In their motion for summary judgment, defendants relied upon cases from the earlier half of this century which held that even the intoxication of a passenger, who was not otherwise behaving boisterously, was not sufficient to alert a carrier that the passenger posed an unreasonable threat of harm to fellow passengers. Compare, e.g., Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 (2) ( 47 S.E.2d 774) (1948) and Powell v. Beasley, 57 Ga. App. 231 ( 194 S.E. 926) (1938) (in which the passenger's mere intoxication was insufficient to put defendant common carrier on notice that the passenger posed a threat to the safety of other passengers) with Hillman v. Georgia R. Banking Co., 126 Ga. 814 ( 56 S.E. 68) (1906) and Grimsley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1 Ga. App. 557 (1) ( 57 S.E. 943) (1907) (in which an intoxicated passenger's boisterous behavior created an issue for jury determination concerning whether the defendant common carrier should have known the passenger posed a threat to the safety of other passengers). From these cases, defendants argued the evidence of the assailant's odd statements is insufficient to show they breached the duty of extraordinary care owed to the victim because the assailant was neither intoxicated nor behaved in a violent manner.

Hence, this evidence alone fails to raise any question of fact whether defendants, in the exercise of extraordinary diligence, were on notice that Irvin was or might be a danger to the carrier's passengers. See Savannah c. R. Co. v. Boyle, 115 Ga. 836 ( 42 S.E. 242) (1902); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774) (1948). However, the Stringers argue and the Court of Appeals held that because Southeastern knew about the 1986 and 1988 assaults, a question of fact exists whether the defendants reasonably should have anticipated criminal activity in general, thus calling into question the adequacy of the security measures taken to prevent or mitigate such danger and the interpretation to be given Irvin's unusual comments.

"In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff the independent criminal act of a third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer." Andrews Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 (2) ( 40 S.E. 300, 88 Am. St. R. 25); Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, 189 Ga. 601 ( 7 S.E.2d 174, 127 A.L.R. 217); Rivers v. Weems, 208 Ga. 783, 784 ( 69 S.E.2d 756); Bowers v. Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App. 367 (3) ( 73 S.E. 677); Gallovitch v. Ellis, 55 Ga. App. 780 ( 191 S.E. 384); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774). In the present case it appears that the criminal act of a third person, which was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage, to wit, the operation of a motor vehicle at an excessive and unlawful rate of speed, intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant Gulf Oil Corporation and the damages sustained by the plaintiff, and the petition was properly dismissed as to this defendant on general demurrer.

Failure to present this or other evidence of foreseeability will result in summary judgment for the carrier. Southeastern Stages, supra at 644; Paschal, supra at 448; Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73, 75 ( 47 S.E.2d 774) (1948); Powell v. Beasley, 57 Ga. App. 231, 232 ( 194 S.E. 926) (1938). In their briefs, the parties primarily cite various cases requiring the defendant to have knowledge of prior substantially similar criminal acts before he can be expected to anticipate criminal acts against his invitees.

Held: "`While it is unquestionably the duty of a carrier to exercise extraordinary care for the protection of passengers, the rule does not [require the carrier to take measures to protect its passengers from the intentional misconduct of third persons] until something occurs . . . to put [the carrier] on notice that . . . such conduct . . . might be reasonably anticipated. . . .'" Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73, 75 ( 47 S.E.2d 774) (1948), citing Powell v. Beasley, 57 Ga. App. 231, 232 ( 194 S.E. 926) (1938). It is apparent without dispute from the evidence of record in this case that nothing whatever occurred prior to the unfortunate incident which resulted in the appellant's injuries which might reasonably have placed the appellee's driver on notice that his passengers were threatened either with criminal assault or with the type of malevolent mischief which in fact occurred.

In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a third person which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant, and which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer. Andrews Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300, 88 ASR 25); Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, Inc., 189 Ga. 601, 605 ( 7 S.E.2d 174, 127 ALR 217); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73, 75 ( 47 S.E.2d 774); Skelton v. Gambrell, 80 Ga. App. 880, 884 ( 57 S.E.2d 694). The latter rule apparently would not apply if the petition had disclosed that the defendant had reasonable grounds for apprehending that the criminal act would be committed.

See also: Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373 ( 86 S.E.2d 311), authorities cited on page 376. See also: Gossett v. Atlantic Steel Co., 102 Ga. App. 23 ( 115 S.E.2d 613); Covington v. S. H. Kress Co., 102 Ga. App. 204 ( 115 S.E.2d 621); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Stanfield, 213 Ga. 436, 440 ( 99 S.E.2d 209); Andrews Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 (2) ( 40 S.E. 300, 88 Am. St. Rep. 25); Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, 189 Ga. 601 ( 7 S.E.2d 174, 127 A.L.R. 217); Rivers v. Weems, 208 Ga. 783, 784 ( 69 S.E.2d 756); Bowers v. Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App. 367 (3) ( 73 S.E. 677); Gallovitch v. Ellis, 55 Ga. App. 780 ( 191 S.E. 384); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774). See also: Weeks v. Denver Tramway Corporation, 108 F.2d 509 and cit.; Box v. Atlantic B. R. Co., 120 Ga. 1050 ( 48 S.E. 427); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hopkins, 18 Ga. App. 230 (2) ( 89 S.E. 186); Georgia R. Bkg. Co. v. Rives, 137 Ga. 376, 380 ( 73 S.E. 645, 38 L.R.A. (NS) 564); Georgia Fla. Ry. v. Thigpen, 141 Ga. 90, 91 ( 80 S.E. 626).

e highway — he was nevertheless liable for concurrent negligence along with the operator of the school bus. To our way of thinking the line of reasoning does not convince us that the defendant Davidson should be released because the defendant Bush violated his statutory duty, in that he did not stop when approaching a school bus. As above observed, both the defendant Davidson and the defendant Bush were concurrently liable in the instant case by the same process of reasoning as was applied in the Gazaway case. Counsel for the defendant Davidson cited the following cases in support of his contention to the effect that the sole proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendant Bush, on the ground, among others, that the defendant Davidson had the right to assume that the defendant Bush would stop, and that the act of Bush was the intervening cause which insulated the defendant Davidson against any liability: Yellow Cab Co. v. Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364 ( 126 S.E. 269); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774); Andrews Co. v. Kinsell, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300); Teche Greyhound Lines v. Daigrepont, 60 Ga. App. 389 ( 3 S.E.2d 857); Dishinger v. Surburban Coach Co., 84 Ga. App. 498 ( 66 S.E.2d 242); Hexter v. Burgess, 52 Ga. App. 819 ( 184 S.E. 769). It is well settled that, except in plain and palpable cases, questions of negligence, proximate cause, and intervening acts of negligence are all for the determination of a jury. Such questions are peculiarly and generally to be determined on questions of fact by a jury rather than, as a matter of law, by the court.

In a suit for damages, where it appears upon the face of the plaintiffs' petition that there intervened between the alleged negligence of the defendant and the damage sustained by the plaintiff, the independent criminal act of a third person which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant, and which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage, the petition should be dismissed on general demurrer. Andrews Company v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Company, 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774). The mere relationship of parent and child will not render the parent liable for an independent tort of the child. Such liability rests upon the same grounds upon which the parent will be responsible for the negligence or wrong of any other person.

Under that rule, it was held that the wholesalers who sold the toy pistol to the retailers were liable in damages for the death of the boy caused by his using the pistol. We have not overlooked Rucker v. Athens Mfg. Co., 54 Ga. 84; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Kelly, 134 Ga. 218 ( 67 S.E. 803); Mayor Council of Macon v. Dykes, 103 Ga. 847 ( 31 S.E. 443); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176 ( 32 S.E. 77); Andrews v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390 ( 40 S.E. 300); Teche Greyhound Lines v. Daigrepont, 60 Ga. App. 389 ( 3 S.E.2d 857); Pinnell v. Yellow Cab Co., 77 Ga. App. 73 ( 47 S.E.2d 774); Harper v. Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, 21 Ga. App. 322 ( 94 S.E. 286); Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177 ( 12 S.E. 304); Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., 100 Ga. 568 ( 28 S.E. 251); Shaw v. Mayor c. of Macon, 6 Ga. App. 306 ( 64 S.E. 1102); Higginbotham v. Rome Ry. Light Co., 23 Ga. App. 735 ( 99 S.E. 638), and other cases cited and relied on by counsel for the defendants. These cases discuss and apply various phases of proximate cause and other rules of negligence to different situations, but none of them appear to be directly in point. We think that it is a question for the jury to say whether the injuries to the plaintiff from being hit by an exploding bomb sold by Milton Bradley Company to Benson, as set forth in the petition of the plaintiff, were proximately caused by its negligence, and were a natural and probable consequence of the original sale, and put into operation other causal forces which were the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the original act, an