" (Emphasis added.) See also Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164, 169, 22 A. 430 (1891) (long usage gives selectmen of towns certain powers). In the present case, the defendants stated in the affidavits attached to their motion for summary judgment that the board customarily has created municipal job positions, and the plaintiff does not dispute this fact.

The Connecticut Supreme Court consistently holds that first selectmen are agents of the town in which they hold office. SeeMorris v. Congdon, 277 Conn. 565, 574, 893 A.2d 413 (2006); Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164, 169, 22 A. 430 (1891); Union v. Crawford, 19 Conn. 331, 332 (1848). The Restatement defines the agency relationship as " the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."

We are, however, unable to find any statutory authority for the vote of April 28th, 1915, or for the payment of compensation by the town to the members of the town school committee for the performance of their official duties as such committeemen; unless such authority may be found in §§ 388 and 389 of the General Statutes, and on that point we express no opinion for the reason given. It is true, as we said in Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164, 169, 22 A. 430, that long usage has given to the selectmen of towns certain powers not expressly conferred by statute; but the finding does not show whether or not there has been long usage of paying school committeemen for the performance of their official duties, and the defendant selectmen have not alleged in their answer that the payments in question were made in accordance with long usage, but have relied solely on the vote of the town meeting of April 28th, 1915. For the reasons indicated, we hold that the vote of the town meeting of April 28th, 1915, was unauthorized and invalid, and the payments made to the defendant Corttis under its supposed authority were, unless justified by long usage, illegal in the sense that they were made and accepted under a mistake of law. If long usage should be pleaded and proved, the defendant would not now be liable for past illegal payments of this character.

It is well settled that when an inhabitant of a municipal corporation accepts a position of honor and trust for the benefit of all the inhabitants, whether the position be created by statute or by municipal action, and no provision by law or contract is made for compensation, no duty is imposed upon the municipality to pay such inhabitant for services rendered in performing the uncompensated public duty he has thus voluntarily assumed. Turney v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 412, 414; Pinney v. Brown, 60 id. 164, 169; O'Connor v. Waterbury, 69 id. 206, 211; White v. Levant, 78 Me. 568; Farnsworth v. Melrose, 122 Mass. 268; Cochrane v. Melrose, 121 id. 563; Sawyer v. Pawners' Bank, 6 Allen (88 Mass.), 207. In view of this law and of the facts alleged in the complaint as amended, it was essential to the plaintiff's cause of action that upon the trial to the jury the evidence should establish at least one of the following facts: (1) that the town agreed to pay some compensation to the members of the building committee; (2) that the town agreed to pay some compensation to the person who might be chosen chairman of the building committee; (3) that the town authorized the building committee to agree with its chairman that the town should pay him for performing the duties of the committee and for the time spent in the supervision of the building the committee were authorized to construct.

We must decide next what consequences attach when a municipal zoning entity conducts a hearing subsequently found to be invalid because of failure to comply with statutory requirements for prehearing notice. Since colonial days, local government has been conducted in town meetings where the will of the people is given expression. It has been well settled since the early nineteenth century that any action taken in a town meeting is without legal effect when statutory provisions as to notice prior to the meeting are not complied with. Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391, 396 (1824); see also Pinney v. Brown, 60 Conn. 164, 168-69, 22 A. 430 (1891), and cases cited therein. This same longstanding principle has been repeatedly applied in the context of actions taken by administrative tribunals, such as zoning bodies.

While the warning need not be couched in language of technical nicety, it must specify the business to be transacted. Bull vs.Town of Warren, 36 Conn. 83, 85; Bedard vs. Cunneen, 111 id. 338, 341. Many cases deal with the matter under discussion, but all of them seem to stand on the principle expressed in South School District vs. Blakeslee,, 13 Conn. 227, 234, that the business to come before the meeting must be so stated in the warning that the legal voters may fairly understand the purpose for which they are to convene. Hayden vs. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Bartlett vs. Kinsley, 15 id. 327; Baldwin vs. Town of North Branford, 32 id. 47; Brooklyn Trust Co. vs. Town of Hebron, 51 id. 22; Wright vs. North School District, 53 id. 576; Woodward vs. Reynolds, 58 id. 486; Pinney vs. Brown, 60 id. 164; State ex rel. Johnson vs. Atchison, 105 id. 315. Obviously, there is nothing expressly stated in the warning as to the proposed rescission of the March vote. And measured in the light of the principle above stated, the warning does not refer inferentially with sufficient clarity, if at all, to the action the meeting eventually took.