Under that rule, it was held that the wholesalers who sold the toy pistol to the retailers were liable in damages for the death of the boy caused by his using the pistol. We have not overlooked Rucker v. Athens Mfg. Co., 54 Ga. 84; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Kelly, 134 Ga. 218 ( 67 S.E. 803); Mayor Council of Macon v. Dykes, 103 Ga. 847 ( 31 S.E. 443); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176 ( 32 S.E. 77); Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300); Teche Greyhound Lines v. Daigrepont, 60 Ga. App. 389 ( 3 S.E.2d 857); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774); Harper v. Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, 21 Ga. App. 322 ( 94 S.E. 286); Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177 ( 12 S.E. 304); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 ( 28 S.E. 251); Shaw v. Mayor c. of Macon, 6 Ga. App. 306 ( 64 S.E. 1102); Higginbotham v. Rome Ry. Light Co., 23 Ga. App. 735 ( 99 S.E. 638), and other cases cited and relied on by counsel for the defendants. These cases discuss and apply various phases of proximate cause and other rules of negligence to different situations, but none of them appear to be directly in point. We think that it is a question for the jury to say whether the injuries to the plaintiff from being hit by an exploding bomb sold by Milton Bradley Company to Benson, as set forth in the petition of the plaintiff, were proximately caused by its negligence, and were a natural and probable consequence of the original sale, and put into operation other causal forces which were the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the original act, an