Opinion
April 8, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leviss, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by refusing to strike that portion of the plaintiff's supplemental bill of particulars which itemized damages for lost earnings. While a supplemental bill of particulars may not be used to claim a "wholly new category of special damages" (Pearce v. Booth Mem. Hosp., 152 A.D.2d 553, 554) not previously asserted (see, CPLR 3043 [b]), the plaintiff's 1985 bill of particulars and 1987 amended bill of particulars fully set forth the elements supporting her loss of earnings claim. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff was properly permitted to assert a claim for damages based on continuing loss of earnings in her supplemental bill of particulars (see, March v. St. Volodymyr Ukranian Catholic Church, 117 A.D.2d 864; O'Neill v. Schlessinger, 86 A.D.2d 842; cf., Kurnitz v. Croft, 91 A.D.2d 972). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.