(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pinnacle Properties V, v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, 319 Ga. App. 94, 100 (2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012). In contesting the arbitration award, Nix only asserted that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law and had exhibited favorable bias toward Scarbrough.

We agree with Doe that Defendant did not raise these specific issues in its motion for summary judgment (focusing rather on the foreseeability and causation issues discussed above), and therefore we decline to address them at this time. See Pfeiffer v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829 (2), 573 S.E.2d 389 (2002) (a party "must stand or fall upon the position taken in the trial court" and thus we "need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal") (citations and punctuation omitted); Pinnacle Properties V, LLC v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 94, 100 (2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) (we "do not consider whether summary judgment should have been granted for a reason not raised below") (citation and punctuation omitted). 3. Finally, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment on Doe’s claims for nuisance and attorney fees.

We will not consider a summary judgment argument raised for the first time on appeal. See Pinnacle Properties V v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, 319 Ga. App. 94, 100 (2) (735 SE2d 166) (2012) ("Appellate courts do not consider whether summary judgment should have been granted for a reason not raised below because, if they did, it would be contrary to the line of cases holding that a party must stand or fall upon the position taken in the trial court.") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

We will not consider a summary judgment argument raised for the first time on appeal. See Pinnacle Properties V, v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta , 319 Ga. App. 94, 100 (2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) ("Appellate courts do not consider whether summary judgment should have been granted for a reason not raised below because, if they did, it would be contrary to the line of cases holding that a party must stand or fall upon the position taken in the trial court.") (citation and punctuation omitted). 2.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pinnacle Properties V v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta , 319 Ga.App. 94, 94, 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) ; see also OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). "We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in favor of the nonmovant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Contrary to Hamilton's argument, we find that the County sufficiently raised this argument in the trial court. As a result, we will consider the County's enumeration. Compare Pinnacle Properties V v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, 319 Ga.App. 94, 100 (2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) ("issues presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review").Although FIRREA does not include a definition of the term "asset," it may be generally defined as "[a]n item that is owned and has value."

Clearly, the issue was justiciable.However, the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Association was correct as demonstrated in Division 1, and a judgment right for any reason must be affirmed. See Pinnacle Properties V, LLC v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta , 319 Ga.App. 94, 99-100 (1) (b), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) ("[A] grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if right for any reason, whether stated or unstated. It is the grant itself that is to be reviewed for error, and not the analysis employed.") (punctuation omitted).Judgment affirmed.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pinnacle Properties V, LLC v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, LLC, 319 Ga.App. 94, 99–100(1)(b), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012). 2. Ratliff further seeks to recover from the Deputies, individually, based on her allegations that they failed to protect her from McDonald's assault.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Pinnacle Properties. V, LLC v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, LLC, 319 Ga.App. 94, 100(2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012). 3. Although the Rimmers' seventh enumeration is that the trial court erred in considering hearsay when granting unsupervised visitation to Tinch, the argument in the brief deals with the legality of attorney fees in a contempt proceeding.

However, the Beneficiaries neither sought this relief nor received a ruling on it below. “Appellate courts do not consider whether summary judgment has been granted for a reason not raised below because, if they did, it would be contrary to the line of cases holding that a party must stand or fall upon the position taken in the trial court.” Pinnacle Properties V, LLC v. Mainline Supply of Atlanta, 319 Ga.App. 94, 100(2), 735 S.E.2d 166 (2012) (punctuation and footnote omitted). On motion for partial summary judgment, the Beneficiaries did not seek an accounting, but rather sought only “summary judgment that Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties and committed breaches of trust.