the Court has dismissed the claims against the United States for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court is without authority to adjudicate the remaining state law negligence claims in the underlying Complaint between Agent Pinones and the Baldridges. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 25.) "[S]upplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when the district court has a hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it." Herman Fam. Revocable Tr. v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, having no supplemental jurisdiction authority over the remaining Complaint, the Court REMANDS the remainder of this action to the San Diego Superior Court and instructs the Clerk of Court to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.