Opinion
No. 16-72229
08-28-2019
HAROLDO DAVID PINEDA, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Agency No. A095-773-432 MEMORANDUM On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Haroldo David Pineda, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing Pineda's appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying Pineda's applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition.
We review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA's interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence the agency's factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006).
Vasquez's asylum claim fails because he filed his asylum application outside the one-year deadline, and the record does not compel the conclusion that he established changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse the untimely filing. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)-(5); see Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.").
The BIA did not err in finding that Pineda did not establish membership in a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group, "[t]he applicant must 'establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question'" (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019) (returnees with perceived wealth is not a cognizable social group). Substantial evidence supports the agency's conclusion that Pineda otherwise failed to establish he would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant's "desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground"). Our conclusion is not affected by the differing nexus standards applicable to asylum and withholding of removal claims. Cf. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Zetino v. Holder having drawn no distinction between the standards where there was no nexus at all to a protected ground). Thus, Pineda's withholding of removal claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of CAT relief because Pineda failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that petitioner did not establish the necessary "state action" for CAT relief).
Pineda waived any challenge to the agency's denial of his cancellation of removal claim by omitting it from his opening brief. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.