I. Background We take the following factual recitation from the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court (USC) affirming the denial of Mr. Pinder's petition for post-conviction relief, which, as the USC noted, "is presented in a light favorable to the prosecution, and consistent with the judgment of conviction," Pinder v. State, 367 P.3d 968, 969 n.1 (Utah 2015) (Pinder II): John Pinder owned a sprawling ostrich ranch in Duchesne County.
As for the motion to amend, the court denied it in its order granting summary judgment, but without explaining its reasons for doing so.Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶¶ 4-19. Pinder timely appealed, asserting two sets of claims for relief: (1) He presented newly discovered evidence of witnesses Alvarez and Heaps, apparently to show Pinder's innocence.
Rudolph v. Galetka , 2002 UT 7, ¶ 5, 43 P.3d 467 (per curiam). A “defendant ‘could have’ raised a claim when he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it.” Pinder v. State , 2015 UT 56, ¶ 44, 367 P.3d 968. “And that conclusion holds even when the defendant later discovers additional evidence providing further support for the claim.” Id.
"Thus, the general rule is that the procedural bar applies to claims known to a defendant or his counsel" at the time of the defendant’s appeal. Pinder v. State , 2015 UT 56, ¶ 44, 367 P.3d 968. ¶36 Traditionally, "the general procedural rules applicable to most issues raised on direct appeal did not always pertain to claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness."
A "defendant `could have' raised a claim when he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it." Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 44, 367 P.3d 968. "And that conclusion holds even when the defendant later discovers additional evidence providing further support for the claim." Id.
"Our cases establish that a defendant =could have' raised a claim when he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it." Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 44, 367 P.3d 968. Below, the court of appeals determined that McCloud "could have" raised his ineffectiveness claims on appeal because, at the time, "[b]oth McCloud and Appellate Counsel were aware of these potential claims and the essential factual basis for asserting them."
"Our cases establish that a defendant 'could have' raised a claim when he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it." Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 44, 367 P.3d 968. Below, the court of appeals determined that McCloud "could have" raised his ineffectiveness claims on appeal because, at the time, "[b]oth McCloud and Appellate Counsel were aware of these potential claims and the essential factual basis for asserting them."
We present the facts "in a light favorable to the prosecution, and consistent with the judgment of conviction." Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 5 n.1, 367 P.3d 968. ¶ 3 Victim was Lynch's wife.
And again in 2015, we noted that Hurst's "common law 'exceptions' . . . were repudiated by the legislature in 2008." Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 56, 367 P.3d 968. ¶184 However, the adoption of rule 65C, and our acceptance of the PCRA's narrowed set of exceptions to the procedural bars, precipitated another question: Were the broader, open-ended exceptions that we abolished constitutionally required?
His latest challenge to those convictions—a federal habeas petition—was rejected earlier this year. See Pinder v. Crowther , 803 F. App'x 165, 167 (10th Cir. 2020) (denying John's request for a certificate of appealability to challenge the federal district court's dismissal of his habeas petition); Pinder v. State , 2015 UT 56, ¶¶ 1–3, 367 P.3d 968 (affirming the dismissal of John's petition for relief under the Post–Conviction Remedies Act); Pinder I , 2005 UT 15, ¶¶ 1, 19 n.2, 114 P.3d 551 (affirming, on direct appeal, John's convictions of two counts of aggravated murder and related crimes). ¶7 Starting in 2009, the Pinders brought four actions (the first in the Eighth District Court, the second in federal district court, the third in the Third District Court, and the fourth in the Fourth District Court) to recover the seized property or damages.