(“Unless time is served in federal custody, it does not count as credit for time served under a federal sentence.”); see, e.g., Pinnow v. Graber, 452 Fed.Appx. 740, 741 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Pinnow remained subject to the jurisdiction of the state during the time he spent in custody pursuant to the writ [of habeas corpus ad prosequendum]”; therefore, “the credits earned during that period applied to his state sentence only.”); Lay v. Gill, 2012 WL

A claim on that ground may be cognizable under § 2241. See, e.g., Pinnow v. Graber, 452 F. App’x 740 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 petition on another ground where the petition raised sole claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)). However, petitioner’s claim does not rely on § 3585(b)(2) and that statute may have been cited due to misunderstanding on the part of petitioner, because the argument he develops is based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

The case law is clear that a person transferred to federal detention pursuant to a federal writ remains in state custody and not federal custody. Schleining, 642 F.3d at 1243 n.1; Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) ("When an accused is transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum he is considered to be 'on loan' to the federal authorities so that the sending state's jurisdiction over the accused continues uninterruptedly."); Cordero v. Benov, 574 Fed.Appx. 788 (9th Cir. 2014) (inmate not entitled to credit towards federal sentence for time spent in federal custody pursuant to writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum); Pinnow v. Graber, 452 Fed.Appx. 740 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). Thus, while Petitioner was "on loan" to the BOP, Petitioner remained under the primary jurisdiction of the state of Utah, and the earliest date that Petitioner's federal sentence could begin is August 6, 2013—the date that the district court in Utah imposed the 120-month sentence.