'"Pine Villey Apts. Ltd. Partnership v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 244 ( 237 SE2d 716) (1977), quoting then 1 Corbin on Contracts 453, 457, § 101. Accord Self v. Smith, 98 Ga. App. 876, 882 ( 107 SE2d 721) (1959) ("A deficiency in a contract caused by indefiniteness . . . is cured by performance."). See 1 Corbin on Contracts § 4.7 (1993).

It is further uncontradicted that plaintiff accepted said proceeds and released the property from the deed to secure debt thereon by quitclaim deeds. It is at least arguable, therefore, that the alleged agreement has been fully performed and that any indefiniteness in its terms has been cured by that performance. See Pine Valley Apartments Limited Partnership v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 244 ( 237 S.E.2d 716). "`The law leans against the destruction of contracts on the ground of uncertainty.' Pierson v. General Plywood Corp., 76 Ga. App. 853, 855 ( 47 S.E.2d 605)."

In such circumstances, the promise to pay a bonus in the future amounts to a promise to change the terms of compensation in the future and, thus, is an unenforceable executory obligation. E. D. Lacey Mills v. Keith, 183 Ga. App. 357, 360 (3) ( 359 S.E.2d 148) (1987). Unlike the circumstances of Steinemann v. Vaughn Co., 169 Ga. App. 573 (1) ( 313 S.E.2d 701) (1984) and Pine Valley Apts. Ltd. Partnership v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242 ( 237 S.E.2d 716) (1977), the original indefiniteness in the arrangement in this case has not been obviated by performance. That performance which would remove the original indefiniteness must itself relate to the contested term of the contract.

Burns v. Dees, 252 Ga.App. 598, 601–602(1)(a), 557 S.E.2d 32 (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted); SeeOCGA § 13–3–2 (“The consent of the parties being essential to a contract, until each has assented to all the terms, there is no binding contract; until assented to, each party may withdraw his bid or proposition.”).Pine Valley Apartments Ltd. P'ship v. First State Bank, 143 Ga.App. 242, 245(2), 237 S.E.2d 716 (1977) (punctuation omitted). Id. (punctuation omitted).

ble because it lacked terms concerning allocation of costs and losses, frequency of payments, manner of calculating proceeds, and time of distribution); Lemming v. Morgan, 228 Ga. App. 763, 764 (1) ( 492 S.E.2d 742) (1997) (oral partnership contract obligating one party to transfer 1/2 interest in real property to other party "if and when" second party's tax problems subsided insufficiently definite to be enforced); Demer v. Capital City Cable, 190 Ga. App. 40, 42-43 (2) ( 378 S.E.2d 162) (1989) (agreement to transfer stock pursuant to an equity participation plan was unenforceable where party conceded that several provisions of plan remained to be determined, including which type and amount of stock party would receive); Sierra Assoc. v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank c., 169 Ga. App. 784, 788-789 (1) ( 315 S.E.2d 250) (1984) (agreement setting out various options for future agreement was unenforceable, because it was merely an agreement to agree in the future on one of the options).Pine Valley Apartments v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 245 ( 237 S.E.2d 716) (1977) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Tattersall Club Corp. v. White, 232 Ga. App. 307, 310 (1) (b) ( 501 S.E.2d 851) (1998) ("part performance of [a] contract is sufficient to validate an otherwise vague and objectionable document, provided that the part performance itself relates to the contested clause") (punctuation and footnote omitted).

Thus, Kerwood is entitled to have a jury determine whether the parties' performance under the variable compensation clause was sufficient to render it enforceable. See Tattersall Club Corp. v. White, 232 Ga. App. 307, 310 (1) (b) ( 501 SE2d 851) (1998) ("part performance of [a] contract is sufficient to validate an otherwise vague and objectionable document, provided that the part performance itself relates to the contested clause") (citation and punctuation omitted); Pine Valley Apts. Ltd. Partnership v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 245 ( 237 SE2d 716) (1977) ("the objection of indefiniteness [to a contract] may be obviated by performance and acceptance of performance") (citation and punctuation omitted). In light of the foregoing, we find that there exist material issues of fact as to (i) whether the parties intended that Kerwood receive 50 percent of the profits for projects booked after he began work for Dinero; (ii) if so, whether the parties intended that Attachment A be used to calculate the profits on each project for the purpose of determining Kerwood's variable compensation; and (iii) whether the previous payment of variable compensation to Kerwood of 50 percent of the profits of a project, calculated using Attachment A, obviated any indefiniteness otherwise existing in the variable compensation clause.

Compare Horner v. Savannah Valley Enterprises, 234 Ga. 371, 373 ( 216 SE2d 113) (1975) (enforceable contract provided for payoff at specified rate per month, including interest with all payments applied first to interest); Griffis Weaver Builders v. Hopson, 230 Ga. 459 ( 197 SE2d 694) (1973) (enforceable contract provided for ten percent deposit with balance over three years in three equal annual installments plus four percent interest). Reeves argues that its tender of the entire purchase price cured the inadequacy of the financing terms, pointing to our decision in Pine Valley Apts. v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242 ( 237 SE2d 716) (1977). That decision is inapplicable for two reasons.

Touche Ross, supra, 162 Ga. App. at 440 (1); see Gram Corp. v. Wilkinson, 210 Ga. App. 680, 681 (1) ( 437 S.E.2d 341) (1993) (parol evidence considered in construing employment contract).Touche Ross, supra, 162 Ga. App. at 440 (2); see Pine Valley Apartments Ltd. v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 245 ( 237 S.E.2d 716) (1977) ("A contract which is originally and inherently too indefinite may later acquire precision and become enforceable by virtue of the subsequent acts, words, or conduct of the parties") (citation and punctuation omitted). White testified he was to market Horseshoe Bend by selling memberships and increasing revenues.

Even when the terms of an agreement are too indefinite to be enforceable, it may later become enforceable "`by virtue of the subsequent acts, words, or conduct of the parties. . . .' [Cit.]" Pine Valley Apts. c. v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 245 ( 237 S.E.2d 716) (1977). Even if the facts of the case would have authorized a different finding by the trial judge, where, as here, the judgment is authorized by the evidence, it will not be set aside on appeal. See Gill v. Catrett, 153 Ga. App. 726 ( 266 S.E.2d 362) (1980).

Moreover, "`[t]he law leans against the destruction of contracts on the ground of uncertainty' . . . `A contract which is originally and inherently too indefinite may later acquire precision and become enforceable by virtue of the subsequent acts, words, or conduct of the parties . . . Thus, the objection of indefiniteness may be obviated by performance and acceptance of performance.'" Pine Valley Apts. v. First State Bank, 143 Ga. App. 242, 245 ( 237 S.E.2d 716) (1977); see also M. W. Buttrill v. Air Conditioning Contractors, 158 Ga. App. 122 ( 279 S.E.2d 296) (1981). In this case, Steinemann sought to enforce the alleged brokerage contract as of the date that the partners of Vaughn Company signed the joint venture agreement proposed by Broadhead and, in a letter dated October 14, 1975, indicated their acceptance of the permanent loan financing arrangement available through the Lincoln Savings Bank. Steinemann had brought forward Broadhead as a joint venturer and had instigated Broadhead's negotiation of the loan commitment.