Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV 471057.
RUVOLO, P.J.
The instant appeal arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute between appellant in propria persona Marci L. Pinkard and respondent John Daly Boulevard Associates, L.P., doing business as Westlake Village Apartments (Westlake). Appellant sued Westlake for breach of contract, nuisance, and retaliatory eviction, alleging that while she lived at Westlake she was harassed by her neighbors, that she experienced habitability issues in her unit and in the common areas of her apartment building, and that when she complained to Westlake she was evicted. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Westlake on all causes of action. Appellant contends that reversal is warranted due to various procedural errors. She also appeals from the postjudgment order denying her motion to tax costs. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Tenancy at Westlake
Between 1981 and 2005, appellant resided in a studio apartment within the Westlake apartment complex. In 1998, appellant filed a complaint against Westlake, alleging that she had been harassed by her neighbors and raising various habitability issues. Appellant was represented by counsel and the action settled in 1999.
As part of the 1999 settlement, appellant was offered relocation assistance, including the option of moving to a larger, more secluded unit at Westlake for no additional rent. Appellant, however, never relocated, despite the continual efforts of Westlake to accommodate appellant. Instead, appellant remained at her apartment and continued to complain about the activities of her neighbors.
Westlake investigated appellant’s complaints and increased its courtesy patrols around her unit. During the 13-month period preceding appellant’s eventual departure in July 2005, Westlake’s courtesy patrols made 2, 001 visits to the area in and around appellant’s unit. In 1, 977 of these visits, “there was no noise to speak of.” For the remaining 24 visits, there was only a “very low noise level” and Westlake addressed the issue with the offending party.
Appellant began to withhold portions of her rent, in part, due to the perceived “[h]ostile housing environment” in which her unit was located. Appellant ultimately vacated her unit in July 2005, as part of the settlement of the eviction proceedings initiated by Westlake.
B. Underlying Litigation and Discovery Sanctions
In March 2008, appellant filed a complaint against Westlake, alleging breach of contract, nuisance, and retaliation. Following the partial demurrers to the original and first amended complaints, appellant filed a second amended complaint (the operative complaint), claiming that while living at Westlake, she had been harassed by her neighbors, had experienced habitability issues, and was evicted when she complained to Westlake about the these issues.
In July 2008, Westlake served its initial discovery demands, which included Judicial Council-approved form interrogatories requesting basic information regarding appellant’s claims and damages, including her present address. Appellant provided incomplete, inadequate, and otherwise inappropriate responses to the form interrogatories. Westlake moved to compel further responses to the interrogatories, which the trial court granted, ordering appellant to provide further responses to most of the questions. In so ruling, the trial court explained that inasmuch as appellant had asserted “only a garden variety claim for breach of contract, nuisance, and retaliation, ” she had not waived her right to privacy with respect to her medical records. The court further explained that “[w]ithout waiving this right, ” appellant was entitled to “seek damages for the pain and suffering generally associated with her claim of injury but she may not introduce... at trial any evidence related to a specific claim for special damages or damages that fall outside the garden variety claim she has filed. Absent waiver of her right to privacy and production of the requested information [appellant] may only request the type of damages any person would experience in her situation, not damages specifically related to her.”
However, the trial court ruled that appellant’s responses to the remainder of the interrogatories were “equivocal and incomplete, ” and ordered appellant to provide further verified responses within 15 days of the order. With respect to the interrogatories seeking general background information, the court ordered that information regarding appellant’s “date of birth, place of birth, and present residence address, shall be for the defense attorneys’ eyes only and used for investigation purposes, and such information... will not be shared by defense counsel with [Westlake] or its related persons or entities.” Westlake served the notice of entry of the order on December 10, 2008.
Rather than comply the court’s order and provide further responses, appellant moved for reconsideration of the order or, alternatively, for a protective order. Appellant’s motion, however, challenged only the two interrogatories seeking information about her place of birth and current residence address. The trial court denied the requested relief, and ordered appellant to comply with the order within 10 days, or by February 6, 2009.
Appellant again failed to provide the requested information, and purported to appeal from the interlocutory discovery order, which this court dismissed. Although neither this court nor the trial court stayed discovery, appellant continued to ignore the order compelling further interrogatory responses.
Westlake elected to obtain the requested information through deposition testimony. Appellant failed to appear, despite an order compelling her deposition. In light of appellant’s continued failure to comply with two trial court orders compelling discovery and due to the impending June 2009 trial date, Westlake moved for evidentiary sanctions on April 23, 2009.
On May 18, 2009, the trial court partially granted Westlake’s motion for evidentiary sanctions, ruling that appellant was precluded from introducing any evidence at trial regarding property damage and loss of income or earning capacity. Appellant was also precluded from introducing evidence that had not already been disclosed during discovery regarding the following: (1) any other special economic or personal injury claim; (2) any alleged violations of statutes, ordinances, or regulations by Westlake; (3) any witnesses or persons with knowledge of relevant facts; (4) any relevant photographs, films, surveillance, videotapes, or written reports; and (5) the contracts and/or agreements between the parties, including the breach thereof.
As to appellant’s refusal to provide her current residential address, the trial court ruled that she was precluded from introducing evidence at trial of damages arising from differences in rent and/or differences in accommodations between her former unit at Westlake’s property and at her current residence. The court also reiterated its ruling that appellant could seek damages for the pain and suffering generally associated with her claim of injury, but she was precluded from introducing any evidence related to a specific claim for special damages or for damages that fell outside the garden variety claim she had filed.
Less than 10 days after the trial court’s imposition of evidentiary sanctions, appellant failed to appear at the May 27, 2009 mandatory settlement conference. A week before the conference, appellant had requested a continuance, but the court denied this request. On the day of the scheduled conference, appellant left a voice mail message indicating she was ill and would not be appearing that day. Although appellant was able to utilize court call services, she apparently received conflicting information about whether she could use these services for a settlement conference. The trial court imposed monetary sanctions against appellant in the amount of $1,000, which the court stated it would vacate if appellant provided the court with a doctor’s note stating that she had been too ill to appear. Subsequently, appellant supplied the requested documentation and moved to vacate the sanctions, which the trial court granted.
C. Trial
1. Day-of-Trial Settlement Conference and Start of Trial
The matter proceeded to trial on June 15, 2009, at which time it was referred to the Honorable Joseph E. Bergeron for a day-of-trial settlement conference. The parties spoke ex parte in chambers with the settlement judge. It appears that appellant left at some point and Westlake had a subsequent unreported conference in chambers without appellant. When the parties were unable to reach a settlement, the matter was assigned to the Honorable Steven L. Dylina for trial commencing the next day. Appellant did not ask Judge Bergeron for a continuance of trial, or for appointment of an expert.
Appearing before Judge Dylina on June 16, 2009, appellant requested a continuance and for a court-appointed expert to testify regarding her potential general emotional damages. After hearing argument, the court denied the request for a continuance and the request for a court-appointed expert. Thereafter, the parties waived a jury trial and the trial court heard and granted Westlake’s motions in limine. The trial court explained to appellant that there would be more flexibility in a court trial, adding that it was going to give her “latitude” in her testimony.
2. Trial Court’s Ruling
At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its tentative ruling from the bench, finding in favor of Westlake on each of appellant’s causes of action and awarding costs to Westlake as the prevailing party. In so ruling, the trial court explained as follows: “Ms. Pinkard, I know you’re self-represented. I’m sure you felt somewhat disadvantaged in that regard. We have certainly done everything possible, I believe, to try to make this a fair and appropriate place for you to try your case, to present the evidence you wanted to present. And we certainly encouraged you to do that throughout the course. We had a lot more leeway doing that in front of the Court as opposed to doing that in front of the jury.... [¶]... [¶] And, Ms. Pinkard, I do not question your perception of what happened. I can only judge this case based on the evidence and what was presented to the Court.... [¶]... [¶] In terms of the first cause of action for breach of contract, the Court finds that there is absolutely no evidence supporting the breach of contract. It appears that [Westlake and its] head of security did everything humanly possible. And in light of the fact that this is a 3, 000-unit [complex], they took extraordinary steps to essentially make sure that the property was safe and secure and, in fact, offered different opportunities for... Ms. Pinkard, to move to different apartments within the [complex that were] safer, more removed from public view. And Ms. Pinkard clearly did not respond to those affirmatively. [¶] In terms of nuisance, whatever happened here, there is simply no proof that [Westlake] allowed nuisance to exist on the premises, supported nuisance, or that nuisance was committed by any of the employees of [Westlake]. In fact, the extraordinary measure that was taken in terms of the security in checking out the area... where all of these events took place, were truly remarkable, almost 2000 times in a very brief period of time. And the incidents were minimal, were certainly not important and were dealt with appropriately by [Westlake] throughout the course. [¶] In terms of the third cause of action for retaliatory eviction, there is simply no proof to substantiate that charge... [Westlake] took great pains in not taking action against Ms. Pinkard until the amount of the arrearage that she owed became... so in excess of her monthly rental obligations, that it was forced with no other option but to essentially begin the eviction process.”
The trial court further added “for the record, the evidence that was presented... supports that [Westlake] not only acted reasonably under the circumstances, but I think it treated Ms. Pinkard fairly, appropriately and with a great deal of patience... [and] showed great forbearance[.]”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Discovery Issues
1. Privacy Concerns
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to “mask her personal data”. According to appellant, the disclosure of her date of birth, place of birth, and current residence address violated her right to privacy.
As an initial matter, appellant fails to cite the portion of the appellate record containing the purported motion to “mask her personal data.” According to our review of the record, appellant did not request the court to redact her personal information, but rather she filed a motion to set aside the motion to compel or alternatively for a protective order, which the trial court denied.
Assuming without deciding that appellant’s privacy claims are cognizable on appeal, we find no violation of appellant’s rights under the state or federal constitutions. While an individual’s date and place of birth and current address is personal information, it is hardly sensitive information. (See Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253; see also Alarcon v. Murphy (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [no reasonable expectation of privacy in disclosure of facts from public record]; People v. Herrara (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 386, 389 [“Information contained on a driver’s license does not give... rise to a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”].) Indeed, California courts have recognized that an address “ is not particularly sensitive, as it is merely contact information....” (Puerto v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1253.) It is not the type of information deemed private such as “medical or financial details, political affiliations, sexual relationships, or personnel information. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 1253-1254.)
Nevertheless, appellant, relying on Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347 (Planned Parenthood), insists that the discovery order resulted in an invasion of her privacy. The instant case, however, is readily distinguishable from the Planned Parenthood case. There, antiabortion protestors sought the names and addresses of nonparty staff and volunteers. (Id. at pp. 350-352.) In granting writ relief to shield this information, our colleagues in Division Two of this court noted that there was “specific evidence” in the record that “Planned Parenthood’s staff and volunteers could well face unique and very real threats not just to their privacy, but to their safety and well-being if personal information about them is disclosed.” (Id. at pp. 361, 369-370.)
Here, appellant is not a third party tangentially related to the litigation. Quite the contrary, as she has been the impetus driving the underlying civil action. Moreover, although appellant claims that the redaction of her personal information was necessary due to the “nuisance, including stalking, threats, insults, hate crimes, and vandalism” she endured while at Westlake and due to the subsequent retaliation she faced when she reported these incidents, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Westlake was involved with any alleged threats to appellant’s safety and well-being.
Finally, the trial court appropriately balanced any privacy concerns against the state interest in compelling disclosure by limiting access to the information only to Westlake’s attorneys and not to Westlake itself.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring appellant to provide information regarding her date and place of birth, and her current address.
2. Evidentiary Sanctions
“Misuse of the discovery process may result in the imposition of a variety of sanctions. These include payment of costs, sanctions barring the introduction of certain evidence, sanctions deeming that certain issues are determined against the offending party, and sanctions terminating an action in favor of the aggrieved party. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.020, 2023.030.) Misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or submit to authorized discovery, providing evasive discovery responses, disobeying a court order to provide discovery, unsuccessfully making or opposing discovery motions without substantial justification, and failing to meet and confer in good faith to resolve a discovery dispute when required by statute to do so. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(i).) The court may impose sanctions ‘[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title....’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.)” (Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1214 (Karlsson).)
We are mindful that discovery sanctions (1) must be tailored in order to remedy the offending party’s discovery abuse, (2) should not give the aggrieved party more than it is entitled to or should not place the aggrieved party in a better position than it would have been in had the discovery been produced, and (3) should not be used to punish the offending party. (Karlsson, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217.) For the reasons explained, however, the trial court’s broad evidentiary sanctions did not run afoul of any of these requirements.
The discovery sanctions at issue here were imposed in connection with appellant’s repeated failure to provide answers to form interrogatories. Westlake sought evidentiary sanctions after the trial court granted its motion to compel and appellant failed to comply with that order, and a subsequent order. This is precisely the situation in which evidentiary sanctions are warranted. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.480, subds. (f), (g), 2031.310, subds. (d), (e).)
Nevertheless, appellant insists that the trial court abused its discretion in granting evidentiary sanctions against her. She claims that the evidentiary sanctions were not necessary because Westlake had obtained her “date of birth and current residence address from other sources” and because she responded to the best of her ability in replying to Westlake’s interrogatories and other discovery demands.
The record belies appellant’s claims of error. The broad evidentiary sanctions were not imposed merely due to appellant’s failure to provide her personal information. Rather, the sanctions were imposed due to appellant’s utter disregard for the discovery process and continued failure to comply the trial court’s discovery orders. Under these circumstances, we are unable to find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting the broad evidentiary sanctions.
3. Monetary Sanctions
Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion by imposing monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,000, which it then failed to vacate even though she fully complied with the court’s request that she provide a doctor’s note excusing her absence. She further claims that “court compelled [her] to spend her limited time and financial resources under duress of ongoing medical conditions to move the court to vacate the order for sanctions in which she eventually prevailed.”
By these arguments, appellant appears to suggest that the trial court erred in failing to vacate the sanctions on its own motion once she provided a doctor’s note. Not only is the claim without merit, it is also moot as the trial court did vacate the monetary sanctions. Stated differently, appellant cannot appeal from the vacated order as it is impossible for this court to grant her any effective relief. (See, e.g., Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 [mootness is when “it [is] impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief”]; see also Sorensen v. Coddington (1926) 79 Cal.App. 199, 202-303 [appeal from order denying motion to set aside execution sale moot where trial court annulled sale and restored property to appellant].) Accordingly, we do not address this claim of error.
B. Alleged Improper Ex Parte Meeting
Appellant asserts that at the day-of-trial settlement conference, Judge Bergeron “intensely” and “antagonistically” questioned her about her absence from the mandatory settlement conference, and then told her to leave his chambers, whereupon he had an ex parte meeting with Westlake. Appellant claims that she was deprived of the information exchanged at this meeting, but she presents no evidence that she incurred any prejudice by this ex parte communication.
As previously noted, Judge Bergeron was not the trial judge.
“ ‘The burden is on the appellant in every case to show that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Injury is not presumed from error, but injury must appear affirmatively upon the court’s examination of the entire record. ‘But our duty to examine the entire cause arises when and only when the appellant has fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument. Because of the need to consider the particulars of the given case, rather than the type of error, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a “miscarriage of justice.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) Appellant does not direct us to anything in the record to support a finding of prejudice. Indeed, she relies solely on the fact that the an ex parte discussion occurred, but not evidence of prejudice. “ ‘Where any error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant to point to the error and rest there.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 337.)
We conclude that appellant has failed to show prejudice and that, on this record, any error would be harmless.
C. Other Issues
Appellant sets forth a laundry list of purported errors, regarding evidentiary issues, continuances, and a fee waiver application, but makes no effort to provide a cogent legal analysis citing and applying the applicable law to the facts of the instant case. (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685 [ “appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal authority”]; People ex rel. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Miller Brewing Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1200 (People etc. v. Miller Brewing Co.) [“appellant must present a factual analysis and legal authority on each point made or the argument may be deemed waived”].) “We are not bound to develop appellant[’s] arguments for [her] [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
Appellant purports to raise various evidentiary issues, claiming the trial court erred by: (1) granting Westlake’s motions in limine; (2) admitting photographs that illustrate the condition of the subject property “outside the prescribed statute of limitations”; (3) failing to admit her “list of documents”; and (4) by interrupting her replies to the court’s questions during the motions in limine.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying her request for continuances to obtain an expert and to take judicial notice. Rather than provide any discussion or legal argument as to these issues, she merely lists a number of statements by the trial court, indicating that continuances would not be entertained.
Appellant argues that the trial court “untimely filed [her] application for a waiver of additional court fees and costs, ” which she asserts resulted in a “series of predetermined hearings” that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Although we recognize that appellant appeared at trial without counsel and that she is similarly appearing in propria persona on appeal, a self-representing litigant is treated like any other party and, therefore, is subject to the same rules of appellate procedure as parties represented by an attorney. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004)122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) Accordingly, we treat these arguments as having been waived.
In any event, even exercising our discretion and reviewing these otherwise forfeited claims (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6), appellant fails to demonstrate any resulting prejudice from the so-called errors.
D. Motion to Tax Costs
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to tax costs because Westlake failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating these costs were reasonable and necessary. As a preliminary matter, appellant fails to refer to the specific costs she is challenging on appeal. Rather, she requests that we take judicial notice of her motion to tax, where she “already depicted... that [Westlake’s] costs... were unnecessary or unreasonable....”
It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that a judgment or order from which an appeal is taken is presumed correct, and “ ‘ “all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” ’ [Citation.]” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610.) It is therefore incumbent upon appellant to provide argument and legal authority to support her contentions. This burden requires more than simply asserting that the judgment or order is wrong. “Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are]... waived. [Citations.]” (Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99.) It is not the appellate court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived....’ [Citations.]” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) “[A]n appellant may not simply incorporate by reference arguments made in papers filed in the trial court rather than brief the arguments on appeal. [Citation.]” (People etc. v. Miller Brewing Co., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) Such arguments are not considered on appeal. Nevertheless, even exercising our discretion and addressing these otherwise forfeited claims (see People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 161-162, fn. 6), they fail on the merits.
“In awarding costs, a trial ‘court’s first determination... is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item, and whether it appears proper on its face. [Citation.] If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show them to be unnecessary or unreasonable. [Citation.]’ (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131....)” Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855.) “Where costs are not expressly allowed by statute, the burden is on the party claiming the costs to show that the charges were reasonable and necessary. [Citation]. ‘Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.’ (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774....)” (Foothill-DeAnza Community College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29-30.)
1. Filing and Motion Fees
The trial court awarded Westlake $640 for filing and motion fees. It appears that appellant bases her challenge to this award on the fact that the filing fees included Westlake’s ex parte application for an order shortening time on its motion to compel appellant’s deposition and its request for sanctions, which appellant claims the trial court denied. Although the trial court denied Westlake’s request for monetary sanctions, it did grant Westlake’s motion to compel appellant’s deposition, which she initially failed to attend. Moreover, the filing fees for the ex parte motion, the motions to compel and for sanctions were necessitated by appellant’s willful failure to comply with discovery.
Filing and motion fees are expressly allowed by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(1).) The amounts of the filing fees awarded were based upon the trial court’s own records of the fees paid. Appellant has not made a specific showing that the fees were excessive. On this record, we find that appellant has utterly failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the filing and motion were unnecessary or unreasonable in cost, or that the court abused its discretion in allowing these costs to be charged to her under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(1).
2. Jury Fees
The trial court awarded Westlake $150 for jury fees. In her motion to tax, appellant argued that these fees were not warranted because the matter proceeded without a jury. This contention is without merit. Westlake was required to deposit advance jury fees or else it would have waived the right to a jury trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subds. (b), (d)(5).) That the parties subsequently agreed to proceed to a court trial did not result in an automatic refund of those fees. Indeed, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 631.3, quite the contrary occurs, to wit: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when a party to the litigation has deposited jury fees with the judge or clerk and that party waives a jury or obtains a continuance of the trial, or the case is settled, none of the deposit shall be refunded if the court finds there has been insufficient time to notify the jurors that the trial would not proceed at the time set.”
Appellant has not made a specific showing that Westlake requested a return of the deposit of jury fees or that the trial court granted any such request. Moreover, as the parties did not waive a jury until the first day of trial, it was highly unlikely that Westlake would have been entitled to a refund of its deposit. Under these circumstances, appellant has not met her burden of demonstrating the jury fees were unnecessary or unreasonable, or that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the fees to be charged to appellant under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(2).
3. Deposition Costs
The trial court awarded Westlake $1,826 for deposition costs. Appellant argues that Westlake should take nothing for its deposition costs because it “knew or should have known” several days in advance that she would be absent due to Westlake’s failure to verify whether it would provide her with certain discovery items during her deposition.
The authority for awarding deposition costs is Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3). Westlake’s counsel presented a declaration and supporting invoice stating that Westlake incurred $291.20 in deposition costs regarding appellant’s failure to appear at her April 10, 2009 deposition. Counsel further stated that Westlake incurred $1,383.65 for the transcription costs of appellant’s subsequent deposition taken on April 28, 2009. Additionally, counsel described the need to subpoena appellant’s medical records, and supplied invoices regarding the costs ($151) in obtaining these records.
Appellant has not established that the depositions were unnecessary or that the transcription fees were excessive. Accordingly, she has not met her burden of demonstrating the depositions fees were unnecessary or unreasonable in cost, or that the court abused its discretion in allowing the costs to be charged to her under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(3).
4. Service of Process
Appellant challenges the trial court’s award to Westlake of $851 for service of process. Costs for service of process are expressly authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(4).
Appellant insists that the $259 cost to serve a Daly City Police Department detective was “ludicrous” because “sheriff’s deputies and marshals routinely serve process for a quarter of that amount....” She further asserts that the other costs for service of process should have been stricken as the subpoenas were “served and or returnable after [the] time for completion of discovery....”
Appellant, however, has not made any specific showing that the challenged costs were excessive or otherwise outside the scope of discovery. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that appellant has met her burden of demonstrating the service of process fees were unnecessary or unreasonable in cost, or that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the costs to be charged to her under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(4).
5. Photocopies of Exhibits
The trial court awarded Westlake $526 for blow-ups and photocopies of exhibits. The authority for an award of photocopying, exhibit and blowup costs is Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4). (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.)
Appellant insists that the award was in error because Westlake was entitled to costs “only for those exhibits admitted as evidence....” In Benach v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 836, the court rejected a similar argument, explaining that although the prevailing party “did not use the majority of its exhibits at trial, nothing indicates it could have anticipated that they would not be used. An experienced trial judge would recognize that it would be inequitable to deny as allowable costs exhibits any prudent counsel would prepare in advance of trial.” (Id. at p. 856.) This, coupled with the fact that the objector failed to make a specific showing that the photocopying costs were excessive, led the appellate court to conclude that the objector had not “met his burden of demonstrating the particular exhibits were unnecessary or unreasonable in cost, or that the court abused its discretion in allowing the costs to be charged to him under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4). [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 856-857.)
So too here, there is nothing indicating that Westlake could have anticipated what exhibits would ultimately be used at trial. Moreover, appellant has not made a specific showing that the exhibits and blow-up were unnecessary or excessive in cost. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4).
6. Court Reporter Fees
The trial court awarded Westlake $122 for court reporter fees. Costs associated with court reporter fees are expressly allowed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(11). In granting this award, the trial court took judicial notice of the fees Westlake paid to the clerk of the court.
Appellant utterly fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that these costs were unnecessary or unreasonable. On this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the costs to be charged against appellant under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(11).
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed, as is the order denying appellant’s motion to tax costs. Respondent is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: SEPULVEDA, J., RIVERA, J.